Chapter 11

Prevention of Radicalization in Western Muslim Diasporas

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This chapter opens with a brief definition of key terms such as “Muslim diasporas,” “prevention of violent extremism” (PVE), “countering violent extremism” (CVE) and discusses the role of Islamophobia in radicalization and its impacts on the prevention of radicalization. The size of the Muslim population in each of the selected five Western countries and the appearance of jihadist, left- and right-wing-groups, as well as the number of attacks resulting from these milieus are briefly discussed at the beginning of the country reports. The main body of this chapter discusses academic, governmental, and civil society approaches to PVE/CVE. For each country, some PVE examples are presented which might be helpful to policymakers and practitioners. A literature review regarding PVE/CVE approaches in each country seeks to provide an overview of the academic state of the art concerning the prevention of radicalization. Finally, a number of recommendations with regard to future PVE initiatives are provided, based on the author’s field research in Salafi milieus in various European countries.¹

Keywords: countering violent extremism (CVE), countering violent extremism policy and practice, extremism, government and civil society responses, Muslim communities, Muslim diasporas, prevention, preventing violent extremism (PVE), PVE recommendations, radicalization, religious extremism, Salafism, terrorism
This chapter seeks to describe the state of research on the prevention of radicalization in Western Muslim diasporas. For this purpose, the following countries were selected: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and UK.²

First, the main terms used in the title of this chapter will be discussed briefly, focusing on religious extremism.³ The understanding of “radicalization” and “prevention” is not uniform in Western societies. That discussion leads to the question of the definition of Muslim diasporas - a composite term that might also vary, depending on the point of view: Is it used to describe an insider Muslim perspective, or a situation as perceived by Western societies hosting Muslim immigrants?

A person’s perception of the term “Muslim diasporas” might itself lead to grievances. This may make some individuals more susceptible to radicalization, e.g. when Muslims see themselves as citizens of Western countries they are living in (in particular if they were born there or are part of the second or third generation), but are still perceived and treated like “foreigners.”

Secondly, a number of research approaches related to the prevention of radicalization and to current debates within this field will be discussed as they relate to the five Western countries considered in this chapter. In this context, it is important to state that only a selection of the literature and only some of the initiatives related to the prevention of radicalization can be described here.

By discussing the efforts of national governments and local communities, as well as the findings of researchers, some helpful insights on the methods and mechanisms of radicalization prevention can be brought to the attention of policymakers, counterterrorism professionals, civil society stakeholders and others directly confronted with the phenomenon of radicalization. A few examples of good practices and approaches are also presented. Following the conclusions, recommendations are made, based on the author’s personal field-research.

Prevention, Radicalization and Western Muslim Diasporas - Can a Single Definition Fit all Countries?

In order to prevent radicalization in Western Muslim diasporas, it is important to understand the mechanisms and the multiple drivers behind radicalization, in particular those related to religious radicalization. According to Vidino, radicalization is “a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of various personal and structural factors.”⁴ Lambert and Wiktorowicz argue that religious fundamentalists are cognitive extremists of whom just a minority are likely to turn to militant jihad.⁵ Ravn, Coolsaet, and Sauer underline a very important aspect within this debate when they note that “despite a lack of a scholarly consensus on how to understand radicalization, a set of preconceived ideas about the phenomenon is taken for granted in the public discourse.”⁶ Different understandings of radicalization become significant in the context of selecting best approaches to strengthen prevention efforts. If the starting points towards a certain phenomenon differ, efforts to achieve common aims are likely to run into difficulties. Due to this, we should free ourselves from the idea that a mono-causal explanation for radicalization exists which applies to every “radical.”

Living in a complex world requires an ability to react in a flexible way. When it comes to prevention, what works in a non-Muslim context might differ in a Muslim-majority country context.⁷ Some terms are “loaded” and if they contain overt or covert elements of discrimination, they are unlikely to open doors to the very group of people which need to be brought back to a peaceful path.⁸ A term like “Muslim diaspora” can be a neutral description of a religious minority, but can also be understood as excluding a whole segment of a minority group from society, even those persons who were born in the “West.” This is not the place to discuss the
“us” versus “them” implications of such perceptions, but it is something we have to keep in mind when discussing prevention of radicalization.

In this chapter, various approaches in the field of the prevention of radicalization are discussed. The existing literature generally distinguishes between preventing violent extremism (PVE) and countering violent extremism (CVE). According to Daniel Koehler:

“PVE programs can be defined as programs designed to prevent recruitment and radicalisation into violent extremism leading to terrorist actions. These programs can address individuals or groups not at risk of violent radicalisation (primary or general prevention, resilience building), or those already considered to be at risk or in the early stages of a violent radicalisation process (secondary or specific prevention, early intervention). Deradicalisation programs are usually not counted among PVE efforts, but rather belong to CVE (countering violent extremism) methods.”

This chapter focuses mainly on PVE approaches that are primarily understood as prevention of radicalization of individuals and groups of people to violent extremism and terrorism. Nevertheless, referring to Koehler’s approach - deradicalization as a form of CVE - can be seen as being closely linked to PVE approaches.

Although several causes for radicalization to violence exist that do not relate to religion, but to other factors such as economic inequality, religion is often seen as the most important driver for the current wave of terrorism – more so in the public debate than in scholarly publications. Cavanaugh calls this mechanism: the “othering” of religion, writing:

“The myth of religious violence helps to construct and marginalize a religious Other, prone to fanaticism, to contrast with the rational, peace-making, secular subject. This myth can be and is used in domestic politics to legitimate the marginalization of certain types of practices and groups labelled religious, while underwriting the nation-state’s monopoly on its citizens’ willingness to sacrifice and kill. In foreign policy, the myth of religious violence serves to cast non-secular social orders, especially Muslim societies, in the role of villain.”

The effect of the “othering” of religion in largely secular states, e.g., for purposes related to domestic political debates, can be seen as a key for some young Muslims in western diasporas to embrace radical religious thoughts. Although some of these vulnerable Muslims were initially not familiar with fundamentalist religious interpretations of Islam, everyday discrimination due, for instance, to their wearing specific clothes such as the hijab or the jellabiya, and media reports portraying “the” Islam as a violent religion, can be seen as partially responsible for the radicalization of some young Muslims across Europe, with radicalization (also) being a form of protest.

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) as well as the Council of Europe in the “Annual Report for 2018” noted:

“Islamophobia is still prevalent … In public discourse, Islam and Muslims continue to be associated with radicalization, violence and terrorism. There is, generally, only very little positive media coverage of Muslim communities in Europe. Islamophobic hatred is often spread via the Internet. Anti-Muslim sentiments are also regularly manifested in petitions and protest rallies against the construction of mosques. In many member states, a dangerous ‘normalisation’ of Islamophobic prejudice can be observed.”
This “normalization of Islamophobic prejudices” and its particular impact on black Muslims (which was addressed by ECRI as well), can be seen as a major push factor for the radicalization of some young Muslims. While a recent report on Islamophobia correctly noted that “Muslims are … the people who suffer the most from terrorism emanating from radicals in the Muslim world as the vast majority of terrorist attacks occur in Muslim-majority countries,” the Western public tend to perceive attacks within the West as more cruel than the ones which occur within Muslim-majority countries.

In addition to experiences of everyday discrimination against Muslims in Western countries - which is partly due to how some may negatively perceive their style of clothing and their public expressions of religiosity - another aspect affects the lives of (young) Muslims in the “West”: “a new kind of terror rooted in anti-Muslim racism and white supremacist ideology.”

By looking at Western Muslim diasporas, one also ought to look at the subjectivity of some researchers regarding the issue of Islamophobia. Very often, their individual understanding of radicalization and its potential prevention is a result of their own positioning vis-à-vis the religion of Islam and its believers. A good example in this context is the development of Islamophobic incidents within Europe. Some researchers, e.g., Günther Jikeli, try to assess various forms of discrimination such as “racist or xenophobic, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic acts” on the basis of their numbers, not on account of the level of discrimination. That this argument could be seen as a discriminatory position of the researcher towards a specific group itself, seems to be excluded from his conclusion:

“Anti-Muslim acts do exist and might be on the rise, but they have not supplemented racist manifestations in Europe in recent years, and they stay below the number of anti-Semitic acts. […] However, there is a growing sense of victimhood on the basis of Islamic belief. Debates on Islamic fundamentalism and increased anti-terror measures are often viewed by Muslims as anti-Muslim bias.”

According to Jikeli, Muslims and Islamic organizations themselves are held responsible for “recent debates about a rise of ‘Islamophobia’ (…) that try to prohibit critical debates about some interpretations of Islam, blur[ring] the lines between such criticism and hatred of Muslims.” Although this argumentation might hold true for some Islamic organizations, it is widely used as a narrative to suppress critics of discrimination against Muslims, especially among right-wing political parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), The Republicans (Les Républicains) in France, the Progress Party in Norway, and the Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre).

In an article titled “Discrimination against Muslims and Antisemitic Views among Young Muslims in Europe,” Günther Jikeli presented a table, combining data from two surveys, one from the Pew Global Attitudes Project “Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe” from 2008, and the second from the Pew Global Attitudes Project “Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and around the World” from 2017. The table, titled “Unfavorable Views of Muslims in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” presented data on these countries from 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2016 in order to highlight that:

“Negative views of Muslims and Islam are prevalent, but contrary to common belief, such views have not increased since 2004, despite the wave of terror attacks in the name of Islam. In spring 2016, 29 percent of the population in Germany (46 percent in 2004), 28 percent of the population in the United
Kingdom (31 percent in 2004) and 29 percent (also 29 percent in 2004) [in France] [held such views].”

However, these “findings” stand in stark contrast to statistics presented in the “Islamophobia Report 2018,” which is based on surveys held in 34 European countries:

“The Collective Against Islamophobia in France (Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France or CCIF) recorded 676 Islamophobic incidents in 2018 against 446 in 2017 (increase of 52%). In the UK, the upward trend in Islamophobic incidents continued in 2017-18 (the typical census period for official government data), with the number of cases recorded in official statistics rising by 17% and religion-specific cases by a staggering 40% (double the figure of 2015/16).”

Most of the Islamophobic incidents, e.g., in France, were directed against women. In Europe as well as in other “Western” countries, an increased number of attacks on Muslim women who wear a veil-variant has been registered. This means that Islamophobia contains a gender-specific discrimination towards female believers. It might be the result of the idea that women are (often) responsible for the “education” of the next generation. With regard to Islamophobic attacks, for instance in Germany, Younes stated that they

“Have to be seen in conjunction with attacks on refugees, their asylum homes as well as NGOs in the services of refugees and their problems. Until the end of 2018, around 1,775 attacks on refugees took place, with around 329 adults and 15 children hurt. Overall, we observe a decline in the reporting and/or registration of physical attacks compared to the previous years.”

This finding underlines the fact that Islamophobia can be both a source of Muslim radicalization and violence, and a cause of reciprocal radicalization by right wing militants. Furthermore, the conflicting outcomes of surveys regarding Muslims, Islam, and the development of Islamophobia can be seen as a result of the use of different terminologies regarding the same phenomenon. This mechanism could easily be extended to the discussion of the prevention of radicalization. Therefore, it is important to keep this heterodox approach in mind, in terms of the religion of Islam, its believers, and the debate about the prevention of radicalization in Western Muslim diasporas. It might become more visible in the following literature review and in the case studies of prevention approaches in the five Western countries that are discussed in this chapter. In terms of increasing Islamophobia, rising right-wing politics within these Western countries and a fear of Muslim immigrants, who are often blamed for being potential terrorists, the term “Radicalization” itself is also often stereotyped.

