



Critical Perspectives on Salafism in the Netherlands

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Abstract

The study establishes how Salafism has been able to influence Dutch Muslim communities in the current period. Through exploratory research, fifteen 'expert' interviews with members from the Dutch Muslim community were conducted. They indicated several shortcomings due to having to endure interventionistic policies that have thus far failed to curb the rise in Salafist recruitment. The analysis also reveals a range of misconceptions currently held regarding the Salafism phenomenon. We argue that statements made by public political figures and the varying definitions used within governmental publications and policy-decisions have caused a disproportionate focus placed upon ordinary Dutch Muslims. As a consequence, it enforces an Islamophobic perspective that diminishes the ability of Dutch Muslims to cooperate with the security services. The process of securitizing Salafism as a whole has led to the Dutch Muslim community to self-censor and self-isolate while experiencing restricted freedom of religion. The process of securitisation reframes the current understanding of Salafism as a greater societal threat.

Keywords: Salafism, Counter-Terrorism, Dutch Muslim community, Salafism categorisation

Introduction

Purist, Political, and Jihadist Salafism

According to conventional academic thinking, Salafism is a reform movement with Sunni Islam in which followers interpret the faith according to how the first three generations enacted it. Salafism is a traditionalist form of Sunni Islam, where the concept of *tawhid* is essential.¹ *Tawhid* means the singularity of God, and the role of a Salafist is to remove any subjectivity whilst interpreting God's commands. By doing so, such a literal interpretation of the Qur'an eliminates the aspect of pluralism within Islam. In recent periods, the concept has gained notoriety due to its associations with radicalisation, extremism and, in some cases, violent extremism among Muslims in Europe today.² This particular stream within the religion aims "to cleanse Islam of its so-called non-Islamic accretions"³ and to live a lifestyle that alludes to a set of ideational morals and values derived from the idea of a *pure* Islam. Nonetheless, Salafism is not a singular perspective. Contemporary social thinking argues that the category should be split into three groups: apolitical/purist Salafists, political Salafists, and jihadi Salafists.⁴ Apolitical or purist Salafism is the stream that profoundly stresses the education of Muslims in terms of living a sober and fundamental lifestyle without the use of violence. Differentiating between the various branches of Salafism is vital to determine the detailed characteristics of this landscape.

Political Salafists are involved in the political realm to mobilise influence in their favour.⁵ They see participation in politics as obligatory, and part of this newly formed doctrine.⁶ Political Salafists aim to involve themselves in the political sphere and are "professionalising" in terms of ideological propagation.⁷ Rather than remaining within Muslim community strongholds, political Salafists understand the importance of social participation in reaching a broader audience to increase its influence. Jihadi Salafism, however, entails the purposeful call to violence, and to take a combative approach. The rapid ascent of jihadi Salafism after 2011 led policy analysts, scholars, and security services to a "Manichean analysis" of Salafism.⁸ The lack of differentiation concerning Salafism accentuates the idea that Salafism is a singular concept, ignoring the many complexities between and within the branches. A recent example of this fear was the apparent discovery of fifty Salafist weekend schools operating within various Mosques which were allegedly teaching children in kindergarten class that non-believers deserved the death penalty.⁹

1 Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–239, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004>.

2 Ibid., 211. The term 'literal interpretation' is based upon Wiktorowicz's (2006) assessment of Salafism's approach concerning the understanding of the Qur'an as the "literal word of God". What is meant by this is that within Salafism, there is no room for personal interpretation concerning the Qur'an. Therefore, Salafists understanding of the Qur'an in their terms is circumventing "human reason" and applying a purely verbatim account.

3 Zoltan Pall and Martijn de Koning, 'Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism', *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 6, no. 1 (2017): 78, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-12341338>.

4 Tahir Abbas, 'Traditional and Modern Muslim Education at the Core and Periphery: Enduring Challenge', *Handbook of Islamic Education* 7 (1 January 2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53620-0_13-1.

5 Beatrice de Graaf, 'The Nexus Between Salafism and Jihadism in the Netherlands', Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 March 2010, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-salafism-and-jihadism-in-the-netherlands/>.

6 Joas Wagemaker, 'Salafism or the Quest for Purity', Fondazione Internazionale Oasis, 2020, <http://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/what-is-salafism-quest-for-purity>.

7 Ineke Roex, 'Should We Be Scared of All Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case Study', *Perspectives on Terrorism (Lowell)* 8, no. 3 (2014): 55.

8 Monica Marks, 'Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current', *Mediterranean Politics* 18 (1 March 2013), 107, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.764657>.

9 Milena Holdert and Andreas Kouwenhoven, 'Grote zorgen Tweede Kamer na onderzoek salafistische moskeescholen [Great Concerns Of The House Of Representatives After Investigation Of Salafist Mosque Schools]', *NOS*, 2019, <https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2301159-grote-zorgen-tweede-kamer-na-onderzoek-salafistische-moskeescholen.html>.

Two unique characteristics that set political and jihadi (radical) Salafism apart from other branches of Islam are its capability to blend seamlessly within society and its informal structure. Salafism's 'invisible' aspect has allowed for its existence to withstand various attempts from security services around the world to deconstruct political and jihadi Salafism. Methods of concealing, such as taking part in political debates or activism to mask political Salafist's religious intentions behind a secular position, have facilitated less well detectable extremist religious motives, therefore lacking the ability to be securitised.¹⁰ Furthermore, informality allows for a sense of communality, generating social capital through the impression and formation of a brotherhood.¹¹ It is through this connected 'brotherhood' that Salafi ideologies can propagate their ideological material. The general lack of integration among Dutch Muslim communities becomes an opportunity in relation to the recruitment process. Recruiters can disseminate their ideology freely where there is a strong sense of a lack of belonging.¹²

Gaps in Knowledge

The characteristics of Salafism marked a noticeable shift in the Netherlands in 2004. A change in ideology that was relatively unheard of and inconspicuous seemingly transformed into a dangerous faction becoming 'on top of the list' for Dutch security services.¹³ The 2004 assassination of Theo Van Gogh by jihadi-Salafist Mohammed Bouyeri indicated a rejection of Dutch norms and values, causing society to respond with outrage. The murder interrupted the progression of a multicultural Netherlands, as anti-Islamic rhetoric among national debates became commonplace, restricting the broader aims of creating and maintaining social cohesion.¹⁴ The permeation of the "West's existential unease" rendered Dutch security services no choice but to partake in vigilant risk management.¹⁵ This meant that the securitisation of radical Islam had become the new normal. It led to various measures being enhanced, such as surveillance, where policies were enforced with the aim of "optimization of existing detection means ... enhancing proactive information-sharing [and] direct action aimed at radicalising juveniles in local risk areas".¹⁶

A report in 2019 from the Verwey-Jonker Institute analysed fifteen years of Dutch literature concerning extreme jihadism and radical Salafism. The report concluded that Salafism as a whole in the Netherlands was under-researched compared to its impact on national security concerns.¹⁷ In determining interventions and effective policies, the categorisation of non-violent Salafist groups as a security threat has led to the entire movement being engulfed into one potential terrorism risk. Over 50 per cent of Dutch Muslims polled by the Social and Cultural Planning Office

10 Martijn de Koning, 'Styles of Salafi Activism: Escaping the Divide', *Material Religion* 8, no. 3 (2012): 400–401, <https://doi.org/10.2752/175183412X13415044209032>.

11 Pall and de Koning, 'Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism', 2017: 76–103.

12 Ibid.

13 Sipco Vellenga and K. de Groot, 'Securitisation, Islamic Chaplaincy, and the Issue of (de)Radicalisation of Muslim Detainees in Dutch Prisons', *Social Compass* 66, no. 2 (2019): 224–237, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768619833313>.

14 Joris van Egmond and Evy van der Sanden, '15 jaar na moord op Theo van Gogh: 'Het trauma bestaat nog steeds' [15 Years After The Murder Of Theo Van Gogh: "The Trauma Still Exists]', *RTL Nieuws*, 2019, <https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/4906676/15-jaar-na-moord-theo-van-gogh>.

15 June Edmunds, 'The "New" Barbarians: Governmentality, Securitisation and Islam in Western Europe', *Contemporary Islam* 6, no. 1 (2012): 71, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-011-0159-6>.

16 Inspectorate of Security and Justice, and Ministry of Security and Justice, 'Evaluation Of The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme To Combat Jihadism.' (The Hague: Inspectorate of Security and Justice, 2017): 43–44, <https://www.inspectie-jenv.nl/Publicaties/rapporten/2017/09/06/evaluation-of-the-netherlands-comprehensive-action-programme-to-combat-jihadism>.