With regard to the possible “amount of growth in Europe’s Muslim population” within the framework of “future migration” in 27 European countries, the UK, Norway and Switzerland, the US-based Pew Research Center estimated a growth from 4.6 percent of the whole population in 2015 up to 14 percent (in a high migration scenario), 11.2 percent (in a medium migration scenario) and 7.4 percent (in a zero-migration scenario) in 2050.

The estimated “World’s Muslim Population” is likely to increase from 5.9 per cent Muslims in Europe in 2010 to 10.2 percent Muslims in 2050 and from 1 percent Muslims in North America in 2010 to 2.4 per cent Muslims in 2050 in North America. Such projections might serve as an explanation for an increase of negative right-wing sentiments regarding the presence of Muslims in the West.

In addition, it is important to note that next to Islamophobia research, investigations about the “mediating role of acculturation in the relationship between perceived threats and support
of violence” among Muslim communities exist. In applying the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT), it is evident that perceived threats as well as hostility towards a specific group, such as members of Western Muslim diasporas, could construct negativity and hostility towards an out-group as a result of discrimination against the former.

For these reasons, the chapter title “Prevention of Radicalization in Muslim Western Diasporas” contains various (individual) implicit assumptions and challenges regarding the prevention of religious related radicalization itself.

**Review of Selected Governmental Approaches and Literature about Radicalization and the Prevention of Radicalization in Western Muslim Diasporas**

Before turning to national responses, it is useful to recall some key developments on the international (UN) and regional (EU) levels.

In 2015, the UN’s “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” (PVE Plan) was presented to the General Assembly. The PVE concept differs from the CVE approach as it focuses more on root causes leading to violent extremism. In order to strengthen community resilience, the plan includes various recommendations for the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism on the international as well as on the local level. In 2017, the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) released the publication “Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: A Guide for Policy-makers.”

According to the release “The Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism” of 16 June 2020, the European Council “recalls that security at home depends on peace and stability beyond the EU’s borders” and a “further strengthening of the EU’s external counterterrorism engagement and action in the priority geographic and thematic fields.” Threats related to terrorism, a focus on further geographical EU investments and priority areas for action such as the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa, as well as the importance of improved international cooperation are issues emphasized in the European Council report. In addition, the report calls for support of the priority partner countries which are the most impacted by the “returnees” phenomenon, “in order to help them bring perpetrators to justice, address radicalization leading to violent extremism and terrorism in prisons, and support rehabilitation and reintegration activities, including of family members, as well as specialised services for returning children.” The Council underlines the need for compliance to all CVE measures with EU core values such as the rule of law in agreement with international law (international human rights law, humanitarian law and international refugee law).

The report highlights the need for a “whole-of-society” approach to prevent and counter violent extremism, and also notes that deradicalization efforts need to address the essential conditions beneficial to terrorism and radicalization; the continuous care for vulnerable groups such as children and women; a gender approach with regard to female empowerment and the support of their resilience toward radicalization, as well as the strengthening of contact to civil society, youth, human rights defenders and victims of terrorism. It notes that “involving civil society organisations in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism remains of utmost importance for a successful approach. It is also important to continue addressing the spread of violent extremist narratives and to further promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue.”

Therefore, in the field of CVE and PVE, a continuing support of enhanced EU external actions, e.g. on online platforms - increasingly important areas for violent extremist Islamist ideology of Da’esh and al-Qaeda, has been suggested. It is also noted that foreign terrorist fighters should be brought to justice and their movements be prevented.
The report further noted that one of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic might be its “potential influence on terrorist activities as well as on the prevention and countering of terrorism.”\(^{46}\) In order to prevent radicalization leading to violent extremism and terrorism, the Council suggested “the development of assistance programming, where appropriate, as well as country-specific and regional strategies”\(^{47}\) and a multi-stakeholder approach whereby “industry works together with EU and partner-country governments as well as academia and civil society in preventing and countering terrorism.”\(^{48}\)

UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that “terrorism is fundamentally the denial and destruction of human rights and the fight against terrorism will never succeed by perpetuating the same denial and destruction.”\(^{49}\) Member states of the UN have reacted in various ways to the common problem of radicalization and the resulting “home-grown” terrorism emerging within Muslim diasporas in their societies.

In the following section, developments in five Western countries will be sketched briefly. These lead to various prevention-oriented recommendations. New directions and challenges in the field of prevention of radicalization are addressed, illustrated by references to various national, regional, or subject-specific experiences.

**Belgium**

In Belgium, 7.6 percent of the total population were Muslims in 2016.\(^{50}\) The projected percent of Muslims of the total population in Belgium in the year 2050 is estimated at 11.1 percent (estimate with zero immigration), 15.1 percent (estimate with medium immigration) and 18.2 percent (estimate with high immigration).\(^{51}\) The Pew Research Center’s survey regarding the destination of migrants to Europe ranked Belgium with 230,000 migrants (57 percent of whom are Muslims) in the position. With regard to the number of Muslim refugees, Belgium is seventh in Europe, with 40,000 Muslim refugees.\(^{52}\)

Molenbeek, a suburb of Brussels, became internationally known as a hot-spot for jihadist radicalization since the attacks of November 2015 in Paris and March 2016 in Brussels, committed by young jihadists from Molenbeek claiming allegiance to ISIS.\(^{53}\) The militant jihadist group Sharia4Belgium is the main violent extremist group; it inspired other groups to radicalize, by providing a jihadist infrastructure.\(^{54}\) Many of the foreign fighters from Western European countries came from Belgium\(^{55}\) and 86 per cent of them were already “known to authorities for offences such as robberies, theft or drug dealing.”\(^{56}\)

In order to address this rising trend, the Belgian government initiated PVE programs in 2013 and established a taskforce to develop a national counterterrorism and counterextremism strategy in 2015.\(^{57}\) In this context, a 12-point action plan against terrorism was created. It included the creation of a new National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and also involves the domestic deployment of the military whenever the threat level is raised significantly, the development of new deradicalization programs in prisons, and also the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to deal with the phenomenon of foreign fighters.\(^{58}\) Furthermore, various CVE initiatives for ten cities in Belgium that faced specific radicalization threats came into existence; these also included PVE approaches, e.g. one focusing on extremist messaging on the internet.\(^{59}\) According to Pauwels et al., online exposure to extremist messages can promote political violence.\(^{60}\)

Accroding to an examination of the Belgian State Security Service from 2017, “nearly 5 percent of all prisoners in Belgium – 450 prisoners in all – pose a radicalization threat.”\(^{61}\) The report found that European cells “partially fund themselves through crime, such as petty theft, shoplifting, and extortion. Some jihadist preachers have reportedly legitimised such offences if used to finance jihad.”\(^{62}\) Such findings suggested that a stronger PVE approach focusing on prisons and probation cases was called for.
Apart from the jihadists, groups as well as individuals of the anarchist and left-wing extremist milieu such as some of the participants of the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) movement, pose a threat to public order in Belgium due to their sometimes violent demonstrations. The Belgian far-right is most visible in the Flemish party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc). It was forced to disband in 2004 as a consequence of its discriminatory statements against immigrants. After that, many members of the Vlaams Blok regrouped under the umbrella of another less extreme party, Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest). Wallonia, the French speaking part of Belgium - traditionally a strong base of the socialist party - has witnessed the rise of the Parti Populaire (People’s Party). Its leader Mischael Modrikamen aligned with various leaders of foreign nationalist parties (e.g., Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Nigel Farage in the UK) who are known for their Islamophobic attitude. Some right-wing extremist groups organized anti-Muslim and anti-migrant demonstrations.

Although no terrorist attacks took place in Belgium during 2019, a number of attacks in the planning stages and instances of individuals providing material support to terrorists have been registered but were prevented, partly thanks to the monitoring of over 200 radical individuals. A total of 89 convictions and acquittals related to jihadist terrorism have been pronounced by Belgian courts in 2019. In addition to 11 arrests for jihadist terrorism, 86 persons have been arrested for non-specified types of terrorism while two persons were apprehended for ethno-nationalist and separatist activities. In addition, “one jihadist-terrorism affiliated attack was foiled.”

**Governmental PVE Strategies**

With regard to the prevention of radicalization, various communities as well as the Belgian government prepared information instruments for schools. One of these is the Prevention Pyramid, a five-level instrument that addresses radicalization at different stages. It is used at the Royal Atheneum of Antwerp, but also by other stakeholders.

The project, Identity and Communication - Based on the Logical Levels of Bateson, is another training program for teachers addressing identity formation. Due to the increased impact of Sharia4Belgium within schools, it enables pupils to comprehend religion as a system of beliefs that shape individual identities. The courses are based on a four-level training for teachers who face students at risk of radicalization in their classrooms. They are trained to use neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) techniques to counter negative self-images of pupils. NLP is also said to develop their confidence in order to make them more resilient against religion-related radicalization attempts and imparts them with a feeling that their future is not pre-determined by religious laws.

The Athena-Syntax project is an educational project of the European-wide Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). It provides an interdisciplinary structure for students and teachers, allowing them to exchange views in a horizontal dialogue, focusing on core human values. Artwork is developed under the guidance of professional artists who work with students outside the school. This gives young people a chance to express their emotions, fears, and questions through art so that they channel their anger and frustrations in positive ways.

BOUNCE is a training and awareness-raising tool for young individuals at risk due to their social environment. It provides preventive measures against violent radicalization. It is a program of the European Commission Prevention of and Fight Against Crime (ISEC), Strengthen Resilience against Violent Radicalisation (STRESAVIORA). BOUNCE Young has been developed for young people to strengthen their resilience. It also serves parents of vulnerable children as well as frontline workers. It provides recommendations, insights, and exercises for adults in order to allow them to better understand the social environments of their kids. BOUNCE Up is a train-the-trainer tool for frontline workers.
Selected Belgian Literature on Radicalization and the Prevention of Radicalization

One study with the title “Exploring the discrimination-radicalization nexus: empirical evidence from youth and young adults in Belgium,” observed a potential link between the perceived discrimination and the support for violent extremism among youth and young adults in Belgium.79 One of this study’s findings is that “over half of individuals who identified as Muslim (55.6%) reported some kind of discrimination, 19.5% [of the] Muslim[s] were also more likely to report experiencing discrimination in the justice system.”80 Such perceived discrimination can sometimes act as trigger for radicalization. The theme of prevention through integration of young adults with an immigration background is therefore prominent within the Belgian literature on radicalization and in recommendations for its prevention.81

The study “Loss of Identity, Radicalization, and Terrorism. Case Studies in France and Belgium” identified the lack of a (national) identity and a need for belonging as major causes of radicalization leading to an increased interest in terrorism in Belgium as well as in France.82

Other researchers identify psychosocial factors among specific groups, e.g., refugees, within Belgium as possible push factors for radicalization.83 The need for family support for vulnerable young adults emerged in a study by Gielen as key for the prevention of radicalization in Belgium.84 There are many governmental and non-governmental efforts to prevent radicalization in Belgium. Three of these stand out:

1. Theological Pilot Project: theological approach to Islamic radicalism (Theologisch pilot project: theologische aanpak van islamitisch radicalisme): This theological pilot project developed by imams and Islam-experts in Flanders tries to prevent radicalization by drawing on religious knowledge and is linked to the Platform of Flemish Imams and Muslim Experts (Vlaams Platform Radicaliseren and Platform van Vlaamse Imams en Moslimdeskundigen, or PVIM).85
2. KLASSE: This initiative aims to impart Islamic knowledge to pupils by recognized religious authorities such as Imam Khalid ben Haddou. It seeks to target radicalization as well as the development of Islamophobia in Belgian schools.86
3. S.A.V.E. (Society Against Violent Extremism): This is an initiative of parents of (former) radical Islamic militants. It aims to impart awareness about radicalization in society from the perspective of affected families. It tries to prevent further radicalization by highlighting the need for psycho-social support of vulnerable persons and their families. It also seeks to strengthen intercultural dialogue and create action plans (Le Tableau Des Actions) for the prevention of radicalization through education and mutual assistance.87

The main feature of Belgium’s prevention approach is its holistic strategy, involving a support network from the local educational sector and from welfare organizations, Flemish employment services as well as job centres, schools, health services, police and justice. These are all linked to a Central Help Desk (CHP) that provides support to young individuals at risk at short notice (within one week). The idea of this prevention network is to avoid a pupil’s expulsion from school. It enables vulnerable individuals to access the labour market or higher-education in order to strengthen their resistance against recruitment by radical organizations. The city of Antwerp developed an education policy that is applicable to all schools in this area; it maintains cooperation with prevention of radicalization services in 26 European countries.88

Given Belgium’s multilingualism, namely French, Flemish, German, English and Arabic (in some cases), the exchange and the cooperation between jihadist actors and networks is much more pronounced than in most other European countries. This could also be noticed from the connections between the Paris-attackers and the Brussels-attackers of the year 2016.89
Denmark

In Denmark, 5.4 per cent of the total population were Muslims in the year 2016. The projected percentage of Muslims of the total population in Denmark in the year 2050 is estimated at 7.6 per cent (estimate with zero migration), 11.9 percent (estimate with medium migration) and 16 per cent (estimate with high migration).