17 Maurits Berger et al., 'Salafism Highlighted in the Netherlands', 15 Years of Salafism Research in the Netherlands, 2019, https://www.verwey-jonker.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/118006_Salafisme_in_Nederland_belichten_WEB.pdf.

in 2015 believed that the West intends to eradicate Islam.¹⁸ However, Huijnk (2018) estimated that 0,5 percent of mainstream Moroccans were known to follow Islam's Salafism branch in 2015.¹⁹ Ultimately, there remains insufficient empirical data to determine a deeper understanding of Salafism's influence and framework.²⁰ The researchers argue that primary data is lacking, and too many studies rely on secondary sources.²¹ The abundance of 'theorising' is overwhelming. The necessity to collect primary data to gain an empirical foundation could lead to more effective political and social policies to counter specific forms of Salafist radicalisation.²²

Securitisation

Pre-emptive security measures, such as the creation of the "Façade Brochure", are the materialisation of anxiety surrounding the perceived invisibility of radical Salafism.²³ Welten and Abbas' previous research shows the perception of Muslim communities in The Hague, Netherlands to consist of hostility and precaution when interacting with security services. The Muslim communities perceive security services to view their community as a national security threat due to the assumed anti-Muslim mentality within the Dutch society. Consequently, the Muslim communities within The Hague have turned inward when dealing with matters of radicalization.²⁴ The aspect of Muslim communities identifying as being securitized can be considered the perfect brewing ground for the *us versus them* mentality. Salafist recruiters see this as a pre-condition in recruiting vulnerable Muslims with identity conflicts. Creating such an atmosphere surrounding pre-emptive policies affecting Muslim communities enforces a sense of dislocation, with results in the negative self-awareness of not belonging or being specifically targeted. Increased affinity with jihadi Salafists' radical actions has proven to be partly the result of communal identity conflicts.²⁵

In the Netherlands, however, excluding interpretations of Salafism as admissible is not constitutionally in line with the law of religious freedom. Political and Jihadi (radical) Salafists can take advantage of this assurance to develop their "organisational ambiguity".²⁶ This ambiguity incites fear and "outlawness" of the invisible influence that Salafism holds over the Muslim communities in the Netherlands.²⁷ This research is based on the perspectives of the Dutch Muslim community on questions relating to the Salafism landscape within the Netherlands. It will also seek answers to a series of open-ended questions: What are the characteristics and profiles of political and jihadi Salafism in the Netherlands? What are the mechanisms behind political and

18 Bart Schuurman, Edwin Bakker, and Quirine Eijkman, 'Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 1 (2018): 103, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1158165>.

19 Willem Huijnk, 'De Religieuze Beleving van Moslims in Nederland [The Religious Experience Of Muslims In The Netherlands]', Diversity and Change in Images. (Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office, 2018), 26, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326149127_De_religieuze_beleving_van_moslims_in_Nederland

20 Bart Schuurman, Edwin Bakker, and Quirine Eijkman, 'Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 1 (2018): 97–115, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1158165>.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, 110.

23 de Koning, 'Styles of Salafi Activism: Escaping the Divide', 2012.

24 Liselotte Welten and Tahir Abbas, "'We Are Already 1-0 behind": Perceptions of Dutch Muslims on Islamophobia, Securitisation, and de-Radicalisation', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 14, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 90–116, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1883714>.

25 Schuurman, Bakker, and Eijkman, 'Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism', 2018: 97–115.

26 Ibid., p99

27 Waqas Tufail and Scott Poynting, 'A Common "Outlawness": Criminalisation of Muslim Minorities in the UK and Australia', *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy* 2 (1 November 2013): 49, <https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcsd.v2i3.125>.

jihadi Salafism's propagation? How successful are they in the propagation of extremist ideologies? Why is this particular extremist ideology a driving force behind successful recruitment?

The study is based on primary research using a grounded theory perspective²⁸ from expert members of the Dutch Muslim community on how the securitisation of Salafism has evolved in line with counter-terrorism, counter-extremism and de-radicalisation policies. The study reveals a structural and nuanced understanding of how the question of Salafism in the Netherlands has become an increasingly discussed phenomenon and the types of threats that ought to give genuine concern to security, intelligence and policing services.

Methodology

In this study, an exploratory factor research approach was used to gain maximum understanding of respondents' generalisations, allowing for a deeper exploration of some social phenomena within the Dutch context. The study was based on qualitative data collected via semi-structured interviews. From the qualitative data, thematic analysis methodology was applied. This entailed the attribution of appropriate codes among subject-based similarities within the interviews.²⁹ A total of nine categories were identified, containing 151 indicators. Participants were selected based upon their positions within the Mosque boards, Islamic organisations, or their established public presence within media.³⁰

The respondents consisted of board members from Turkish, Surinamese and Moroccan Mosques, as well as Islamic organisations, scholars, retired board members, and social workers. The interviews were carried out via phone calls or video calls. The choice of which communication and when the interviews would take place was left to the respondents to decide.³¹ The interviews lasted between 40 minutes up to two hours.

To guarantee ethical dependability, each respondent was ensured that they would remain anonymous via pseudonyms throughout the research to protect their identity. Verbal consent of participation was given to the researchers before an interview took place, after which each respondent was asked for permission to record the interviews for transcription purposes. Once recording, the researchers would inform the respondents about the aim of the study as well as their right not to answer any question they did not feel comfortable with. Due to the sensitivity surrounding the topic of Salafism, the researchers chose not to mention this term unless the respondent initially brought it up. Instead, to avoid negative or biased answers towards the research topic, questions used terms such as 'extreme ideologies', 'radicalisation', and 'extremism' to circumvent the highly polarising expression. This was not done to be untruthful, but rather to gain insights that relate to the same terminology without inciting respondents to have an aversive emotional reaction behind the intentions of the research itself. Throughout the paper, radical Salafism will be referred to as the term that includes both the political and jihadi

28 Kathy Charmaz, 'Grounded Theory', in *Rethinking Methods in Psychology*, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, Inc, 1996), 27–49. Grounded theory entails the formation of abstract theories based most frequently upon qualitative data involving personal experiences. From data such as interviews, where personal perceptions, opinions and experiences are given, a set of codes are derived. These codes lead to inductively based theories that explain the researched social phenomena. (See Appendix II for codebook)

29 Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun, 'Thematic Analysis', *The Journal of Positive Psychology* 12 (8 December 2016): 1–2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2016.1262613>.

30 See Appendix I for list of respondents.

31 William C. Adams, 'Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews', in *Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation*, ed. Kathryn E. Newcomer, Harry P. Hatry, and Joseph S. Wholey (Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), 492–505, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119171386.ch19>.

branch. Additionally, fourteen of the fifteen respondents were male. Therefore, the interview data does contain a male based perspective. This may be since male board members of Islamic organisations and Mosques are more prevalent in those social domains.

Results and Analysis

Salafism Influence

“When will it be my turn, as the non-Salafst?”

The specific definitions applied within any policy determine how these definitions will be perceived and how the subsequent consequences can be assessed. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in charge of protecting national security and the Dutch National Coordinator of Counter-Terrorism (NCTV) tasked with counter-terrorism efforts define Salafism as a spectrum of fundamentalism within the Sunni branch of Islam.³² This definition was clearly stated within the most recent AIVD publication from 2019.³³ However, several respondents deem this definition to be problematic. Within the category Salafism Influence, the indicator ‘Incorrect definition used’ ranked the highest out of forty total indicators. The aspect of characterising Salafism’s entire spectrum as problematic led many individuals within the Muslim community to be distinctly aware of their projected religiosity levels. Respondent Adam stated,

Salafism is often used by the government as a synonym for strict Islam. And it also begs the question of ‘Okay, well, the government is now chasing Salafism. [...] But when will it be my turn, as the non-Salafist? Or will I perhaps soon also be counted among the Salafists?’³⁴

The questionable linking of the idea of radical Salafism with stricter interpretations of Islam *per se* propelled the sentiment of hypervigilance among members within the Muslim communities. A total of thirteen out of fifteen respondents indicated an evident lack of understanding of the Salafist phenomenon within Dutch politics. Having to moderate behaviour due to “being terrified to death that [Muslim individuals] might be compared or seen as an extremist”³⁵ had led to the perception that “the goal [of the government] is not to allow Islam to be an accepted religion in the Netherlands”.³⁶ The Dutch Muslim community became engulfed by the fear that they, as a whole, could be targeted due to an unclear differentiation between fundamental or strict Islam. The stereotyping of Islam through mediums such as media, government rhetoric, and education create the view that “religiosity is becoming heavily interrogated.”³⁷ Any religious affiliation shown towards a stricter form of Islam was deemed as a risk since,

Man is afraid to say anything that may be used against them. Then we resort to self-censorship. It is very common that Muslim leaders don’t dare to say everything [...] otherwise

32 Dutch Ministry of Justice and Safety, ‘Definities gebruikt in het Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland [Definitions used in the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands]’, Government Website (Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 25 July 2019), <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/dtn/definities-gebruikt-in-het-dtn>.

33 Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, ‘CTIVD-rapport nr. 67 over gegevensverstrekking over Cornelius Haga Lyceum [CTIVD report No. 67 on data provision on Cornelius Haga Lyceum]’, Government Website (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 6 December 2019), <https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/12/06/ctivd-rapport-nr.-67-over-gegevensverstrekking-aangaande-cornelius-haga-lyceum>.

34 Adam, Interview.

35 Selim, Interview.

36 Nusrat, Interview.

37 Mathew Guest et al., ‘Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges’, *SOAS University of London*, 2020, 41.

*you will be punished!*³⁸

Sara considered the use of the term ‘Salafism’ within policy formation as a “catch-all term”³⁹, where the branches’ internal differentiations had not been elaborated upon, thus leading to heightened Islamophobia (“indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims”).⁴⁰ When discussing the “Taskforce Problematic Behaviour & Unwanted Foreign Funding”,⁴¹ a group directed explicitly at the disturbance created by Salafism, one respondent described it as “broad-based” and required a more “specific policy framework”.⁴² A particular point voiced on the Taskforce was that Salafism included a branch of purist Salafists that denounces jihadi Salafi acts. While any form of religious fundamentalism could lead to extremism, it was not the assumption that such extremism would always take place.⁴³ However, Salafism’s limited generalisation may be due to the Dutch security services’ interpretation that Salafism as a whole is a risk to democratic peace and order.⁴⁴

Olsson (2020) claims that the generalisability of Salafism only pertains to the creed that is followed and not the pragmatics of dealing with daily life. Salafism, as used within academia and policy formation, has had extensive consequences, such as automatically implying negative connotations by using the term “extremism”⁴⁵, which suggest an inevitable “authoritarian and anti-democratic [...] ideal”.⁴⁶ The indicator ‘Policymakers are not well informed’ ranked second highest out of 30 total indicators within the category ‘Counter-Salafism Policies’. As Cesari (2009) has previously asserted, the definitions applied within policies originated more so from the bureaucratic realm “than objective facts concerning movements or groups”.⁴⁷ Jack described a conversation he had with an employee at the NCTV concerning the use of the term Salafism:

NCTV Employee: “Yeah, but we’re not stigmatising the community as a whole.”