In 2019, the Danish authorities noted that Islamist and jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria remained the primary recipients of terrorist financing from Denmark-based individuals with ties to Sunni Muslim networks. The amount of the transfers decreased due to the reduced opportunities for transferring funds to the (declining) ISIS and because of the small number of remaining Danish citizens within the zones of armed conflict.

With regard to prisons, Europol noted that “Denmark is concerned that radicalized inmates in contact with people from organized crime circles may pose an increasing risk of jihadists gaining access to weapons.” Convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2019 in Denmark were related exclusively to jihads. There have been 21 arrests for jihadist terrorism and four convictions and acquittals for jihadist terrorism, while two jihadist attacks were foiled. In December 2019, arrests were carried out in several locations in Denmark. Seven persons were charged with planning and preparing two separate jihadist attacks in Denmark or another European country.

With regard to the left-wing extremist milieu in Denmark, collaboration between Norwegian and Swedish groups and other European like-minded groups was observed in 2019. Danish right-wing extremist movements increased their ties “to like-minded individuals abroad, including on virtual platforms.” Several anti-Jewish acts e.g., in November 2019, when Danish right-wing extremists “committed acts of gross vandalism and desecration of Jewish symbols and graves,” have been observed.

Governmental PVE Strategies

Following several terrorist incidents, e.g. an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen as well as the “cartoon crisis,” Denmark has strengthened its PVE efforts by means of an Administration of Justice Act. It postulated a multi-sectional collaboration between agencies, organizations, and institutions based on local and regional best practice examples.

The Danish P/CVE approach goes back to the year 2009 and has become known as the Aarhus Model. It involves a cooperation of state as well as municipal structures and focuses mainly on vulnerable individuals, paying special attention to forms of peer monitoring, and educational and psychological support, which is likely to have a positive impact on individuals in terms of providing them with a clearer understanding of their identity and instilling in them a sense of belonging. By tackling intolerance, frustration, and other possible push-factors towards radicalization, this approach amounts to an active form of community-based prevention. The plan includes:

“22 initiatives that would strengthen democracy and provide alternatives to extremism. This would revolve around counter-terrorism, efforts against gangs and youth crime, international co-operation on peace, development and democracy, efforts against discrimination and intolerance, education, jobs and opportunities for all, and integration and intercultural dialogue.”

The Danish PVE strategy is built on a partnership of major actors in the field of the prevention of radicalization and focuses on three aspects:

1. A prevention and exit strategy;
2. The prosecution of radicalized persons;
3. The prevention and countering of threats to national security.
The Aarhus Model became a conceptual role model for other Western countries with regard to early prevention and exit processes. It aims “to stop or redirect the process of violent radicalisation” and is characterized by the reintegration of radicals into society while downplaying “the ideologies as a cause for recruitment into extremist organisations.”

Based on a cooperation of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningsstjeneste, PET), the Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, and various experts from academia, social services, and ministries, the interdisciplinary approach unifies methods from personality psychology, social psychology, societal psychology, social science, and the humanities.

The Aarhus Model is based on six steps:

1. **Step 1:** Information, e.g., from the social environment of an affected individual, regarding his/her potential extremist attitude, is forwarded to the “Info-house” (staffed by the East Jutland Police);
2. **Step 2:** Further information is gathered by the police to assess the situation in detail;
3. **Step 3:** If the results of these investigations lead to the decision that the individual is showing signs of “pre-radicalization,” an interdisciplinary workshop is organized that provides support or counselling;
4. **Step 4:** In cases of “false positives” or “youth rebellion” signs, social services and other relevant measures will be recommended.
5. **Step 5:** If risk factors of violent radicalization are identified, the Information House will start an assessment and stay in contact with the affected person and involve members from the social environment;
6. **Step 6:** Mentors with broad expertise in the field of (prevention of) radicalization will provide social and legal alternatives to resolve personal conflicts.

In 2013 an exit program was added to the Aarhus Model in order to “de-radicalise returning foreign fighters by reintegration efforts that help transition the individual back into society and daily life.” Based on the specific needs of the individual returnee, a task force recommends the kind of assistance which should be offered to the returnee and to his/her social network (e.g. family, friends, school) in order to provide the best possible way for his/her reintegration. On the basis of a written exit-process agreement between the returnee and those responsible for the exit program, specific help suggestions are provided, e.g., with regard to therapy, medical care, employment and accommodation. It is important to note that the exit program includes an exception clause regarding its target group: it only accepts foreign fighters who did not commit any criminal acts and are deemed to pose no security risk to Danish society. This seems to be a problem, because it is widely known that most of the foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) already committed (mostly minor) crimes, before they went abroad. In addition, their participation in ISIS (which might have included fighting against others and probably also killing people) is also seen as a crime. Although the position of the “exit program” regarding possible misuse of the Aarhus Model by some returnees is clear, the practical application is not.

In 2014, the Danish government launched its Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism: Action Plan, based on a dozen initiatives, with a focus on increased involvement of local authorities. It focuses on “pre-radicals” who are 18 years or over and involves strategic partnerships with local authorities, skills-enhancement programs, and additional intervention steps.

An additional focus has been on the development of new P/CVE tools, including:

1. methods for prevention and interventions at an early stage (initiative 4);
2. increased online presence (initiative 5);
3. measures regarding recruitment to terrorist groups to participate in armed conflict abroad (initiative 6);
4. improved exit programs (initiative 7); and
5. closer international partnerships (initiatives 8 and 9).

Furthermore, it recommended a larger degree of civil society collaboration with local authorities (initiative 10) as well as enhanced participation of parents of vulnerable and/or radicalized youth (initiative 11).

In 2016, a National Action Plan “Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation,” was made public. It covers, inter alia, better coordination of evidence-based prevention approaches, issues related to P/CVE online and prison approaches, greater involvement of local communities and municipalities, as well as strengthening of international cooperation.

Against the background of concerns regarding detained ISIS fighters who could escape SDF detention as Turkish forces entered northeast Syria, Denmark’s parliament passed in October 2019 a bill concerning the revocation of Danish citizenship in the case of dual citizenship of FTFs. The new law, which allows citizenship revocation without a trial, states that anyone acting in a manner seriously prejudicial to Denmark’s vital interests may have his or her Danish citizenship revoked, unless the person would be rendered stateless.

**Selected Danish Literature on Radicalization and the Prevention of Radicalization**

Tammikkoa examined the political challenges of community-level PVE practices in Copenhagen and Aarhus. He found, inter alia, that “regarding practices related to Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE): a community-level dialogue was discontinued with an extremist milieu in Copenhagen due to the specific worldview but allowed to continue in a similar situation in Aarhus.” Furthermore, confusion regarding the new concept of PVE and political issues, the decision-making structures and the development of “coherent PVE practices with a solid understanding of PVE goals on a political level” were seen as major challenges in Denmark.

Bertelsen examined the “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalisation Strategies” of the Aarhus Model with regard to its beginning and evolution in view of its exit program. Her article provides important insights on the development of this – in the beginning unique – Danish prevention concept.

Gielen’s articles “Anti-radicalization in Belgium, Denmark and Germany” (Antiradicalisering in België, Denemarken en Duitsland) and “Syria fighters: Rather support families than take their passport” (Syrië-strijders: liever families ondersteunen dan paspoort afnemen) are highly recommended in terms of providing a deeper understanding of the motives of FTFs and their family backgrounds in Denmark, Belgium and Germany. Gielen’s work on exit programmes for female jihadists, her study on the assessment of CVE initiatives, and her recently published doctoral thesis on the evaluation of CVE deal with various challenges linked to the Danish (re-) integration process of different types of jihadists against the background of practicability and usability of existing P/CVE approaches.

Another commendable report is Koehler’s examination of the concept of family counselling, de-radicalization, and counterterrorism, involving a comparison between Danish and German programs. It addresses the need for, and examines the effectiveness of, family counselling regarding (pre-)radicalized individuals at a time when Germany was not aware of its importance, offering several insights based on the Danish model.

There are many other governmental and non-governmental efforts to prevent radicalization in Denmark. Three of these stand out:

1. **The Centre for Prevention of Extremism**: This governmental Centre for Prevention of Extremism brings together multiple stakeholders from the whole of Denmark and offers intervention tools for helping individuals who are entangled in extremist circles,
as well as providing preventive measures for individuals at risk, while also offering support for children and young adults.  

2. **Centre of Prevention**: PET also houses a Centre of Prevention. It coordinates crime prevention networks (SSP - schools, social services and police), PSP (psychiatric sector, social service, and police), and KSP (Danish Prison Service, social service, and police) within its structure. The PET Centre of Prevention offers support for those wanting to leave militant extremism (EXIT) as well as for individuals and groups at risk of becoming radicalized (capacity building) while also addressing certain social preconditions in its outreach activities.  

3. **Unit for the Prevention of Extremism and Radicalization (Forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikaliserer, VINK)**: VINK is a prevention initiative of the municipality of Copenhagen that offers general information regarding the prevention of radicalization for affected families and the public at large. It also offers advice and counselling by professionals, and provides coaching and mentoring for families.

While the success of the Aarhus Model has been widely acknowledged, some critical voices focused on the selection of employees in CVE environments and CVE policies in general. Johansen points out that “the Danish case shows, [that] the detection and categorization of the concept of radicalization is not a straightforward process at the front line of the state.” The responsibility of naming and defining the phenomenon of radicalization is tied to the particular role of the “expert” within the bureaucratic system. However, these “experts” may have been more or less randomly selected for the task. The ever present “terror threat” could lead into an endless “risk assessment that categorizes risk [on the basis of] second-hand information” to “categorical suspicion.” According to Johansen, “it is this balancing act between the politics of anxiety and the potential for public moral outrage that I regard as one of the basic elements of current bureaucratic CVE practices in Denmark.”