Jack: “You do, and you do it out of the best of your intentions because you want to include the rest of the mosque communities and Muslim communities in your attack against Salafism. But because you cannot define Salafism, you never know [how it will affect the Muslim community], [...] and in the end, your approach does stigmatise the community, perhaps not because of what you say, but because of what politicians make of what you’re saying.”

And the guy from the NCTV was actually complaining that he wrote this [differences of the branches within Salafism] in that piece for that day, and then there was a parliamentary debate about it. And then he was thinking, “Why did I do so much work? Only to hear the politicians basically constructing a really different story?”

*I think how Salafism is used, the term Salafism is used at the moment, definitely in politics and in policy circles, Salafism is basically synonymous for unacceptable Islam now. And that is unacceptable.*⁴⁸

38 Hosmut, Interview.

39 Sara, Interview.

40 Erik Bleich, ‘What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept’, *American Behavioral Scientist* 55 (14 November 2011): p. 1582, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211409387>.

41 Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, and Employment, ‘Integrale aanpak Problematisch gedrag en ongewenste buitenlandse financiering van maatschappelijke en religieuze instellingen [Integrated Approach To Problematic Behaviour And Unwanted Foreign Financing Of Social And Religious Institutions]’, (11 February 2019), <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/02/11/kamerbrief-integrale-aanpak-problematisch-gedrag-en-ongewenste-buitenlandse-financiering-van-maatschappelijke-en-religieuze-instellingen>.

42 Sara, Interview.

43 Olsson, “‘True, Masculine Men Are Not Like Women!”, 2020: 118.

44 Sara, Interview.

45 Olsson, “‘True, Masculine Men Are Not Like Women!”, 2020: 118.

46 Ibid, 5.

47 Jocelyne Cesari, *The Securitisation of Islam in Europe*, vol. 15 (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies-CEPS, 2009), 4.

48 Jack, Interview.

The conversation above demonstrates the bureaucratic hurdles that prevented the progress of overcoming the psyche of Islamophobia. The limited interpretation of the Salafism phenomenon had led to the distortion of the public's understanding.

Scattered Landscape

The notion of radical Salafist 'hotspots' present in larger cities may be a phenomenon no longer applicable to current times. The Dutch Parliament has speculated that most radical Salafists were located in mosques financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states through their foreign funding investigation.⁴⁹ These mosques are concentrated in the larger metropolitan areas of the Netherlands, such as The Hague, Amsterdam, Tilburg, Rotterdam and Eindhoven.⁵⁰ However, many of the respondents did not agree with this speculation. Although there was a consensus among respondents that there were indeed hotspots present in larger metropolitan areas due to larger populations,⁵¹ they also indicated a heavier presence among smaller cities throughout the Netherlands. From the category 'Radical Salafism Influence', the indicator 'Hotspots present in both smaller and larger cities' scored equally to 'Hotspots present only in larger cities'. Five respondents noted that the presence of radical Salafists within smaller cities was motivated by strategic reasons,

[B]ecause they [Salafists] can walk around freely there. Why? [...] If we look at Islamic movements: extremists who are very radical. They are able to carry out certain acts such as putting a bomb together there; you name it. Most are on the [country's] borders. But this is in order not to be noticed anymore, people like that now live throughout the Netherlands, scattered.⁵²

Furthermore, places such as Geleen, Oss, Delft, Leidschendam, Roermond, Maastricht, Ede, Den Bosch, Zeeland, and Nijmegen had been named by interviewees as other locations where radical Salafists have settled.⁵³ Emre contemplated that the reasoning for hotspots being located in scattered locations was that,

They don't want to be visible either, a little 'undercover' and then suddenly appear. That is probably a strategy. I do not know. Some don't really want to stand out. They want to appear [that they] live a normal life. And they meet somewhere at a club [in larger cities]. And then they separate without being visible.⁵⁴

According to Emre, the reasoning that radical Salafists are living in isolated areas to remain undetectable is well-known. The lack of 'supervision' of other members from the Dutch Muslim community in smaller cities enabled a type of invisibility. The supervision mentioned by Emre was part of what he considered to be social and supervisory control within his Mosque and among the wider local Muslim community. Throughout the data analysis, six respondents indicated

49 '(On)zichtbare invloed verslag parlementaire ondervragingscommissie naar ongewenste beïnvloeding uit onvrije landen [(In) visible influence report of the parliamentary interrogation committee on undesirable influence from unfree countries]', Pub. L. No. 35228, § Parliamentary questioning unwanted influence from unfree countries, 240 (2020), https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/eindverslag_pocob.pdf.

50 Andreas Kouwenhoven, 'Geheime lijsten financiering moskeeën onthuld [Secret Funding Lists For Mosques Revealed]', NOS, 2018, <https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2228686-geheime-lijsten-financiering-moskeeën-onthuld.html>.

51 Dilan, Interview.

52 Ibid.

53 Sara, Interview; Hosmut, Interview.

54 Emre, Interview.

the aspect of social control and the Muslim communities' social capital as a deterrent for radical Salafists to settle within large cities.⁵⁵ From the six respondents, five with a Turkish cultural background described social control as a tool in which efforts of recruitments or sentiments against the Mosques' norms and values were dissuaded. Hosmut suggested that,

[T]he difference is that the Turkish community has a very low number of extremist individuals. That is no coincidence. There is a hierarchy and authority. You cannot just speak at a Turkish organisation. If I call today and I see a flyer [promoting Salafism] and I call people [to partake] then that [lecture or event] doesn't go through. [...]. If they [Salafists] sometimes want to organize a lecture or program somewhere, then it is simply sabotaged.⁵⁶

Hosmut speculated that social awareness combined with the shared cultural heritage among Mosque attendees has allowed the Turkish community to foster a strong cultural identity. An identity in which the Turkish youth “are consciously part of a club and continue to be part of Turkish society [...] and that they should take the Turkish community as an example of identity and not denigrate it”.⁵⁷ Siisiäinen's (2003) note on Pierre Bourdieu's social capital concepts substantiates Hosmut's assumptions seamlessly.⁵⁸ The three dimensions of Bourdieu capital theory consist of economic, cultural and social elements. Social and cultural capital are combined with the struggle of power, social resources, and conflicts, such as Islamophobia and institutional discrimination in this case. Therefore, the Turkish community's high cultural resources levels diminished Dutch Turkish youth's vulnerability and tendency to look for social capital elsewhere. Research by the Dutch police academy in 2008 highlighted the fact that most Salafists had a Moroccan background rather than Turkish.⁵⁹ Hosmut's statement is in line with the report, which notes that a lower concentration of Turkish Salafists in the larger metropolitan areas was evident.⁶⁰ The higher number of Moroccan Salafists in larger urban areas resulted from having no far-reaching Moroccan umbrella organisation, such as the Diyanet for the Dutch Turkish communities. Instead, Moroccan mosques were seen by many respondents as an isolated “island where anything and everything happens.”⁶¹ Research by Bakker (2006) concludes that thirteen out of eighteen jihadi networks researched in the Netherlands consisted of individuals originally from Morocco or Algeria, with the former having the highest concentration of jihadi individuals (59 individuals from Morocco and 55 individuals from Algeria).⁶² Hosmut regards the cultural and social capital of the Turkish Muslim community as a safeguard against extremism.

According to all fifteen respondents, the need to accumulate cultural and social capital remains a defining factor in identity formation. Simultaneously, Siisiäinen (2003) alludes that Bourdieu's combination of power and struggle from external factors, such as the threat of securitisation, enforce the “legitimation” of the symbolic social capital of radical Salafist recruiters.⁶³ Radical Salafist recruiters can exploit perceived and actual discrimination and Islamophobia, advancing their

55 Berat; Jack; Adam; Hosmut; Sara; Murat Interviews.

56 Hosmut, Interview.

57 Emre, Interview.

58 Martti Siisiäinen, 'Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam', *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 40 (1 January 2003): 183–204.

59 NCTV and Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Salafisme in Nederland: Een voorbijgaand fenomeen of een blijvende factor van belang? [Salafism in the Netherlands: A passing phenomenon or a lasting factor of importance?]* (Politieacademie, 2008), <https://www.politieacademie.nl/kennisenonderzoek/kennis/mediatheek/PDF/68871.pdf>.

60 Ibid.

61 Hosmut, Interview.

62 Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad ; an Exploratory Study*, Clingendael Security Paper, No. 2, 32, (Den Haag: Clingendael, 2006).