Similar to the strategy of the British government, the approach towards the question of repatriation of former Danish foreign fighters or the revocation of their Danish citizenship in terms of a dual-national citizenship is questionable with regard to its effectiveness in terms of the prevention of radicalization. On the one hand, it could be seen as a deterrent for others, telling them not to follow the path of violent extremism without risking the loss of links to their places of origin forever. On the other hand, those defectors who only possess one citizenship – the Danish citizenship - cannot be stripped of it. That would indicate discrimination against some former FTFs of foreign heritage. In this regard, the results of hardliner policies have not been assessed. It is still possible that they could be counter-productive and lead to solidarization effects within the Islamist milieu.

**France**

In France, 8.8 per cent of the total population were Muslims in 2016. The projected percentage of Muslims of the total population in France in the year 2050 is estimated at 12.7 per cent (estimate with zero immigration), 17.4 per cent (estimate with medium immigration) 18 per cent (estimate with high immigration). The Pew Research Center’s survey regarding the destination of migrants to Europe ranked France at third place with 530,000 Muslim migrants and ranked sixth in Europe with 50,000 Muslim refugees.

In 2019, 202 persons were arrested based on charges related to jihadist terrorism, seven individuals had been arrested for right-wing extremism and 13 persons were detained for ethnonationalist and separatist terrorism in France. Four jihadist attacks, including those on March 25, April 26, and September 23, were foiled in 2019. Three jihadist attacks took place in France, including one in May 2019 in Lyon in a pedestrian zone by a student, and another in October in Paris by an IT specialist working for a police intelligence unit in Paris.
French courts issued multiple convictions (105) as well as several acquittals related to jihadist terrorism in 2019.\textsuperscript{144} Between 2018 and 2019, four attacks within French prisons, including one at the Condé-sur-Sarthe prison in March 2019, were foiled.\textsuperscript{145} There have also been several female Islamist terrorists imprisoned in France in recent years. The Children’s Court of Paris issued a sentence against a French-Algerian minor charged with participation in a criminal conspiracy involving the preparation of a terrorist act in the name of ISIS against police officers.\textsuperscript{146} In another case, the Children’s Court of Nancy sentenced three French minor offenders from Belfort for preparing a terrorist act.\textsuperscript{147} The close connection between Belgian, Dutch, and French jihadist networks is still an important source of concern. According to Europol:

“\textit{In the Netherlands, the District Court of Rotterdam heard the cases of several defendants investigated in relation to the discovery of a large amount of ammunition. The defendants were suspected of having been involved in the supply of (part of) the ammunition found in an apartment in Argenteuil (France) in March 2016 that was used by a transnational network of jihadists from Belgium, the Netherlands and France.”}^{148}

Right-wing extremism in France is characterized by various features “such as structured right-wing extremist movements,” e.g., the neo-fascist Troisième Voie (Third Path) and the monarchist Action Française (French Action). These “have lost influence following self-dissolutions in 2014, in an attempt to avoid formal bans following the death of a left-wing activist during an attack.”\textsuperscript{149} In addition, the French white supremacist movement Suavelos provides an internet platform for white supremacists, whose messages have been exposed and faced deletion on major platforms like Facebook and YouTube in the wake of the Christchurch attacks.\textsuperscript{150} Non-structured right-wing extremists in France try to distinguish “original” French natives from those with a Muslim heritage, e.g. by propagating the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, claiming that Muslims plan to replace the original Europeans and “overrun” Western countries.\textsuperscript{151}

In addition to militant movements, the National Front (Front Nationale) and its “neo-conservative” politics have still influence on many French (voters), using Muslim immigration and refugee politics as well as Islamophobia for gaining electoral support. Two attacks on mosques in Brest and Bayonne took place in 2019. The latter incident was reported as being the work of a neo-populist fringe group from the right-wing extremist scene.\textsuperscript{152} With regard to left-wing extremism in France, several militants engaged in violent acts towards public institutions and agents, targeting, inter alia, the security forces. It is assumed that they have established connections with anarchist terrorist milieus in Italy - the Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale, or FAI), and Greece – the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (Synomosia Pyrinon tis Fotias, or CCF), whose modi operandi they partly imitate.\textsuperscript{153}

\textit{Governmental PVE Strategies}

Due to the fact that major terrorist attacks, such as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo incident, and the following year the major incidents in Paris (Bataclan) and Nice took place, and due to the fact that many French foreign fighters departed for Iraq and Syria in order to join ISIS, the French government elaborated since 2014 several counterterrorism plans, including the Action Plan Against Terrorism (which was updated in July 2017). This plan was created by the National Coordination of Intelligence and of the Fight Against Terrorism (La Coordination Nationale du Renseignement et de la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme) and is directly supervised by the French president, providing counterterrorism coordination on the highest level.
On an institutional level, the Anti-Terror Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antiterroriste, or UCLAT) is seeking to prevent terrorist threats. In contrast to some other democratic countries, France allows UCLAT to conduct surveillance of smartphones of suspected persons and to gain physical admission to their electronic devices. Citizens can report suspects to the National Center for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalization (Centre National d’Assistance et de Prévention de la Radicalisation, or CNAPR). This initiative led to thousands of calls on suspect activities and persons right from its start; currently data of some 20,000 persons have been collected in a database for the prevention of radicalization, the ‘File of alerts for the prevention of terrorist radicalization’ (Fichier des signalements pour la radicalisation à caractère terroriste or FSPRT). More than 11,000 persons have been monitored, with 4,000 of them being given the label “pre-terrorist.” This form of prevention of radicalization has been criticized because of the large number of “persons of interest” in relation to the actual threat level within the country.

Unlike some other Western countries, France’s approach to the prevention of radicalization also contains repressive components. The French parliament passed seven major laws on terrorism since the establishment of ISIS. These laws include, for instance, banning convicted jihadists from leaving France, expanded surveillance, the shutting down of jihadist homepages and heavy sentences for participation in terrorist groups, as well as for preparatory acts that might lead to terrorism, with sentences ranging from three to five years in prison for offenders. Since 2018, approximately 1,600 persons have been prosecuted or investigated with regard to jihadist activities. Attempts by French jihadists to join ISIS in Syria can lead to sentences of up to ten years and assistance in ISIS armed operations can lead to sentences of 30 years in prison. In 2018, a governmental plan to create an improved national counterterrorist office was initiated.

Efforts towards the prevention of radicalization in France have, in recent years, moved towards resilience-building directed at the internet, focusing on web content and users. The Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalization (Comité Interministériel de la Prévention de la Déliquance et de la Radicalisation, or CIPDR) coordinates counterradicalization initiatives within France, providing training and supporting resilience-building measures. Until 2016, it invested over €90 million for the support of civil society efforts towards de-radicalization, but was accused of mismanagement by members of the French Senate in 2017. In 2018, CIPDR’s efforts shifted from de-radicalization to disengagement. Its new plan focuses on secondary prevention and on community-building, encompassing sports clubs in addition to schools and universities.

Selected French Literature on Radicalization and the Prevention of Radicalization

The book Preventing jihadist violence: The paradoxes of a security model (Prévenir la violence djihadiste. Les paradoxes d’un modèle sécuritaire) by Romain Sèze addresses French prevention policies since 2014; it is a very good example of critical research. Starting with the question of a proper definition of jihadist radicalization, Sèze discusses the development of various forms of governmental risk management in this area. A very interesting aspect is the author’s critical discussion of attempts of the French government to create a French Islam (Islam de France) or a republican Islam (Islam républicain) as an answer to Muslim radicalization. Sèze understands radicalization as a broad concept (concept 304adicaliz) that can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if not wisely handled.

Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy are the most prominent French researchers on militant Islam, but their positions are very much opposed to each other. Kepel did field-research in the French suburbs (les banlieues) since the 1980s. He identified a combination of poor education, racism-linked deprivation, and economic hardship among Muslim immigrants, making it difficult for them to integrate into French society.
radicalization of young adults within various (international) radical Islamic movements and Salafist groups. As a result of his field-research in French prisons and in the banlieues, Kepel found that both environments were recruiting-areas for ISIS in France. He describes the Islamist practices of many young French Muslims as a rejection of secular society (laïcité) and noted their penchant for the use of violence, as illustrated by the many young French Muslims who departed for Syria, attracted by the Islamic State.

Like Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy has observed radical Islamic movements since the 1980s. However, he concludes that young Muslims did not radicalize because of a lack of integration into French society. Rather, he found that radicalization is mainly a form of protest and provocation and part of a process to sever ties with their own parents. For Roy, this phase of youth development among many young Muslims in French diasporas has been responsible for the tendency of a number of them to turn to a fundamentalist version of Islam as a more congenial environment for their situation.

According to Roy, phantasies of violence and a suicide-inclination of militant young French Muslims, should be seen as the main drivers for them wanting to join jihadist groups, rather than an Islamist ideology. Roy rejects the thesis that the marginalization of young Muslims in the banlieues and their discrimination are the main push factors for those who join the jihadist movement. He notes that the majority of the inhabitants of the banlieues have remained peaceful. Roy also points to the fact that many of the jihadists have been criminal delinquents before becoming violent political extremists. Their inability to make something positive with their lives produces a kind of self-hate. As a liberation from their criminal past, a catharsis through embracing militant jihad offers many of them a way to gain, or re-gain, self-esteem. Due to its heterogeneity, Roy subsumes the current Salafistic movement under the term neo-fundamentalism. It includes a conservative wing that is based on a Wahhabi (Saudi Arabian) interpretation of Islam, and a jihadist wing based on militant Salafism. For Roy, the modern Salafiyya seeks to resurrect the former hegemony of Islam, whereas the Wahabiyya is characterized more by its hostility toward the current (modern) world.

Roy sees the motivation for the violence of young Muslims from the banlieues as being based on their situation of individual hopelessness (e.g. regarding getting a decent job) and labels this process the “Islamization of radicalism” for the “negative heroes” who are challenged by society. Kepel, on the other hand, identifies a “radicalization of Islam” in the acts of many young French Muslims. Kepel sees their wish to participate in the establishment of a “caliphate” as a result of their fundamentalist understanding of Islam.

Next to Kepel and Roy, Farhad Khosrokhavar is another important field researcher. He explores Islamic radicalization in French prisons and also outlines several potentially fruitful approaches to prevention. As a sociologist, he explores changes in the interest of young Muslims for engaging in militant jihad in Europe and beyond.

McLaughlin’s work “Thinking about political radicalization in France” (“Penser la radicalisation politique en France”) provides an alternative approach regarding the roots of radicalization and jihadism (e.g. racial discrimination). He suggests a change of prevention policy in France in terms of a larger investment in education, and in enhancing psychological approaches.

Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié’s work, The fabric of radicality: A sociology of young French jihadists (La Fabrique de la radicalité. Une sociologie des jeunes djihadistes français) examined 133 law suits brought against French jihadists in order to identify from the court documents he studied early signals of their initial radicalization and their growing interest in terrorism and in becoming foreign fighters.