63 Martti Siisiäinen, 'Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam', *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 40 (1 January 2003): 182,

recruitment while propagating their extremist propaganda.⁶⁴ For Muslim communities to thrive without the influence of extremist ideologies, the aspect of individual identity and a stable social capital should not be a vulnerability exploited by recruiters. Alternatively, it is used as an asset within most Turkish communities to assure “that the youth don’t go against the grain and revolt.”⁶⁵

Virtual Domination

The online presence of jihadi propaganda has been extensively studied, yet the internet remains a method of information dissemination where surveillance is challenging.⁶⁶ Throughout the interviews, a prominent characteristic mentioned by interviewees was radical Salafism’s ability to dominate the online sphere.⁶⁷ From the category ‘Radical Salafism influence’, the indicator ‘Active/ Dominate Internet presence’ scored third-highest, thus demonstrating the supposed large scale of radical Salafism’s online status in the Netherlands. Research by Baffa et al. (2019) notes that Generation Z (individuals born between 1997 and 2012) youths are more susceptible to online self-recruitment than face-to-face recruitment.⁶⁸ The internet allows for rapid information absorption, where “experimenting with the ethical sensorium” becomes a type of “devotional pleasure”, which in turn increases youth sensitivity.⁶⁹ The ethical sensorium referred to the cognitive malleability of the younger generation that is still in the process of mental development. Thus, understandings of ethical limits are naturally lower among Generation Z due to their affinity for such ‘experimentation’.⁷⁰ Consequently, Baffa et al. (2019) argue that the method of information uptake linked with the sensationalism inherent in such propaganda could entice further radical Salafism publicity. Within the landscape of the Netherlands, Sara echoes the concern of radical Salafism sources being readily available to the youth,

*[Salafists] are also very fast on the internet, they live streamed first, they used chat-rooms first, e-mails, etc., [...] If Muslim youths are looking for information about Islam, they actually end up automatically seeing Salafist sources online first.*⁷¹

Moreover, how online disinformation is carried out offers low-risk detection and high-reward in terms of recruitment efficiency.⁷² According to Ratelle and Sokirianskaia (2018), recruiters reach a wide-scaled audience and use the internet as a “reinforcer” of the scattered/informal radical Salafist network.⁷³ The effort needed to post propagandistic content is far less than active recruitment within Muslim communities themselves. Dilan concurred with this notion and stated that

You don’t need to do much for that. If you’re a good speaker, then you just need a camera

64 Ibid.

65 Adil, Interview..

66 Ines von Behr et al., ‘Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism’, *RAND Corporation*, 5 November 2013, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html.

67 Berat; Jack; Adam; Adil; Ipek; Hosmut; Sara; Murat; Talha; Emre; Selim; Nusrat Interviews.

68 Richard C. Baffa et al., ‘Defining and Understanding the Next Generation of Salafi-Jihadis’, *RAND Corporation*, 22 August 2019, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE341.html>.

69 Charles Hirschkind, ‘EXPERIMENTS IN DEVOTION ONLINE: THE YOUTUBE KHUṬBA’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 1 (2012): 16.

70 Richard C. Baffa et al., ‘Defining and Understanding the Next Generation of Salafi-Jihadis’, *RAND Corporation*, 22 August 2019, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE341.html>.

71 Sara, Interview.

72 Jean-François Ratelle and Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, ‘Online Militant Jihadist Propaganda Targeting Russian-Speaking Audiences and the Russian Response’, *Religion and Violence in Russia* (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018), 123, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22453.9>.

73 Ibid, 121.

and sketches where you can show “Hey this is what happened” or “Look at what they [the West] did!” [...] Virtually it [recruiting] happens much faster.⁷⁴

Dilan noted the availability of propaganda coupled with a lack of Islamic knowledge increased the propensity of an individual to convert to extremist ideologies. The indicator ‘Identity issues rather than religion’ scored highest in the category of ‘Recruitment’. This indicator represented individuals who were more inclined to seek extreme ideologies due to social dissatisfaction than personal religious qualms.

Ideology vs Inequality

Another critical characteristic discovered within this research was radical Salafism’s perception as not being a solely religiously motivated faction campaigning for social change but rather a social injustice faction preaching for retribution. Twelve respondents within the study viewed jihadi Salafists as individuals with little knowledge of the Qur’an, who simply abused Islam as a “PR marketing” tool.⁷⁵ According to Bakker (2006), 53 out of 108 recruited individuals had minimal Quranic knowledge.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the number of low-faith individuals recruited for radical Salafism during their youth was twice as large as the group of individuals who were highly religious before recruitment.⁷⁷ Linking the aspect of radical Salafism to the Islamic creed was undoubtedly a fundamental part of the Salafism movement; however, Adil strongly iterated that the absence of Quranic knowledge should not be ignored. According to Adil, moving into radical Salafism is a process where “recognition and alienation do not take place on a theological level”, but rather on the level of social inequality.⁷⁸ Adil assumes that the motivation for an individual to radicalise into radical Salafism is based more strongly upon the social injustices they experience within a highly discriminatory society compared to the desires to adhere to an authentic form of Islam. From the interview data, the indicator ‘Focused on social dissatisfaction rather than religious guidance’ scored second highest in the category of ‘Radical Salafism Influence’. Omer agrees with this notion, and stated that,

99.9 percent of [radicalised] young people have no knowledge and cannot read the Qur’an, and do not know the traditions well. [...]. They have a life that doesn’t mean anything, that is nothing. If you have no knowledge, I can easily talk you into my knowledge because you have no knowledge of yourself. Brainwash them.⁷⁹

The experience of Salafism within the Dutch context, however, differs from Salafism as found within Muslim countries.⁸⁰ As reported by Byman (2013), the support for Jihadi Salafism in Nigeria (50 percent) was much higher than that in Egypt (20 percent).⁸¹ The grievances in one country varied from the other. Radical Salafists adjust their motives behind their calls to violence. Those who turn to radical Salafism within a secular state such as the Netherlands are radicalising in a social environment where the emphasis upon religious importance is low. The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistic (CBS) showed that from 2010 to 2018, the percentage of the Dutch population

⁷⁴ Dilan, Interview.

⁷⁵ Daniel, Interview.

⁷⁶ Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad ; an Exploratory Study*, Clingendael Security Paper, No. 2 (Den Haag: Clingendael, 2006), 46.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 46.

⁷⁸ Adil, Interview.

⁷⁹ Omer, Interview.

⁸⁰ Daniel Byman, ‘Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36 (1 May 2013), 358, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.775417>.

⁸¹ Ibid, 360..

who were non-religious increased from 45 percent to 53 percent.⁸² The rise of non-religious individuals within the Netherlands demonstrated the confrontation Muslim communities are exposed to in a growing secular environment. The number of Muslims practising Islam did not change during 2010-2018.⁸³ This indicates that young Dutch Muslims were being brought up in an increasingly laic society while Islamophobia was becoming unexceptional.⁸⁴ Vellenga (2018) highlights the “realistic threat” of young Muslim individuals turning to Jihadism as a result of Islamophobia.⁸⁵ Hosmut believes successful interpersonal relationships between radical Salafists and prospective recruited individuals are founded upon the structural and ideological ‘push’ factors of social discrimination caused by Islamophobia.

[B]ecause it is very difficult for Muslims to break into higher social classes, they always remain in the lower class. And then is it a coincidence that the lower social class is suffering from extremism? It doesn't make sense. That's actually the problem of how you [academia, politicians, etc.] think about it.[...] If you look at countries where they just accept Muslims and are also just part of daily life, then you see that they quickly integrate themselves and develop as ordinary citizens of that country. If you keep knocking them down like “know your place”, then you very easily get that lower social classes to generate extremism. No shit?!⁸⁶

The account by Hosmut did not differ radically from others. Berat described a situation in which he was called via telephone by recruiters.⁸⁷ Berat explained that the recruiters pushed the rhetoric of political and social injustice, and as soon as Berat started to ask ideological questions, the recruiters were dazed and frustrated. He described the recruiters as “giving up”⁸⁸ as soon as he challenged their religious reasoning. Berat raising religious queries depicted an emotionality and religious culpability present among radical Salafist recruiters. Instead, the conversation focused upon the experiences of feeling rejected by mainstream society and how that was enough justification to radicalise. Another respondent, Ipek, stated that he would immediately recognise a Salafist as soon as he would accost them about their ideological beliefs.⁸⁹ Various respondents believed that the generally held view that portrayed radical Salafism as a religious stronghold was more of a veil than a genuine characteristic.

“Listen, I am your bro”

After 9/11, the ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT) emerged as the new focus of policy formations worldwide.⁹⁰ The motivation to eradicate Islamic extremism had become prevalent. This impetus led to the “reinforcing [of] stigmatisation symptomatic” to the failure of the conflict against Islamic terrorism.⁹¹ Furthermore, according to a study by Sides and Gross (2013), the aspect of “group-centrism”⁹² within counter-terrorism policies has caused American-Muslims to be vilified more

82 CBS Statline, ‘StatLine - Religieuze betrokkenheid; persoonskenmerken [Religious affiliation; personal characteristics]’, accessed 9 December 2020, <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/82904NED/table?ts=1607526382825>.

83 Ibid.

84 Sipco Vellenga, ‘Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands: Concepts, Developments, and Backdrops’, *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 33, no. 2 (4 May 2018): 175–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2018.1469257>.

85 Ibid, 179.

86 Hosmut, Interview.

87 Berat, Interview.

88 Ibid.

89 Ipek, Interview.

90 Robert Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’, *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41, no. 1 (2008): 31–35.

91 Ibid, 33.

92 John Sides and Kimberly Gross, ‘Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror’, *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 3

than any other ethnic group present within the US. This created a dialectic between policies surrounding the GWOT concept and the perception of ethnic minorities as a whole.⁹³ Policy-labelling had propelled the American-Muslim communities into a negative light while their social position had been undermined.

Radical Salafism recruitment within the Netherlands has various pathways, as indicated above. However, according to Adil, the primary method used to entice recruitments was through the manipulation of negative imagery, such as social discrimination present within Dutch society. Adil described the process where,

You [Dutch society] have made it so that young people have given up hope because they are discriminated against everywhere, are thrown out everywhere, including by their employers. And those are also points that they [recruiters] pick up like “Listen, I am your brother. I can find work for you. Courier work.” The second phase is then “I’ll pay your debts. And then you will no longer run into problems.” And then that loyalty starts to come from “hey he’s helping me, he’s my brother” And he [young boy] sees him [recruiter] praying a lot too. It is a process of months. But in the end they are done. And then they [recruiters] say “listen, can you do that for me?” Those kind of things. [...] They [young boys] are unsure every day about whether or not they belong in the country in which they live, where they were raised, where they learned to ride a bicycle, and that has a very strong impact on them. They [recruiters] use that.⁹⁴

The feature of making prospective recruits feel as though they belonged to a group that did not discriminate against them was of high value. According to the data, the indicator ‘Social exclusion issues’ scored second highest in recruitment methods. Alongside social discrimination, the second aspect that had a high impact on recruitment success was social bonds or kinship. Bakker (2006) notes that from a sample of 242 jihadis, more than 35 percent of recruitment occurred through social ties of friendships.⁹⁵ This percentage indicated that the affiliation of ‘brotherhood’ drew in large numbers of recruitments that joined due to interpersonal relationships with the recruiters. Additionally, several respondents confirm this implication, one being Dilan. Dilan described how ties of friendship led to stronger sentiments of empathy towards jihadi Salafists,

But I do know about certain guys my age, I talk to those guys [recruited individuals] sometimes. I have heard from them that they are so bound by brotherhood because there is nowhere for them to go.[...] They [recruiters] know exactly what the young people want. And at a certain point that [friendships] becomes such an attraction for the young people that they are there [at the houses of recruiters] very often.⁹⁶

Given the wider context of social discrimination, recruiters relied on interpersonal relationships as a tool to manipulate a sense of ‘belonging’. Belongingness was scored fourth out of the fourteen indicators in the category ‘Recruitment’. Research by Sageman (2004) concluded that from a sample of 172 individuals, 150 joined jihadist networks due to social bonds.⁹⁷ The score of belongingness from the fifteen interviews coupled with the score of the indicator ‘Social dissatisfaction rather than religion’ in the category ‘Radical Salafism influence’ explained the nature of recruitment and the reasoning behind fostering heightened kinship senses. Furthermore,

(2013): 583, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000388>.

93 Ibid, 583–98.

94 Adil, Interview.

95 Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad ; an Exploratory Study*, Clingendael Security Paper, No. 2, 42, (Den Haag: Clingendael, 2006).

96 Dilan, Interview.

97 Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, UNITED STATES: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 111, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kb/detail.action?docID=3441870>.

the “bottom-up” process noted by Sageman (2004) depicts a model in which young individuals, who felt rejected by mainstream society, were searching for friendships elsewhere.⁹⁸ Radical Salafists would view the void of bonds as the perfect recruitment pool, where the perception of transparency and meeting by ‘chance’ was crucial.

Another scholar supporting the concept of transparency among radical Salafists is de Koning (2013). De Koning (2013) claims that transparency methods, such as civil protests, are a tool used commonly by political Salafists.⁹⁹ For political Salafists to engage in public activism and recruitment, the aspect of appearing approachable and visible is a calculated means to an end. The necessity to blend in with society added a layer of protection in which “state authorities [...] find it more difficult to control them as they are less recognisable.”¹⁰⁰ Dilan stressed that the development of radical Salafist recruiters’ ability to blend into society was remarkable, so much so that “it was so unrecognisable because that person was talking to me in a social way.”¹⁰¹ Nusrat explained that during *Jumma* prayers,

*When they [Salafists] come you will not notice it at all. They come, they pray and they are gone. Most of the people who come to the Mosque don't stay. If 200 people come to the Mosque, it is not that 200 people are talking to each other. After the prayer, 80 percent already have their shoes on and leave. That's the reality ... They somehow don't exist within the mainstream groups and visibility that we know. That's why they don't 'exist'. Maybe there's one next to me during prayer time, but I don't know. I wouldn't know because their behaviour towards me is just normal.*¹⁰²

To maintain the façade, Nusrat perceives that radical Salafists appear transparent and profess to be a part of society. According to the interviewees, the pretence facilitated radical Salafists’ movement, network meetings, and recruitment efforts.

Although the concept of transparency was a critical factor in remaining hidden from security services, one respondent, Adil, noted that it was the aspect of transparency that made political and jihadi Salafists easily recognisable to most of the Muslim community. Adil stated that individuals who had radicalised seem indistinguishable to security services yet were easily identifiable for his community. Moreover, Adil described radical Salafist recruiters as

*[U]seless people, unemployed, and have a very simplistic idea of Islam. These are the people who are in the mosque because they have no work. [...] A recruiter from Zoetermeer was an unemployed good-for-nothing. He could get all those guys to follow him because he spoke some Arabic, he could chat a little. That's how he made his group. He had never worked a day in his life. In Manchester, they [recruiters] were also unemployed and you name it.*¹⁰³

Several respondents disputed Adil’s initial assumption. The interview data indicated that the indicator ‘Invisible to Whole Society’ scored fifteen points more than the ‘Muslim Community is Aware of Radical Salafism Presence’ indicator, which means that the frequency of respondents unable to identify radical Salafists was higher than respondents who were able to recognise radical Salafists within their community. Therefore, transparency and belongingness seemed more effective and prevalent than initially assumed by Adil. However, the data did not discredit

98 Ibid, 110.

99 de Koning, ‘Styles of Salafi Activism: Escaping the Divide’, 2012: 400–401.

100 Ibid, 401.

101 Dilan, Interview.

102 Nusrat, Interview.

103 Adil, Interview.

Adil's claim of political and jihadi Salafists' presumed lower social status within the Muslim community. The indicator 'Individual with Low Social Status' from the category 'Radical Salafism Influence' scored comparatively higher than both indicators mentioned previously. All thirteen respondents corroborated the interpretation of radical Salafists as having a lower social status than mainstream Muslims within Dutch society.

Government Missteps

Symptomatic Treatment: The Post-Crime Logic

To create a society free of extremist ideologies, avoiding conflicting interpretations of enduring interventions should be at the centre of any policy discourse. The focus of enduring interventions by the "Taskforce Problematic Behaviour & Unwanted Foreign Funding" is currently primarily based on the financial hampering of Salafism recruitment efforts, and the actions that hinder democratic freedoms are deterred.¹⁰⁴ The general meeting of the House of Representatives of the States General concerning intergenerational rights in 2016 accepted eight different policy responses to the strategy against Salafism.¹⁰⁵ They are:

- Compiling a public list of active Salafist organisations;
- Giving unfree countries a clear message to stop financing Salafism in the Netherlands;
- Banning Salafists in asylum centres;
- Barring of any government relations with known Salafist institutions;
- Halting Salafist preachers from entering the Netherlands;
- Stopping any foreign investments for Mosques from Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar;
- Performing research to discover which Salafist organisations conflict with the public ordinance;
- Forbidding employees of the Defence organisation to adhere to any form of Salafism whatsoever.¹⁰⁶

Although these policies are at the discretion of varying local municipalities, no specific policies concerning the Muslim communities' local involvement to prevent political or jihadi Salafism had been mentioned. Noticeably, the application of a post-crime logic is present within the Taskforce policies. Taking actions in terms of policy formation, such as the hampering of funding, only occurs after establishing a risk's presence.¹⁰⁷ This is a highly problematic strategy. In creating policies with a post-crime logic, the probability of radicalisation remaining an imminent security threat increases.

Radical Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of its impact within the Netherlands,¹⁰⁸ but the security services should not treat it as such. There are currently policies in place to prevent radicalisation as a general phenomenon. They are collectively known as the "Comprehensive Action Program To Combat Jihadis".¹⁰⁹ They were created based on a pre-crime approach yet

104 Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, and Employment, 'Integrated Approach To Problematic Behaviour And Unwanted Foreign Financing Of Social And Religious Institutions', 2019.

105 'Overheidsbrief; Concrete benadering van het salafisme - Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving KST2961439 [Government letter; Concrete approach to Salafism - Fundamental rights in a multiform society KST2961439]', Pub. L. No. KST2961439, § Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment; Dutch Ministry of Justice and Safety (2016), <https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk23ir9rwcwr#p1>.

106 Ibid.

107 Lucia Zedner, 'Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?', *Theoretical Criminology* 11, no. 2 (1 May 2007): 261–81, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480607075851>.

108 Berger et al., 'Salafism Highlighted in the Netherlands', 2019.

109 Inspectorate of Security and Justice & Ministry of Security and Justice, 'Evaluation Of The Netherlands Comprehensive

excluded any mention of radical Salafism prevention. Consequently, no policies created with a pre-crime logic directed towards radical Salafism had been presented. Nevertheless, with a noticeable increase in concern surrounding radical Salafism in the Netherlands, one would think the same pre-crime logic of the Action Program is applied. According to Adil, by overlooking a pre-crime rationalisation approach towards radical Salafism, the security services were merely addressing the “symptoms”.¹¹⁰ For radical Salafism to be a threat of the past, a pre-crime securitisation process must take place in policy decision-making. Zedner (2007) describes the lack of pre-crime logic of policies as a “path not taken”¹¹¹ due to lacking “sources of intellectual renewal” that prohibit tackling the core of the threats.¹¹² The need to create policies that include the Muslim communities remains of vital informative importance.