The study The Revenants – They had gone to jihad, they are back in France (Les Revenants. Ils étaient partis faire le jihad, ils sont de retour en France) by David Thomson, an expert in the field of French and Tunisian jihadism, provides useful insights in the motivation of French FTFs/returnees and proposes new prevention approaches for this vulnerable group.
There are many governmental and non-governmental efforts to prevent radicalization in France. Three of these stand out:

1. **Artemis Association**: This governmental program tries to prevent pre-school children from falling under the influence of radicalized family members by strengthening their bonds with relatives who still feel a sense of loyalty to French society.182

2. **Plateforme d’harmonisation, de recoupement et d’orientation des signalements (Platform of harmonization, cross-checking, and orientation of reports – PHAROS)**: This governmental platform serves to locate and neutralize illegal online Internet content which seeks to glorify violence and engages in hate speech. Citizens are invited to report their observations on inappropriate Internet content to the authorities via PHAROS.183

3. **Stop Djihadisme (Stop Jihadism)**: This governmental campaign was initiated after the attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in 2015. It provides both online (via Facebook and Twitter) and offline contacts and prepares counternarrative programs for schools and prisons. In 2016, it launched a well-known project called “Toujours le choix” about two young adults on their way to radicalization that offers several exit options for those undergoing a radicalization process.184

Many governmental PVE approaches in France adopt the penitentiary point of view of the Penitentiary Administration of the French Ministry of Justice and are lacking in more preventive approaches.185 Some of the law enforcement measures could be seen as problematic for young Muslims who want to provoke others in their environment, but are not attracted to violence themselves. Giving harsh punishments, such as a prison sentence, to young Muslims who speak positively about IS, may lead to “solidarization effects” and further radicalization.

French authorities had not considered the impact of religion in terms of extremism until the 1980s. It would appear that they are still not fully aware of appropriate PVE strategies in cases of religious extremism, due to its constitutional principle, that “religion is excluded from the republican way of thinking in France.”186 This stance - which was originally introduced to promote the equality of all French citizens - can be an obstacle when it comes to the prevention of radicalization. This is shown e.g. as in one case, when a moderate Rabbi and a moderate Imam were banned from talking to school classes, because they represent religions and wear religious clothing. If schools ban religious education, they surrender the interpretational sovereignty to outside religious leaders, who may, in some cases, be fundamentalists. With regard to religious radicalization, this could be prevented by introducing regular educational workshops on specific religions in French schools, led by teachers rather than clerics, in line with the concept of laïcité.

France appears to have a high number of female Muslims who travelled to Syria to join ISIS: 33 percent of the 1,324 individuals who travelled from France since 2012 were women.187 The share of young women and even minors involved in terrorist plots in France could point to the need for a larger investment in educational work by schools and communities.

Similar to the UK and Denmark, France’s returnee policy is inflexible, lacking a deeper understanding of initial radicalization motivations of vulnerable young men and women from diasporas, their subsequent rejection of the jihadist ideology, and their wish to be repatriated. With regard to a long-term PVE policy that is likely to reduce the interest in extremist ideologies, French authorities should therefore be considering changing the current hard-line policy towards the repatriation of FTFs and their children.
German Federal Republic

According to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren, or BMI), 5.4 to 5.7 percent of the total population of Germany were Muslims in 2019. The projected percentage of Muslims of the total population in Germany in the year 2050 is estimated at 8.7 per cent (estimate with zero immigration), 10.8 per cent (estimate with medium immigration) 19.7 per cent (estimate with high immigration).

Germany was the primary destination country for asylum seekers from the Middle East, receiving 457,000 asylum requests from Iraqis and Syrians between mid-2010 and mid-2016. With hundreds of thousands of more persons seeking asylum in 2015–16, Germany became the top destination for refugees (86 per cent of whom were Muslim). Nevertheless, the share of people in Germany who hold that large numbers of refugees from countries such as Iraq and Syria are posing a “major threat” is among the lowest of all European countries surveyed (28 per cent).

In 2018, the German Higher Regional Court of Hamburg sentenced three Syrian nationals to long prison sentences for membership to a foreign terrorist organisation (ISIS) and (attempted) document forgery. Furthermore, the Court found that they were “part of an ISIS ‘sleeper cell.’(...) The Islamic State had arranged for them to travel to Germany with false passports, cash, and mobile phones in 2015, telling them to awaited orders for an attack.” In August of the same year, a 19-year-old Afghan national, who had applied for asylum in Germany, stabbed and severely wounded two American tourists in the Amsterdam central railway station, with a terrorist motive. He was arrested on the spot by police. In June 2018, a terrorist plot using ricin was discovered in Cologne, Germany. It was planned by a Tunisian citizen who was inspired by ISIS. He had tried to combine ricin with explosives, ball bearings, and bladed weapons.

An increasing number of offences against Turkish facilities such as shops and mosques, such as those which took place in Lauffen, Baden-Württemberg in 2018, by persons affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK) were interpreted as revenge acts for Turkish attacks on Kurds in Afrin, Syria. Against this background, collaboration between left-wing extremists and Kurdish organizations increased in various European countries.

According to the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2020, 59 arrests were related to terrorist offences in Germany in the year 2018; amongst them 43 for jihadist terrorism, eight for right-wing terrorism, five for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism (with ties to PKK), while the background of three remaining offences have not been specified. Two jihadist attacks occurred in the years 2017 to 2018, while another two jihadist terrorist plots were successfully disrupted. Eight attacks were completed but a number of suspects from right-wing terrorism in Germany could be foiled.

The German right-wing extremist movement is known for its attraction to weapons, explosives and the formation of neo-Nazi circles such as Comradeship (Kameradschaften). There exists also networks of sympathizers from the “intellectual right” as well as right-wing populist/extremist political parties, such as the Revolution Chemnitz group and the Empire Citizens Movement (Reichsbürgerbewegung). They mobilize discontent against migrants, such as in the case of an attack by members of the Revolution Chemnitz in September 2018. They target immigration policies as well political opponents, such as in the case of the Gruppe Freital (Freital Group) which attacked a left-wing politician. Members were found “guilty for leadership or membership within a terrorist organization, multiple attempted murders and grievous bodily harm.” In June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a conservative politician who campaigned for refugees, was shot and killed by a right-wing actor in his own house. It is assumed that this “lone wolf” was not alone but part of a larger right-wing network. Ominously, in 2019, a right-wing extremist network was discovered within the German Federal Army’s (Bundeswehr’s) Special Forces Command (Kommando Spezialkräfte, or KSK), based in
Baden-Württemberg. Several members of the KSK hoarded weapons and explosives and planned an attack. Some of them were members of right-wing extremist groups such as Hannibal that seeks to attack Germany’s democratic system. In June 2020, the German Ministry of Defense dissolved the KSK unit. Furthermore, a rise of anti-Semitic attacks such as the one in Halle in 2019, has been attributed to the German right-wing milieu.

There is also a transnational left-wing and anarchist movement in Germany which includes environmental activists. They collaborate with members of violent anti-fascist movements in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, as well as with left-wing and anarchist extremist persons and groups from Greece. Since the start of the Syrian war, “approximately 5,000 individuals from the EU have travelled to join fighting groups in Iraq and Syria. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK are the major EU source countries.” Germany appears to have experienced the highest proportion (33 per cent) of returning foreign fighters (FTFs). Between 2016 and 2018, the estimated number of violence-prone Islamists grew from 24,400 to 26,560 persons (9 percent).

**Governmental PVE Strategies**

In July 2016, a 10-point declaration called “Strengthening of democracy and prevention” (Demokratie und Prävention stärken), was launched by the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, or BMFSFJ) in cooperation with various municipalities. It seeks to exchange information between social scientists and practitioners within Germany. In addition, in the same year, a governmental strategy with the title “Prevention of Extremism and the Promotion of Democracy” (Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung) was launched by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the BMFSFJ. It involves the establishment of counselling structures on the local level and is meant to focus on vulnerable individuals. The federal prevention program Living Democracy! (Demokratie leben!) sponsors selected prevention ideas for persons at risk, their parents, and families as well as for youth work-related institutions and NGOs. 265 cities in Germany participate in this program, forming so-called Partnerships for Democracy (Partnerschaften für Demokratie, or PfD). In addition, various types of counselling, including for victims, are offered in cooperation with local democracy centres. Specific project ideas on the prevention of radicalization are sponsored by Living Democracy! In 2018, it sponsored 47 projects on the prevention of Islamic extremism.

A National Prevention Program against Islamic Extremism (Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus, or NPP) was launched in 2017. It is administered by the BMFSFJ and BMI, with support from other governmental departments such as the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, or BMBF) and the representative for Migration, Refugees and Integration (IntB). The prevention concept of NPP combines elements of repression and prevention. It is a partnership between civil society organizations and government, with a budget of €100 million in 2018. It identifies focal points for prevention such as communities, mosques, and also focuses on prevention and deradicalization in prisons and in the probation service, and maintains a network of counselling and information points.

These federal PVE approaches must be seen in relation to the governmental claim for the continuous evaluation of their measures in order to improve quality standards in a fast-changing environment. The National Center for Crime Prevention (Nationales Zentrum für Kriminalitätsprävention, or NZK) was commissioned to assess this goal by the “Development of Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Extremism.” This assessment led to the publication
Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Islam- EvIs. This remarkable document identified 38 indicators to detect potential Islamist radicalization.212

In addition to government-driven approaches, various NGOs such as Ufuq or Violence Prevention Network (VPN) are working in the area of prevention of radicalization. These NGOs provide workshops, offer training sessions, distribute literature, and develop information programs (e.g. Inshallah Online - How religious extremists use the internet and what we can do against this, (Inshallah Online - Wie religiöse Extremisten das Internet nutzen und was wir dagegen tun können).213

Although there have been a number of evaluations of governmental prevention programs so far,214 there still exists a wider lack of evaluation initiatives within the field of NGO prevention organizations. In order to provide more “best practice cases” for new employees of these organizations and in order to assess which prevention methods work and which do not, it would be good to begin evaluations within these organizations.215

In Germany a distinction is often made between prevention of violence, and prevention of radicalization.216 The first deals with violent incidents, whereas the second tries to prevent the development of radical ideologies.217 Regarding the latter, it is important to enhance the skills of the employees of prevention initiatives, increasing their levels of expertise and to support them with best practice examples of radicalization cases. They also ought to be given better religious knowledge, e.g. by offering them assistance from Islamic theologians who graduated in Germany, in order to strengthen their position when arguing with young Muslims.218

Some of the major causes for radicalization within Germany are deprivation and prejudices (Islamophobia) since these may cause a loss of a sense of belonging and an intensive search for identity among vulnerable young adults.219 For this reason, a psychosocial approach towards the prevention of radicalization is seen as a key element by several German researchers in this field.220 There are many governmental and non-governmental efforts to prevent radicalization in Germany. Three of these stand out:

1. Datteltäter: This civil society initiative was established in 2015 as a humorous response to the rise of ISIS. Its founders are five young Germans who themselves also have ties to Islam or share a migration background. Datteltäter [Date perpetrator] focuses on prejudices towards Muslims and Islam but also tries to confront and prevent Islamic fundamentalism with the help of satire. Due to its use of various social media platforms and its authentic approach, it has gained several media awards and is very popular among young German adults.221

2. German Institute of Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS): GIRDS focuses on theoretical research as well as practical work. It offers training on de-radicalization and supports other organizations in the development of counterradicalization initiatives and advises these organizations on issues such as re-radicalization while also providing expertise for the evaluation of ongoing projects.222

3. NEXUS: Nexus is part of a project on Prävention und Deradikalisierung in Strafvollzug und Bewährungshilfe (Prevention and De-radicalization in Prisons and Probation Services), and is operated by BMFSFJ, VPN, the NGO Denkzeit-Gesellschaft (Thinking Time Society), and the research group Modellprojekte e.V. (Model Projects e.V.). It offers psychological support for prisoners and their families with the help of the union for the prevention of extremism in Berlin.223

Islamist extremism and its prevention are targeted by 32 percent of the P/CVE programs in Germany.224 Half of all these programs mostly target children and adolescents in critical periods of their lives, in order to help them form an identity and provide them with a sense of belonging, as well as in order to strengthen their resilience against radicalization.225 Experiences of discrimination such as Islamophobia are high risk factors for radicalization in
Germany. Due to the fact that the majority of radical Islamic movements belong to a non-violent puritan social environment, the major aims of 75 per cent of PVE programs in Germany focus on knowledge transfer and educational work and deal with youth, (social) professions and civil society in the context of primary prevention. Only few PVE program providers such as VPN, offer additional secondary and tertiary prevention programs (including de-radicalization and opt-out-programs) such as the Coordination and Advisory Center for the Prevention of Radicalisation (KORA).226

One of the challenges for many German PVE programs is the lack of external or internal evaluations, as Gansewig and Walsh found in their study about the utilization of “formers” from extremist milieus in PVE projects.227 It was found that 15 per cent of the German projects did not carry out an evaluation in 2017.228 Therefore, the NZK recommends the integration of quality guidelines such as the Beccaria Standard,229 already in a project’s planning stage.230

It is notable that family counselling is hardly a focus in German PVE projects though there is a manifest need for such counselling.231 Germany counts a large number of Muslim communities with ties to Turkey and other Muslim countries such as Morocco. Some of the young adults from these communities do not only participate in an Islamist movement but also in ethno-nationalist and separatist movements. Yet others are linked to organized crime. It is important to increase support for the families affected by this and to involve them in PVE strategies to counter extremism.