“A Mayor visits now and again”

On the whole, the perceptions of pre-emptive de-radicalisation policies and policies regarding radical Salafism were considered ineffective according to the Dutch Muslim communities.¹¹³ Daniel stated,

*This [Salafism] is just a current that is growing very fast and we stand by and we simply stare at it. So the only thing we do about it is that a mayor pays a visit now and then. Honestly, I think that not enough is being done or happening.*¹¹⁴

Daniel referred to the policy “Cooperation with the Muslim community”¹¹⁵, where the municipality introduced quarterly meetings. More than half of the respondents referred to this policy as a “waste of time” since the meetings were “kept a bit superficial because [the cooperation policy] did not yield anything”.¹¹⁶ Ten respondents explained the lack of effective results as an absence of commitment from the security services to implement policies, including cooperation with Muslim communities.¹¹⁷ Ipek described a case where government officials would simply meet with board members once an incident occurred and only then ask for information rather than collaboration. Ipek saw it as a type of evidence retrieval, where,

*They were not conversations on an equal footing. [...]. But those conversations happened without any recording or official confirmations. It was sending people out to see what was going on in the Muslim community.*¹¹⁸

Furthermore, the indicator ‘Failed policies’ scored 30 compared to zero of the ‘Effective policies’ in the category ‘Counter Salafism policies’. All respondents made a clear distinction that the current policies were ineffective. The local Mosque board members saw the policy of communication as futile, to the point where some respondents experienced sentiments of being taken advantage of for “populistic electoral politics”.¹¹⁹ All respondents viewed the decision-making process

Action Programme To Combat Jihadism., 2017: 43-44.

110 Adil, Interview.

111 David Garland and Richard Sparks, ‘CRIMINOLOGY, SOCIAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES’, *The British Journal of Criminology* 40, no. 2 (2000): 189–204, as quoted in Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’, 2007: 264,

112 Ibid, 267.

113 Welten and Abbas, ‘We Are Already 1-0 behind’, 2021.

114 Daniel, Interview.

115 Inspectorate of Security and Justice & Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘Evaluation Of The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme To Combat Jihadism.’, 2017: 43-44.

116 Adil, Interview.

117 Berat, Jack, Daniel, Adam, Adil, Omer, Dilan, Hosmut, Sara, Talha, Emre Interviews.

118 Ipek, Interview.

119 Hosmut, Interview.

as a delicate public image marketing scheme rather than a process founded upon “absolute knowledge and science-based observation.”¹²⁰

In addition, respondents mentioned the government’s recent investigation named “Parliamentary questioning unwanted influence from unfree countries”¹²¹ (POCOB) as a point of contention. The investigation focused on the foreign investments from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait and the State of Qatar. It analysed whether or not these investments included a clause for recipients to preach Salafistic ideologies. The investigation concluded that the financing had led to increased extremism amongst Muslim youths through sponsored mediums such as weekend schools, educational materials, guest speakers, and radicalised Imams.¹²² Moreover, the POCOB commission considers Salafism as ‘problematic behaviour’ and did not exclude apolitical Salafists in its interpretation.¹²³ Problematic behaviour is broadly defined as “a focus on ‘Salafism’, unwanted foreign funding and extremist speakers”.¹²⁴ The investigation’s description of Salafism’s problematic behaviour is not in line with the interpretation of the “Taskforce Problematic Behaviour & Unwanted Foreign Funding” briefing.¹²⁵ The briefing specifies political and jihadi Salafists as risks and indicates that “only those parts of the Salafist movement should be tackled”, thus excluding apolitical Salafists from the problematic behaviour criteria.¹²⁶ Using varying interpretations of what constitutes ‘problematic behaviour’ led to the Dutch government blurring the different lines of the Salafism branches.

This lack of knowledge and the use of varying definitions have led all respondents with a Muslim background (N= 11) to regard the POCOB investigation as disproportionate and “offensive”.¹²⁷ Emre viewed the inquiry as a political ploy to reinforce the perceived concept of “taming Muslims worldwide”.¹²⁸ Additionally, the analysis of the interviews showed that the policies countering radicalisation and Salafism were highly discriminatory towards the Muslim community. The indicator ‘Perceived discriminatory policies’ scored the highest figure out of all 151 indicators within the data set. Likewise, Adil described the investigation as “scandalous”, where “in a democratic and free country, we [the Muslim community] are placed in this puppet show”.¹²⁹ Many members of the Dutch Muslim community see the inquiry as an infringement upon the rights to religious freedom.

Prejudicing Religious Liberty

The aspect of fundamental human rights such as the freedom of religion has been a legal staple right within the European Union since 1953, with the European Convention on Human Rights.¹³⁰ Article 9 includes the right to express, change, or manifest an individual’s religion

¹²⁰ Hosmut, Interview.

¹²¹ ‘(In) visible influence report of the parliamentary interrogation committee on undesirable influence from unfree countries’, 2020: 240.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 217-218.

¹²⁵ Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, and Employment, ‘Integrated Approach To Problematic Behaviour And Unwanted Foreign Financing Of Social And Religious Institutions’, 2019.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 3.

¹²⁷ Emre, Interview.

¹²⁸ Emre, Interview.

¹²⁹ Adil, Interview

¹³⁰ European Court of Human Rights, ‘CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND PROTOCOL’ (European court of Human Rights, 1953), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Archives_1950_Convention_ENG.pdf.

through “worship, teaching, practice, and observance.”¹³¹ However, certain restrictions of Article 9 include “limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety”.¹³² In 2019, the Dutch government changed the national Penal Code to increase punishment concerning discrimination, violence, and hatred towards peoples with certain religious beliefs or race.¹³³ However, a 2019 report from The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) evaluating the Netherlands had specified that the Dutch government did not implement the legislation to the fullest extent of policy guidelines to provide effective sanctions against discrimination. The adjusted penal code was deemed relatively lenient in terms of penalties compared to other EU member state countries.¹³⁴ The ECRI noted that the discussion surrounding the niqab ban’s policy led to a change in the Penal Code in terms of hate speech. However, it had not led to changes in the conduct concerning public political figures.¹³⁵

A 2018 executive summary by the U.S. State Department regarding the freedom of religion in the Netherlands highlighted specific discriminatory actions by Dutch politicians.¹³⁶ One such example was the Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest created by PVV (Dutch: *Partij voor de Vrijheid*; Party for Freedom) party leader, Geert Wilders. The contest led to many demonstrations worldwide, including Khamid Rizvi’s announcement (leader of Pakistani political party Tehreek-e-Labbaik) to issue a *fatwa* against Wilders.¹³⁷ The contest resulted in Wilders tweeting various statements, one being that Mr Rizvi should have been arrested for his threats and that “Freedom of speech must prevail over violence and Islamic fatwa”.¹³⁸ Policies that were meant to protect the freedom of religion drove the “feeling of exclusion” and “contribute[d] to the emergence of parallel societies and radicalisation”, according to the ECRI.¹³⁹ The ECRI observed the recurrent conduct of protecting freedom of speech over religious freedom and religious discrimination.

The ECRI made several recommendations, including the development of the codes of conduct of hate speech and discrimination for political figures. Additionally, the need to “evaluate whether Dutch anti-discrimination legislation provides for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” was advised.¹⁴⁰ The report’s evaluation and suggestions shine a light on the faulty policies that immersed the right to freedom of religion. Through such shortcomings, fourteen of the fifteen respondents perceived Dutch society to be highly discriminatory towards Islam and even more so towards more traditional forms of Islam. The indicator ‘Need to be aware of the consequences from statements’ in the category ‘Politicians/Government’ scored sixth highest out of thirteen indicators. Respondents frequently emphasised that the aspect of accepting accountability, which could slightly remedy the hostility and distrust towards the government. However, for politicians to take responsibility for their actions, Murat noted it as an impossibility due to the “day and night”¹⁴¹ participation of “politicians who couldn’t possibly be censored”.¹⁴²

131 Ibid 5.

132 Ibid..

133 European Union and Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Fundamental Rights Report - 2020*. (Luxembourg: FRA- European Union Agency for fundamental Rights, 2020), 63, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf.

134 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ‘ECRI REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS’, ECRI - Country Monitoring in the Netherlands (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 6 April 2019), <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-netherlands/168094c577>

135 Ibid,18.

136 Office of International Religious Freedom, ‘THE NETHERLANDS 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT’, International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State, 2018), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NETHERLANDS-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf>.

137 Deutsche Welle, ‘Dutch Far-Right Politician Geert Wilders Holds Muhammad Cartoon Contest’, DW.COM, 29 December 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/dutch-far-right-politician-geert-wilders-holds-muhammad-cartoon-contest/a-51823840>

138 Ibid.

139 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ‘ECRI REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS’, 2019.