The United Kingdom

In the UK, 6.3 per cent of the total population were Muslims in the year 2016.232 The projected percentage of Muslims of the total population in the UK in the year 2050 is estimated at 9.7 per cent (estimate with zero immigration), 16.7 per cent (estimate with medium immigration) 17.2 per cent (estimate with high immigration).233 43 per cent of recent migrants into the UK were Muslims.234 According to a survey of the Pew Research Data, 80 per cent of British people who have a negative opinion of Muslims said that the high number of refugees from Iraq and Syria represent a major threat.235 However, only 17,000 asylum seekers from Iraq and Syria were counted in the UK whereas 457,000 asylum seekers reached Germany at the same time.236

According to Europol’s EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 281 terrorism-related arrests between 2015 and 2019 have been reported in the UK (not including Northern Ireland).237 With regard to right-wing terrorist attacks, one completed attack and three foiled plots were recorded in the UK in 2019 (not including ethno-nationalist attacks in Northern Ireland).238

Governmental PVE Strategies

Since the 7/7 bombing of 2005 which targeted people in London transport, the British government has developed four “pillars” that form the UK’s government CVE policy CONTEST:

1. Prevent the ideological challenge of terrorism;239
2. Pursue (stopping terrorist attacks happening in the UK and overseas)
3. Protect against a terrorist attack in the UK or overseas;
4. Prepare to mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident if it occurs.240

Prevent costs nearly £40m per year and is meant to prevent young people from joining terrorism-related activities or supporting these activities, focusing on the “pre-criminal space.”241 It includes training for public sector workers and frontline practitioners such as
nurses, probation officers, doctors, teachers, and university lecturers in order to prevent radicalization. Through the “Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015,” Prevent became a legal obligation, the frequency of trainings increased, including in the private sector, as in the case of cooperation with the fast food chain McDonald’s. Prevent will be discussed in more detail below. When it was initiated, its approach was unique among Europe’s PVE strategies; it was also exported to other countries.

Prevent is accompanied by a program termed Channel. It means a Prevent referral will be indicated, for instance based on a recommendation of a general practitioner whose patient might have shown “signs of radicalisation.” Such a “case will be screened by the Prevent lead within the organisation, often a safeguarding professional.” The police will examine whether the person who might be at risk of radicalization is not already part of “an active counter-terrorism investigation” and will check the motivation based on the “3M test” (“misguided, malicious or misinformed”).

After that process, the case might be discussed in a Channel panel meeting, a multi-agency assembly that is led by the police; it involves various representatives, e.g., from health, education, or local authorities in the decision-making procedure. At this stage, a check regarding specific needs of a “pre-radicalized” person (such as mental health support) would not yet have taken place.

With regard to Prevent and the Channel process, Aked criticizes the fact that only between five and ten per cent of the total amount of all Prevent referrals led to the Channel panel, whereas between 90 and 95 per cent of the referrals have been marked as “false positives” by the police. Regardless of the fact that some “Prevent cases never reached a Channel panel, all of the referrals are recorded in a Prevent Case Management (PCM) database, and reportedly stored for seven years.”

Although over 1,500 individuals have been brought into the Channel program since 2012, the exact content of the program is still kept secret. The BBC compared it with a system of “re-education,” while the Home Office calls it “ideological mentoring,” claiming also that participation is “voluntary and confidential.”

The report “False Positives: The Prevent counter-extremism policy in healthcare” addressed some of the problems found, including a suspected correlation between mental health issues of certain individuals and their engagement in violent extremism or terrorism. The report found that:

“The evidence for official claims that people with mental health conditions are more likely to be drawn into terrorism is not robust enough to base policy upon. […] some mental health specialists believe the claim risks pathologisation and exacerbating stigma.”

In addition, the report criticized the pressure on health workers by authorities “to navigate [and] to comply, and to refer, often without consent.” It was reported that many were “deeply concerned about the possibility of a broader erosion of trust and some are concerned about criminalization in the context of all Prevent referral data being recorded on a police database.” The report concluded that the Prevent policy in healthcare rests on “grey areas, a lack of clarity, conflation of safeguarding with public protection and a failure to distinguish between “vulnerable” patients and patients lacking capacity.” The large variation in Prevent referrals and the false positives rates across the National Health Service (NHS) “was considered as problematic.” Another result of the study was that Prevent might contribute to discrimination of two groups in the UK: Asian communities and Muslims. Asians were referred four times more often than non-Asians. Muslims were referred eight times more than non-Muslims. In addition, Aked’s report on Prevent found that “it stigmatizes people with mental health conditions, and often damages the care they receive. There is also strong
evidence that Prevent is damaging presumption of patient consent and confidential medical care, and trust in the medical profession.”

The Prevent training materials include indicators of possible signs of radicalization that are built on elements of the “Extremism Risk Guidance 22+” (ERG22+), also known as Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework. They were based on just one psychological study that identified 22 factors (“Engagement factors,” “Intent factors,” and “Capability factors”) considered as possible radicalization indicators. Although this framework has been embedded in Prevent since 2011, it was classified until 2015 and the underlying assumptions were never made public, which makes the reliability and validity of it difficult to assess.

According to the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism:

“Psychometric systems like the ERG22+ “mix structured forensic analysis models, traditionally focused on mental illness and deviance, with other models of intelligence analysis containing strong ideological and political connotations” and “consistently use ambiguous factors in their application.”

While the Home Office claimed that 85 per cent of the Channel participants had emerged from the programme without any future interest in radicalization, its efficacy is empirically unverifiable from the outside. Several former participants, e.g. the Parsons Green bomber who had been flagged to Prevent, or the perpetrator of the London Bridge attack in December 2019, who had completed this program, were clearly not de-radicalized.

Selected Review of the British Literature on Radicalization and the Prevention of Radicalization

An outstanding study on the development of ISIS-related radicalization in Britain as well as on prevention possibilities, is titled *The Islamic State in Britain. Radicalization and Resilience in an Activist Network* and authored by Michael Kenney in 2018. He suggested that:

“Britain and other Western democracies can continue to deal with the threat of violent extremism without sacrificing the political rights and civil liberties that sustain their own identities as democratic societies. Part of the solution is to allow groups that engage in peaceful protest the room to express their grievances lawfully. This is part and parcel of what makes Britain great.”

Kenney’s approach aims to actively include British Muslims as citizens of the UK in the process of preventing and countering radicalization – an approach also advocated in other studies which do not stereotype members of Muslim diasporas as “enemies” of British values. According to Heath-Kelly, the “othering” of British Muslims has been a result of various jihadist attacks in Britain. But this “othering” can lead to a solidarization of young Muslims and converts with radical Islamist groups. More recent initiatives by the British government indicate a shift from a repressive to a preventive approach, and often include a focus on family counselling to prevent radicalization.

The study titled “I left to be closer to Allah. Learning about Foreign Fighters from Family and Friends” by Amarasingam and Dawson, also emphasizes the need for the involvement of family and friends in prevention and deradicalization approaches. Sadek Hamid’s work “The Attraction of ‘Authentic’ Islam. Salafism and British Muslim Youth” discusses the search of young British Muslims for a non-traditional, but “pure” Islam. He underlines the importance of a “shelter” which a (strict) religious community can offer to young adults in the face of daily
discrimination while they are torn between familial traditions, societal expectations, political pressure, and individual wishes.

Sarah Marsden, in her book *Terrorist Recidivism: Deradicalisation and Reintegration*, underlines the need “to focus on addressing perceived misinterpretations of religion, or attempting to modify emotional responses to perceived injustice to encourage people to pursue those same goods in pro-social ways.” She recommends a “Good Lives Model” – a concept that contains both values and personal agency, in order to combat terrorism - and to pay closer attention to individuals in their social and political context in order to secure better outcomes.

In part of the British literature on the subject there is a major focus on prevention within educational settings, based on “the idea that access to quality education for all students, regardless of gender, culture, faith, nationality or ethnicity, is the starting point for PVE.” A fine account on this topic can be found in Taylor and Soni’s “Preventing Radicalisation: a Systematic Review of Literature considering the Lived Experiences of the UK’s Prevent Strategy in Educational Settings.” Afia Ahmed Chaudhry’s dissertation “Resisting Radicalisation: The Impact of the Prevent Duty on Teacher-Student Relationships” is field-research based and raises pertinent questions with regard to the usefulness of prevention initiatives in schools or by teachers. Chaudhry observes: “it is perhaps important to note the way teachers engage with this topic because it encourages the need for critical and honest debate, spearheaded by those directly impacted by government policy.”

With regard to the prevention of radicalization within schools and universities, there are a number of notable studies. There has been a growth of Islamic NGOs which claim to be able to prevent and de-radicalize their fellow believers, which, in turn, has led to criticism from others in Muslim communities. Many Muslims do not see the benefits of a pedagogical approach, with some of them viewing this as a new form of governmental surveillance of Muslims in so-called “safe spaces,” with racist implications. Indeed, there have been a few cases identified where teachers or social workers have been unmasked as counterterrorism officers. This has led to a higher level of mistrust towards such education-based initiatives, and, possibly, also contributed to radicalization.

There are many governmental and non-governmental initiatives to prevent radicalization in the UK. Three of these stand out:

1. **The Active Change Foundation (ACF):** This initiative was led by its founder Hanif Qadir, a former radical-Islamic activist, and his team from 2005 until 2019. It aimed to empower young Muslims and to prevent them from being attracted by radical Islamist ideas. One well-known initiative of the ACF was its campaign #NotinmyName. Like some other groups, the ACF has been accused by some members from Muslim communities of conducting surveillance for the intelligence service and many participants became mistrustful and left the foundation.

2. **Project Generation Global (the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change):** This project offers training for teachers to facilitate dialogue in the classroom in order to create “safe spaces.” It tries to connect classrooms across the globe and helps students to navigate their problems in a positive way.

3. **Imams Online:** This initiative tries to prevent radicalization through imparting Islamic knowledge by recognized religious authorities.

Ahmed Patel, the brother-in-law of the former London 7/7 bomber Mohammed Siddique, is an excellent example of a British Muslim who stood up against religious radicalization. From an outside observer’s perspective, it would appear that people like Patel are authentic actors in the field of prevention work and should therefore be included to a greater extent in British (non-) governmental PVE approaches.