140 Ibid, 39.

141 Ipek, Interview.

142 Murat, Interview.

“Freedom of religion is restricted”

Discrimination affecting the perception of the right to freedom of religion was an incident Hosmut described during the first lockdown due to Covid-19.¹⁴³ During the lockdown, the temporary governmental measures prohibited Muslims from visiting mosques for prayer times. In response, an Islamic organisation handed out speaker systems to all mosques in their neighbourhood so as to be able to play the call to prayer in public. The use of the speakers was to foster solidarity and to reach out to Muslims at home. Hosmut described how one particular mosque wanted to continue using the loudspeakers after the lockdown would be lifted. However, a municipality councillor asked them to discontinue the audio tapes from playing in public. Rather than stopping the daily calls, a member of the board mosque replied, “No absolutely not, this is our right”. Yet, less than a day later, the board members stopped all use of loudspeakers. When Hosmut confronted the board members, the given explanation was, “Soon, the councillor will be angry with us. We still have to arrange other things like a building permit for the Mosque”.¹⁴⁴ The incident Hosmut recounted portrayed the fear of expressing religion due to perceived discrimination. Not only was the mosque advised to stop all public activities temporarily, but the board members regarded the request as a ‘warning’. The mosque did not want to jeopardise its limited resources and allowances from the municipality as it is a religious right but hardly used due to fear of repercussion.

Respondents verified a higher frequency of observing deficient democratic and religious rights. Nusrat stated that “nine out of ten Muslims feel that their freedom of religion is restricted” within his community.¹⁴⁵ From the category ‘Counter-Salafism policies’, the indicator ‘Lack of democracy and freedom of religion’ scored third-highest. In Nusrat’s case, the indicator included democracy, which he interpreted as the norms and values mainstream Dutch society upholds. In discussing the norms and values present within the Netherlands, the corresponding emotion expressed was frustration. The ‘Frustration’ indicator scored third-highest within the ‘Emotional response’ category. Many examples brought up by respondents indicated the double-standard judgment regarding the topic of Islam. Murat explained that the Muslim community was regarded often as the “bad guys”.¹⁴⁶ When discussing the issue of Halal slaughtering, immediate anger arose,

*Had it not been for the Jewish community, they [Dutch government] would have forbidden it [ritual slaughtering] long ago! Yes, I have that feeling. But all Muslims actually have that feeling in the Netherlands. Because the Jews also perform ritual slaughters and only through the lobbying of the Jewish community, has the law been accepted. Otherwise it would have been stopped long ago, we [Muslim community] know that.*¹⁴⁷

Murat highlighted the unfair treatment that he identified as ongoing within the Netherlands. Thirteen other respondents similarly expressed unequal treatment of Muslims. The indicator ‘Aware of prejudice against the Muslim community’ scored highest out of sixteen total indicators from the category ‘Self-perception’. The portrayed openness of Dutch society was considered a mask, where a lack of tolerance and equality predominated.

Freedom of religion was linked often with freedom of speech among the respondents. The controversial 2018 incident of the As-Soannah mosque Imam teaching followers online about

¹⁴³ Hosmut, Interview.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Nusrat, Interview.

¹⁴⁶ Murat, Interview.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

female circumcision within The Hague led to heated debates within the Netherlands.¹⁴⁸ The advocate group, Femmes For Freedom, pressed criminal charges against the Imam, leading to a conviction by the public prosecutors for incitement to violence. The recent hearing sentenced the Imam to 80 hours of community service.¹⁴⁹ The chairman of As-Soennah at the time immediately responded and condemned the Imam's teachings. Whilst there was much concern within the Dutch Muslim community, two respondents reacted with anger. They viewed the sentencing as a verdict of the limitations of freedom of speech and religion. Hosmut exclaimed that the decision to charge the Imam was undoubtedly a big mistake of the prosecutors. He argued the sentencing to be a tool to silence Muslims' grievances concerning policies,

See, you have Islamists who think you should circumcise women. You also have texts that say you absolutely can't do that. It is therefore punishable if you treat classical text during class! If you treat such a text in a liberalist country like the Netherlands, it is punishable. Soon other texts will also be punishable! [...] If I discuss a classical text that the government think is unpleasant, then I could be charged for it! The freedom of religion is actually abolished. See, I am not in favour of female circumcision. The essential thing is: the erosion that arises from such a conviction is that you let the legal security of the minorities suffer. The rule of law is the only gripe for a minority and if that erodes then we [Muslim community] have nothing.¹⁵⁰

The sentencing of the Imam caused a ripple effect among Dutch Muslim individuals feeling scrutinised and targeted. Emre viewed the sentencing and judgement as one-dimensional when it came to the lack of freedom of religion within the Netherlands. Emre deemed the political atmosphere surrounding Islam as “disrespectful” and two-fold.¹⁵¹ He stated that

Why disrespectful? Can you imagine that we as a Muslim community or a president of a country say “Christians or Buddhists or Hindus should do that, and do this, and change that.” I think it's a disdain and disrespectful behaviour. I would look at the mirror first. What have we done wrong in the West all these years?¹⁵²

The policies meant to curb religious discrimination and radicalisation have indirectly fostered anger and distrust towards the government. According to the respondents, the increase in hostility observed by the Dutch Muslim community has opened a window of opportunity for radical Salafism.

Self-Sabotage

The distinction of what is ‘acceptable’ Islam has broadened the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Not only have perceptions of security services become adverse, but the manipulation by radical Salafists surrounding the distrust of security policies for recruitment efforts is ever-present.

148 NOS, ‘Aangifte tegen As-Soennah-moskee om aanzetten tot vrouwenbesnijdenis [Report against As-Soennah mosque to incite female circumcision]’, *NOS Nieuws*, 11 September 2018, <https://nos.nl/artikel/2258498-aangifte-tegen-as-soennah-moskee-om-aanzetten-tot-vrouwenbesnijdenis.html>.

149 OmroepWest, ‘Tachtig uur werkstraf voor medewerker as-Soennah moskee om promoten vrouwenbesnijdenis [Eighty hours of community service for As-Soennah mosque employee to promote female circumcision]’, Omroep West, 19 June 2020, <https://www.omroepwest.nl/nieuws/4063296/Tachtig-uur-werkstraf-voor-medewerker-as-Soennah-moskee-om-promoten-vrouwenbesnijdenis>.

150 Hosmut, Interview.

151 Emre, Interview.

152 Ibid.

A study by Roex and Van Riezen (2012) emphasises the importance of the Dutch government reevaluating their policies regarding overriding “ethical and legal norms”.¹⁵³ Policymakers have frequently ignored these norms for policy implementation within the UK and the Netherlands. What has resulted from counter-terrorism policies has an inversed effect: increased propensity towards radicalisation. Roex and Van Riezen (2012) discovered that policies within the Netherlands and the UK frequently “hamper[ed] the achievement of important [policy] goals”.¹⁵⁴ This, in turn, would often be seen as being manipulated to the advantage of radical Salafi recruitment efforts. As Murat explained, “[T]he politics and the media actually create [...] the radicalism in the Netherlands and automatically creates a kind of self-sabotage effect”.¹⁵⁵ Murat viewed the increased presence of radical Salafism as a self-inflicted ‘wound’ of the government. Overemphasising the importance of countering political and jihadi Salafism and blaming Muslim communities had inevitably created the “perfect breeding ground for Salafism and violent Salafism”.¹⁵⁶ The psyche of Islamophobia had fostered the sentiment of discrimination among the Dutch Muslim communities. The conflict that arose from negative judgements and perceived limitations upon freedom of religion connected effortlessly with radical Salafists’ political view. Murat further described that the decision-makers were at fault. He was not at all surprised by the youth turning towards radical Salafism.

*Yeah well what do you expect? Those young people have to run into discrimination in daily life because they are Muslim. Those are things that help them [recruiters] to make it easier for them to convince young people.*¹⁵⁷

Through the securitised lens of society, the Muslim youth had become exclusionary. Enduring interventions meant to keep radicalisation efforts at bay shifted it into a normalised reaction. Murat believed the response to radicalise to be nothing short of “easy prey” for Salafist recruiters.¹⁵⁸ Murat perceived the exposure of vulnerability within the Muslim youth’s isolationism as a natural consequence of securitisation. Therefore, the process of securitisation and its subsequent policies have allowed radical Salafist recruiters to manipulate their alienation as a “means to use those people [perceived excluded Muslim youth]” for the progression of their movement.¹⁵⁹

The consequences of counter-terrorism policies included a decrease in trust towards the government. From the category ‘Politicians/Government’, the indicator ‘No trust in the government’ ranked fifth highest. Ipek mentioned the mistrust most frequently within his interview. Ipek stated that the policies allowed Muslim youths to “walk willingly into the arms of malicious people [radical Salafist recruiters], who give a listening ear and embrace them”.¹⁶⁰ As the perceived discriminatory effects of policies and the Muslim youths’ distrust towards the Dutch government increased, the appeal of radical Salafism seemed to grow. All fifteen respondents were of the view that without future corrections made to policies it would not be possible to decrease the influence of radical Salafism within the Netherlands.

¹⁵³ Karlijn L. A. Roex and Bram Van Riezen, ‘Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Literature Review Study’, Article, Social Cosmos (Igitur, 24 January 2012), 98, <http://localhost/handle/1874/237594>.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 99.

¹⁵⁵ Murat, Interview.

¹⁵⁶ Sara, Interview.

¹⁵⁷ Murat, Interview.

¹⁵⁸ Murat, Interview.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ipek, Interview.

Conclusion

The increasing angst surrounding political and jihadi Salafism influence within the Netherlands has become a staple topic of concern for the Dutch security services. This human angle of the study concerning the Muslim communities has revealed several areas of concern within the security services' approach. The geographic landscape available to radical Salafis has proven to be of strategic importance; however, they remain unidentifiable to security services and the policies meant to dissuade their activities. With their robust online dominance, radical Salafi recruiters have found a pathway to undetectable and prolific propaganda propagation. At the same time, hypervigilance among the Muslim communities has led to the unavoidable heightened sense of scrutiny and polarisation. Securitisation casts a wide net over the Muslim communities through the policies that address the community as a whole.