According to Lloyd and Dean, guidelines for assessing risk in extremist offenders are necessary in order to prevent recidivism. Although it would appear that the Home Office has
changed its strategy toward some elements of the original program. In the case of Prevent, many elements are still unknown and may remain so for some time. This lack of transparency, in combination with the terrorist attacks by former participants in this program, does not increase trust in its efficacy.

Lessons Learned

In the following, a selection of outstanding national PVE approaches will be discussed. These could be applied, or at least helpful, for the improvement of such approaches in other countries.

A good example for a promising PVE approach is DERAD, a project of eight institutions from six European countries aimed at the prevention of radicalization in prisons. It supports imprisoned political offenders as well as officers guarding them, warning the latter about the risks of jihadist recruitment in general and individual radicalization processes in particular. As a large-scale program with a broad online menu, it supports prison and probation officers as well as officials from judiciaries, translation services, law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders. Furthermore, DERAD provides recommendations based on court decisions across Europe and offers advice regarding social rehabilitation. One spin-off of DERAD is HERMES, a platform for interactive training for CVE-activities.

Two other good examples in the field of CVE and PVE deserve to be mentioned. The first is the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which was established in 2011 and currently includes several thousand stakeholders from academia, government, and civil society, including many social workers. RAN offers a broad range of workshops and activities for the exchange of good practices among participants.

One of the main participant groups of RAN are consultants involved in preventing and countering radicalization that leads to violent extremism, especially on the municipal level within Europe. RAN organizes working groups related to specific topics or professions such as prison and probation workers. Such groups meet on- and offline and exchange information about challenges and new approaches. Their experiences and recommendations are gathered in reports and so-called “Collection of practices” - a selection of best practices which are freely available on the internet.

One of the best studies about female radicalization with regard to ISIS in Europe and abroad, is the book *Guest House for Young Widows - Among the Women of ISIS* by Azadeh Moaveni. It highlights the fate of several girls from their initial radicalization in their countries of origins, to their departure for joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq and their escape from the terrorist organization. In addition, it sketches a critical picture of their social and political circumstances as well as their interest in religion. The different reasons for girls and young women from the “West” and the “East” for radicalization are identified, without losing sight of the individuality of decision-making by these female jihadists. One key finding of the book with regard to the prevention of radicalization is the fact that Muslims, who are socially and religiously conservative, should not automatically be viewed by governments as extremists and treated as such. Otherwise, the alienation of Muslimas which is often based on the absence of a self-determined life perspective, might make them even more vulnerable to radicalization.

Conclusion

This overview of various efforts towards the prevention of radicalization in Western Muslim diasporas in five countries has shown that over the years there has been a shift from CVE to PVE. The initial, more repressive, CVE approach was the result of a series of terrorist attacks in Europe and North America and was meant to restore a sense of security among citizens. Strict law enforcement and the frequent stereotyping of members of one religion as potential
“enemies” did not bring about a decline in radicalization or a greater identification of diaspora members with the cultural and political values of Western societies. Rather, it led to a new wave of clashes with the host country’s traditional values, and to new forms of radicalization and further attacks, partly driven by growing Islamophobia, and partly driven by a continuing search for belonging which the former “Islamic State” initially seemed to satisfy.301 The old truism that “violence begets violence” became true again, e.g., in France, where various special armed police units such as the Sentinelle, while meant to restore public security, were also seen as provocation by some members of Muslim communities. Furthermore, their presence did apparently not significantly reduce the number of attacks in France, or lead to a decline in numbers of radicalized French citizens and residents. Terrorist attacks in Britain could not all be prevented by the extensive public surveillance put in place, but seemed to “provoke” or - even worse - to “attract” some social media “addicted” jihadists who wish to see themselves being video-taped during their attacks in order to become “famous” in the online Jihadi scene.

The idea of monitoring one section of the public and inviting citizens to report on their neighbours’ activities leaves a bitter taste, especially in those countries which experienced Fascist rule in the not so distant past. While the idea to prevent terrorist attacks with the help of civil society involvement and citizens’ awareness of radicalization symptoms in their neighbourhood is based on good intentions and can be made to work, as exemplified by the Danish Aarhus model, it is a double-edged sword as it can also lead to greater mistrust between host society and diasporas, fan religion-based prejudices, and provoke vigilantism in the form of right-wing racist actions.

In recent years, it has become quite clear that a long-term solution for the problem of radicalization has to be sought in preventive approaches302 at various levels. An example of this could be the initiative of the European Commission termed EU Cities against Radicalisation.303 Radicalization does not come out of the blue but is, in the majority of cases, the result of persistent discrimination, deprivation, and the absence of societal and political participation. Vulnerable persons have to be approached by others who do not judge them beforehand, but are willing to listen and help them to discover the various pull and push factors behind their attraction to extremist ideas.304 Professional assistance, based on psychosocial approaches, appears to be the way forward to show vulnerable people how to make something of their own lives without feeling the need to destroy the lives of others to feel empowered themselves.305

Successful PVE approaches are usually based on the cooperation of experts from academia with practitioners such as street workers.306 In addition to skilled social workers and trained psychologists, such combined efforts can also include individual police officers who are well-known and trusted within the community.

The CVE approach became for a while “big business” in some of the countries discussed.307 However, many initiatives were often mismanaged and less than sensitive to the actual needs of the targeted groups. According to Johansen, many CVE “experts” have been randomly selected for the task. In some cases, they were chosen because of their skills to manage risk in different domains, such as youth crime prevention, protection of children’s well-being, or the prevention of substance abuse among homeless and mentally disadvantaged groups.308

This review of the P/CVE-approaches in the five Western countries highlights that in reality several of the initiatives in the field of CVE were not able to provide adequate help. It is important not to repeat the same mistakes in the growing field of PVE.

The key element of PVE should be the willingness to understand the real needs of vulnerable individuals and groups in diasporas so that adequate assistance can be provided. PVE approaches should be able to challenge fundamentalist religious narratives in various spheres of life - such as schools, families, sport clubs, mosques, and on the internet - and try to offer constructive and persuasive alternative religious and non-religious narratives. This can only be achieved when and where credible narratives are provided by authentic “role
models”. Whether these are (quietist) religious authorities, peer-group members with street credibility, or highly-regarded individuals from local communities. The best PVE initiatives respond to actual needs by combining religious, social, psychological, academic, and criminological expertise. Such approaches ought to be based on a “living-together” approach that includes the “Good Lives Model” for everyone in society.

With regard to the various (non-)governmental approaches of prevention within the five countries that have been briefly discussed in this chapter, it might be wise to abandon the idea that it is possible to invent a national Islam (be it French or German) or a Euro-Islam. It should be accepted by Western democracies that religious affiliation and practice, freedom of thought, and belief is a private matter and a human right. The inalienable rights of religious freedom and freedom of speech should be granted to everyone, regardless of their religious affiliation. Conservative religiosity is not synonymous with fundamentalism nor is it linked to terrorism. Not every statement of young Muslims about ISIS should necessarily be seen as “real” sympathy for violence, but might just be an expression of youth “rebellion” against their social environment.

In this context, we should also ask ourselves whether the term “Western Muslim Diasporas” is not already a form of “othering,” implying that Muslims could never be “real” citizens of Western countries because their “real” loyalties lie elsewhere. The othering of Muslims who in their majority have become Western citizens makes them more vulnerable to radical recruiters. This vicious circle can only be interrupted by strengthening the national ties of citizens with Islamic roots towards their Western homelands and through the support of their feeling of belonging to a specific Western society. According to Yasseen, “the underlying rationale for the strategy is not to implicate all Muslims as terrorists,” because this assumption “unintentionally perpetuates the myth of an antagonistic relationship between Islam and the West. The very act of identifying Muslims as the “other” that needs to be engaged creates the space for those who are predisposed to viewing Islam and Muslims in negative terms.”

Another term is also problematic: “Islamist.” It is widely used in the fields of P/CVE. On the face of it, “Islamist” seems to be a suitable description for radical, fundamentalist, extremist, and terrorist approaches associated with the religion Islam, because the term seems to cover all of this. However, the use of this term might actually support recruiters for radical Islamic movements because it associates an entire world religion with terrorist attacks and implicitly criminalizes all believers - although most of them would never dream of getting involved in violent extremism or perpetrate terrorist attacks themselves. Lawyer and Islamic theologian Hamideh Mohagheghi sees an implicit combination of crime and religion in the term “Islamist,” one that is negatively influencing public perception of a particular religion. One wonders why such a link between a crime and a religious affiliation is not applied to acts of terrorism perpetrated by members of other religions, such as Christianity. In the US, a number of perpetrators of terrorist acts have been Christian fundamentalists, but nobody calls this phenomenon “Christianism” or their attacks “Christianistic.”

Within Europe, there is no common legal understanding of radicalization and extremism. This has led to diverse penalties for those considered radicalized and extremists. This has social and political consequences, such as when it comes to the “resocialization” of “formers” into their societies. For this as well as for other reasons, and in accordance with the EU’s External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism directive from June 2020, the cooperation between different (EU) countries regarding the internal and external dimensions of counterterrorism and prevention should be strengthened in order to build more effective synergies between these countries. It might be wise to consider the implementation of “uniform” PVE strategies and laws on (at least) a European level. By following a common strategy, without “regional or local exceptions”, the (sometimes) misleading approaches and effects that result from dissimilar P/CVE approaches could be avoided and the positive effects
of PVE measures in each country could be increased. This would be in line with a recent recommendation of the Council of the European Union regarding the use of strategic communication “to enhance EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism” and to “contribute to national and regional efforts to address terrorism and curtail the radicalisation and recruitment that bolster extremist groups.”

Seven Recommendations

Based on the research of the PVE strategies within the selected five European countries of this chapter and the author’s own experiences in the field of prevention of jihadist radicalization, the following recommendations are offered with regard to the improvement of the effectiveness of future prevention of radicalization efforts and existing PVE approaches:

1. Resilience Assessment Tools

With regard to the debate of the possible repatriation of former foreign fighters and other returnees such as children, it might be wise to develop a Resilience Assessment Tool for first- and second-line practitioners e.g. probation officers, social and youth workers, teacher, as well as university lecturers who have to deal with vulnerable individuals in order to prevent recidivism to the jihadist milieu.

In addition, Resilience Assessment Tools have to be developed in a multi-disciplinary collaboration of religious scientists, law enforcement agencies, criminologists, and ethnologists with regard to the specific needs of the vulnerable returning groups. According to Orla Lynch, “trauma training should be a key component for interventionists/practitioners. This should involve a self-care component as well as awareness of trauma in clients.”

Currently, insufficient psychological support is provided to former foreign fighters and returnees in Europe. In addition, there is a shortage of polyglot therapists who are aware of the specific radicalization content and the experiences of members of jihadist groups. Therefore, it might be helpful for the reintegration of these individuals into their society to provide therapists who are able to talk to their clients in their mother tongues in order to provide a secure climate of communication.

Furthermore, it must be guaranteed that only female therapists will talk to female individuals who experienced violence by men, or refuse to talk to male therapists for religious reasons. The provision of specific therapies for traumatized children whose parents have a background of religious extremism is also essential.

Resilience Assessment Tools could be used, for example, for the evaluation of reintegration programs of former foreign fighters, as well as other returnees and their children, in order to assess their effectiveness and sustainability and to recommend, if necessary, modifications.