Furthermore, the inconsequential use of varying definitions has led to the generalisation of Salafism, leading to increased confusion and isolation among other Islam followers. The binary distinction placed upon 'acceptable' Islam has led Muslim youth to become dissatisfied and feel removed from Dutch society. Lacking a singular definition that includes or excludes individual branches within the Salafism faction has led to more frustration for the Muslim community, to the point where self-censorship has become a survival mechanism. To be viewed as an unthreatening member of society, Muslims have sought to suppress their religious beliefs to avert the ever-present surveillance and social judgement.

Rather than working alongside Muslim communities, members of these communities see policies as working against them. The consequences of unsuccessful policies have played in the hands of Salafist recruiters. Externally, it can be interpreted that Dutch society regards the faction's motives as a pure and utopian implementation of the Salafism ideology. However, the Muslim communities view it as a faction that pays more regard to social retribution. Consequently, by portraying a religious cause as the motivation for political revolutions and violent acts, radical Salafist recruiters have maintained the persona of a lesser threat to prospective recruitments.

Inappropriate statements made by public political figures have had a much heavier influence on young Muslim perceptions of belongingness than religious identity struggles. Subsequently, this discrimination has led to perceived increased social inequality and generalised Islamophobia which spearheaded the radical Salafist movement. By emphasising the discrimination present, radical Salafist recruiters play upon the existing vulnerabilities facing youth. Recruitment is based upon the presence of a social capital vacuum rather than religious conviction. For radical Salafists to gain a more extensive following, fostering friendships and creating commonality through the perceived suppressive and self-sabotaging government was paramount.

For future policies to have a positive impact, the reinstatement of fairly enforced freedom rights should be the norm. As the security services continue their efforts against radicalisation, one should keep in mind the possible advantageous alliance the mainstream Muslim community could provide for future initiatives rather than inadvertently categorising the community as a whole.

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Appendix I: Descriptive Demographics of Respondents

Respondent	Age	Gender	Cultural Background	Nationality
Berat	43	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Jack	49	Male	Dutch	Dutch
Daniel	33	Male	Dutch	Dutch
Adam	49	Male	Dutch	Dutch
Adil	42	Male	Dutch & Moroccan	Dutch
Omer	39	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Dilan	35	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Ipek	54	Male	Moroccan	Dutch
Hosmut	30	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Sara	38	Female	Dutch	Dutch
Murat	57	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Talha	35	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Emre	50	Male	Turkish	Dutch
Selim	59	Male	Surinamese	Dutch
Nusrat	54	Male	Surinamese	Dutch

Appendix II: Codebook

Code	Category	Definition	Indicators
A	Self-Perception	The perception of Dutch Muslims concerning the “Us vs Them” mentality when observing non-Muslim behaviors and the actions from Dutch society.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aware of prejudice against the Muslim community. 2. Perceived to be specifically targeted by non-Muslims. 3. Increased isolation of the Muslim communities. 4. Perceive society not be accepting of the Muslim community. 5. Needing to explain that the Muslim community does not condone the actions of jihadis. 6. Automatically labelled as negative by non-Muslims. 7. Disproportional representation within Dutch society. 8. Constantly questioned whether they support the violent actions of jihadi's. 9. Wanting to be treated as equal citizens. 10. Perception of discrimination in their social environment. 11. No ethnic differentiation made, only labelled as 'Muslim'. 12. Clear ethnic differentiations made within Muslims communities. 13. Negative perceptions influenced by foreign countries. 14. Think the Muslim community should make more effort to integrate with the Dutch culture. 15. Negative labelling increased since 9/11. 16. Should be a clear difference between what is understood as norms and democracy.
B	Emotional Response	The emotions the respondents associated with their personal experiences.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actively ignore negative labeling. 2. Negative self-image. 3. Annoyed/Irritated. 4. Frustration. 5. Anger. 6. Lack of trust. 7. Shame. 8. Conflicted Identity. 9. Afraid/Concerned. 10. Confused.

C	Radical Salafism Influence	The radical ideology of Salafism thought to be present within The Netherlands	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Radical Salafism (RS) present within the Netherlands. 2. RS not present. 3. RS increasingly present. 4. RS decreasingly present. 5. RS not compatible with current society. 6. RS abusing Dutch democratic freedom. 7. Hot spots only in larger cities. 8. Hot spots only in small cities. 9. Hot spots present in both smaller and larger cities. 10. Individuals with low social status 11. Not surprised of its influence and presence. 12. Hard to identify by security services. 13. Incorrect definition used. 14. RS can co-exist within society. 15. Has a 3-based typology. 16. Breeding ground present. 17. Individuals with little to no religious upbringing. 18. Small group. 19. Individual phenomenon. 20. Decentralized/Unorganized. 21. RS don't go to the Mosque/ Not associated with the Muslim community, but mainstream Muslims are labelled as them. 22. RS openly discussed within the Muslim community. 23. RS not linked with mainstream Sunni Islam. 24. Mainstream Muslims are very concerned of RS presence in the Netherlands. 25. Muslim community aware of RS presence. 26. Present in own Muslim community. 27. Not present in own Muslim community. 28. Social control limits Salafism presence. 29. Active/Dominate internet presence. 30. RS easily recognizable by Muslim community. 31. Invisible to the whole society. 32. Focused on social dissatisfaction rather than religious guidance. 33. Claim to have strong religious views rather than political views to not damage their public image. 34. RS are becoming more progressive: to blend in. 35. Internal conflict of Qur'an interpretation. 36. RS can evolve into violence. 37. Salafists and violent extremists are two different things. 38. Don't think there should be a typology. 39. Influenced by foreign countries. 40. RS individuals with high social status.
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D	Politicians/ Government	Respondents perception of politicians and the Dutch government.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Specific politicians to blame for negative labelling. 2. Negative labelling present within politics. 3. Islamophobia used for political gain. 4. Dutch government has the incorrect perception of radical Islam/extremists 5. Positive representation of the Muslim community within politics. 6. No positive political change in favor of the Muslim communities. 7. Politics following the media's narrative. 8. Lack of correct representation in politics. 9. Misuse of policies for political gain. 10. No trust in the government. 11. Need to be aware of consequences of policies. 12. Need to be aware of the consequences from statements. 13. Institutional discrimination present
E	Media's Role	The use and representation media portrays of the Dutch Muslim community.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Negative labeling via media. 2. Sensationalizing Islamophobia. 3. Media Instilling fear surrounding the topic of Islam. 4. Respondents do not believe the media. 5. Media quick to label Muslims as 'radicalized'. 6. Disproportionate negative media coverage.

F	Counter Salafism Policies	Policies that were observed by the respondents.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Negatively perceived policies. 2. Policies deemed as non-effective. 3. Not aware of presence/Never been part of policy. 4. Harshly perceived policies. 5. Policy makers are not well informed. 6. Meetings with the Mayor/Municipality. 7. Need more communication with Muslim community. 8. Positive experience with district police officer. 9. Negative view of AIVD & NCTV. 10. Security services has positive relations with the Muslim community. 11. Muslim community wanting to prove they have nothing to hide. 12. Failed policies. 13. Lack of democracy and freedom of religion. 14. More attention since 9/11. 15. Not being taken seriously by the police. 16. Believe policy makers are making a good effort. 17. Failed integration policies. 18. Active cooperation with the AIVD&NCTV. 19. Policies against Salafism should be clearly defined. 20. Police not aware of radicalized individuals. 21. Perceived discriminatory policies. 22. Should enforce more policies to gain more information on radicalized. 23. Effective policies. 24. No cooperation with AIVD/NCTV. 25. No trust in the security services. 26. Security services don't differentiate between different ethnic groups within the Muslim communities. 27. Salafism should be observed more closely. 28. Counter-terrorism policies expanded to social cohesion domain. 29. Government doesn't differentiate the branches of Salafism. 30. Policies target the Muslim community as a whole.
G	Islam	The perception that Islam is not understood correctly.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Islam heavily misunderstood. 2. Wrong definitions are applied. 3. Lack of correct understanding. 4. Discrimination of Islam. 5. State should not interfere with religious matters. 6. Islam immediately linked to terrorism. 7. Compare other religions to depict unfair treatment. 8. Clear differences of cultural traditions within Islam. 9. Cultural background highly important in Muslim identity.

H	Self-Help	The activities organized by the Muslim community or mosques on their own accord.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mosque guides young individuals. 2. Community involvement projects. 3. Invest in own security. 4. Radicalized individuals are dealt with internally by the Imam and the board. 5. Communicate with other Mosques (warn of potential radicalizing individuals and signs of conflict). 6. Communicate within community about concerns of individuals. 7. Qur'an class after school. 8. Expel radical individuals. 9. Mosques need to present a united front. 10. Foreign financing necessary. 11. Don't discuss radicalization. 12. Mosques want more exposure. 13. Mosques more progressive.
I	Recruitment	Respondents view on who is recruited, how, why.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Youth recruited. 2. Vulnerable individuals recruited. 3. RS has social media attraction. 4. Recruitment via social media. 5. Social exclusion issues. 6. Ideological attraction. 7. Recruited have Low IQ. 8. Identity issues rather than religion. 9. Progressive individuals who are looking for a better life. 10. Recruiters give sense of belonging. 11. RS blend in to avoid suspicion. 12. Recruited blame non-Muslims for their socio-economic problems. 13. Youths searching for themselves/ Recruiters not actively approaching. 14. Recruitment process using violence.

About the Authors

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