2. Create Support Groups for Formers and Returnees

Apart from psychological, pedagogical, and law enforcement approaches regarding formers and returnees, the development of support groups – led by repatriated and re-socialized formers or returnees - can be seen as an authentic approach to get in touch with these vulnerable persons and make sure that they feel understood. In contrast to professional support situations with clearly defined roles such as “therapists” and “clients”, a low threshold connection between individuals who experienced similar radicalization processes or experienced fascination for violence themselves, could enable formers and returnees to open up, exchange information with each other on their daily frustrations and experiences, and talk about their fear of
recidivism due to continuing links with their previous networks. Such support groups for formers and returnees are important and well-suited for the prevention of re-radicalization.

3. Support Groups for Parents and Siblings of Radicalized Individuals

There is also a need for the establishment of support groups for parents and siblings of (former) radicals in order to empower these, both for themselves as well as for their brothers, sisters and children. In contrast to family counselling that is often led by professionals or experts in these fields, this approach may be more likely to be successful if it could provide a “private sphere” or “protected places” for parents and siblings of radicalized individuals. There they could find some respite away from media attention, to exchange information, if they want to, and find others who experienced the same as they did. From this author’s perspective, this concept is comparable to the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) groups where churches or public buildings provide places for AA to meet and where they can find a mentor who has “recovered.”

4. Invest in Family Counselling

According to Koehler, “Family matters far more in de-radicalization and counter-terrorism work than typically realized. (…) The social environment and within it, more specifically, close friends and family, is arguably one of the spaces in which violent radicalization takes place and becomes visible in early stages.” According to one study on lone actor terrorists, family as well as friends recognized the future perpetrator’s increasing interest in terrorism “in 63.9% of the cases because the offender verbally told them.” With regard to future PVE approaches in the field of jihadist radicalization, family counselling programs could be very useful for “pre-radicals,” because the family as a social unit and the internal family dynamics and individual driving forces behind violent radicalization can be targeted. In compliance with Koehler’s recommendations, various quality standards should be introduced for family counselling programs in the PVE environment. Furthermore, families should be treated “as partners in early prevention and even intervention work” and “not be seen as a source of intelligence and information for the authorities.”

5. Research on the Physical and Mental Health Impacts of Prevention Programs on their Clients

As has been pointed out by Aked, this area is seen as “chronically under-studied” and needs “further evidence,” especially with regard “to people with mental health conditions, […], BAME [Blacks, Asians and Minority Ethnics] groups, and children and young people.” It might be useful to adopt a strategy of “proportionate universalism” instead of focusing on specific individuals and to avoid the pathologization as well as discrimination against certain groups. In addition, funding for research on prevention programs appears to be a good step towards a more effective strategy based on justice and equality.

6. Greater Awareness of the Terminology in PVE Programs

With regard to PVE programs and projects, appropriate terminology is crucial. Currently, it seems to be quite “trendy” to integrate the term “religious related extremism” in the title of PVE approaches. Several projects have been funded that include this terminology. Critics from the Muslim community point out that “religious related extremism” is just a cloak for Islamic extremism. In fact, a large number of these projects cannot hide the fact that their main interest
lies in countering Islamic radicalization and they are solely interacting with Muslim communities but not with any other religious community. One example of this practice is the German federal government’s working committee Religious Related Extremism (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus*, or BAG RelEx), that was established in 2016 as an association with 26 civil society partners. In 2018, it still concentrated on “Islamic-related extremism.”³³⁵ This exclusive focus raises suspicions within Muslim communities. Some also fear potential cooperation of these PVE approaches with security services, e.g., in terms of providing personal data from members of Muslim communities or groups.

7. The Integration of Quietist Salafi Preachers in PVE Approaches

In Germany, another gap in the field of prevention of radicalization is the refusal of governmental PVE approaches to integrate quietist preachers from the Salafi milieu in prevention projects. In the view of this author, this is short-sighted. This author found that a number of quietist/puritan Salafist preachers whom she had interviewed did very good prevention work in their local environment, managing to dissuade a number of ISIS-sympathizers who wanted to become foreign fighters in Syria, thanks to their religious reasoning skills. They were certainly more successful and more interested in the needs of young Muslim adults than many imams from other Muslim associations such as, for instance, The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, or DITIB), the largest Islamic Union in Germany, controlled by the powerful Turkish government agency for religious affairs Diyanet, which “services” more than 900 communities and affiliates in Germany. Based on the author’s own experiences with many quietist preachers, they would recommend their integration into PVE approaches, because they are often more aware of the specific needs of the target groups who are at risk for being attracted to jihadism than anyone else, but deny violence as “un-Islamic” themselves.

The decision to include puritan Salafist preachers within prevention or de-radicalization work should certainly be decided on a case-by-case basis. With regard to this decision, Western societies should keep in mind that these preachers have great knowledge of Islam that could be very helpful when it comes to theological “debates” with radicalized individuals. The puritan Salafist preachers would not require a specific religious education, because they are already familiar with Islamic theology and sources – although their interpretation can certainly not be considered as “liberal.” But for the sake of avoiding Muslim teenagers and (young) adults killing and getting killed in the name of Islam, most of the puritan Salafist preachers can be seen as strong potential partners, because they also see jihadist movements such as ISIS as evil and describe them as anti-Islamic, due to ISIS’ focus on violence and “wrong” Islamic sources.

In the view of this author, puritan Salafist preachers could become strong allies of Western societies and help them in separating vulnerable Muslim youth from jihadist Salafist preachers. That is important, because puritan Salafist preachers are often themselves threatened physically by jihadist Salafist preachers and their followers, because – in contrast to the jihadist Salafist preachers - they stand up against violence in the name of Islam. Though this peaceful attitude of the puritan Salafist preachers is often not visible to the public, it could become more visible by their official acceptance by the government. This would support the daily prevention work of these Salafist preachers. Based on this author’s field-research in nine European countries, some experts are aware of the fact that various puritan Salafist preachers try to achieve respect for their prevention work within so called “secular” mosques whose imams they often support in terms of “de-radicalization.” However, so far, they often do not receive any personal or monetary credits for their Islamic “de-radicalization” and prevention work. This lack of recognition frustrates them a great deal. If governmental P/CVE approaches would officially include puritan Salafist preachers in their P/CVE programmes, this would, on the one hand,
strengthen their bond to Western societies and values. On the other hand, the experience of governmental respect and the recognition of being part of a “good cause” would surely be transferred into the P/CVE work of puritan Salafist preachers. Thereby the vicious circle of Muslim- or Islam-related discrimination - as one of the major drivers for radicalization in Western societies - could be broken. In sum, the integration of purist Salafist preachers into governmental P/CVE efforts should be seen as valuable for both diaspora youth at risk and Western societies as a whole.

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Endnotes

1 A longer version of this chapter, including more case studies, has been published as: Käsehage, Nina (2020). *Prevention of Violent Extremism in Western Muslim Diasporas, Religionswissenschaft: Forschung und Wissenschaft*. Berlin and Zürich: LIT Verlag.


3 In this chapter, “prevention” and “Radicalization” relate solely to religion. It is important to underline this focus, because members of Muslim diasporas can also be radicalized by a secular ideology.


11 Ibid.


16 The real or imagined discrimination against Muslims in the “non-Islamic world” and abroad is also a strong motivation for converts to Islam to solidarize with the needs of “the” Islam. In cases of radicalization, it can be seen as a push-factor for the recruitment of new activists for violent ideologies. Cf. Kunst, Jonas R., and David L. Sam, ‘Relationship


18 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and Council of Europe ‘Annual Report on ECRI’s Activities Covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2018,’ *ECRI and Council of Europe*, 29, 2019, pp. 10ff. Conversely, “Westernphobia” may be discerned in religion related education within radical Islamic milieus among Europe. In contrast to “Islamophobia,” a phenomenon that is measurable in all societal milieus within ‘Western’ societies, “Westernphobia” is solely assessable within a minor field: the radical, religion-related environment.


Bayrakli and Hafez 2019, Foreword.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


26 Jikeli 2018, p. 103.

27 Bayrakli and Hafez 2019, p. 12.


33 Cf. Pew Research Center, ‘Europe’s Growing Muslim Population. Muslims are projected to increase as a share of Europe’s migration – even with no future migration,’ Pew Research Centre, 29 November 2017, p. 5.

34 Tahir, Kunst, and Sam 2018, p. 2.


36 Although the need for a multidisciplinary approach and the cooperation of governments and stakeholders regarding the prevention of violent extremism followed one key requirement of the *EU Counterterrorism Strategy* from 2005, van Ginkel and Entenmann pointed out, that not all EU member states have adopted comprehensive strategies that include preventive measures (Van Ginkel, Bibi, and Eva Entenmann, Eva, ‘The Foreign
35 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
43 Council of European Union 2020, p. 12.
44 Ibid., pp. 2ff.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 5.
48 Ibid., p. 10.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 20; p. 22.
55 See van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016.
58 Ibid., p. 31.
59 Ibid.
62 Europol 2020, p. 22.
63 Ibid., p. 61.
65 Dechesne and Paton 2020, p. 5.
66 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 85.
71 Ibid., p. 84.
72 The Pyramid Prevention model focuses on prevention measures for the well-being of people in a broad social context society (Level 0: Broad, societal context: political, social, cultural, ecological; Level 1: Improvement of the living environment and Level 2: General prevention) on the one hand. On the other hand, it consists of “urgent, problem-oriented immediate preventive measures (Level 3: Specific prevention and Level 4: Tackling the problem).” - Kudlacek et al.2017, pp. 28ff.
75 Ibid., p. 27.
76 For more information see: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7447_en
78 Ibid.
80 Ibid., pp. 897ff.
83 Cf. Ellis, B. Heidi, et al., ‘Relation of Psychosocial Factors to Diverse Behaviors and Attitudes among Somali Refugees,’ Am J Orthopsychiatry, 86, 2016, pp. 393-408.


S.A.V.E. Belgium. Available at: https://savebelgium.org/.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 23; p.41.


Ibid., p. 83; p. 85; p. 87.

Ibid., p. 38.

Ibid., p. 61.

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 67.


Ibid., pp. 39f.

Ibid., p. 39.


Ibid.

See Bertelsen 2015.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 See Bertelsen 2015.
115 See Danish Government 2014.
118 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 See Bertelsen 2015.
124 See Gielen 2014.
131 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET), ‘The Centre for Prevention,’ PET. Available at: https://www.pet.dk/English/The%20Preventive%20Security%20Department/The%20Centre%20for%20Prevention.aspx.
132 Forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikaliserings (VINK). Available at: https://vink.kk.dk/.


Ibid.

Europol 2020, p. 85.

Ibid., p. 84; p. 37; p. 27.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 87; p. 26.

Ibid., p. 13; p. 35.

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 29.


Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., p. 66.

Ibid., p. 61.

Cf. Hecker, Marc, ‘137 shades of terrorism. France’s jihadists face justice’ (*137 nuances de terrorisme. Les djihadistes de France face à la justice*) Focus stratégique, n° 79, April 2018. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/focus-strategique/137-nuances-de-terrorisme-djihadistes-de-france-face.


See Brisard et al. 2018.


Sèze 2019a, p. 96; p. 89.


See Kepel 2012 and2015.

See Kepel 2015.


Cf Roy 2006.


182 L’Association Artemis. Available at: https://www.association-artemis.com/.

183 Plateforme d’harmonisation, de recoupement et d’orientation des signalements (PHAROS). Available at: https://www.internet-signalement.gouv.fr/PortailWeb/planets/Accueil/input.action.

184 Stop Djihadisme. Available at: http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr

185 Kudlacek et al. 2017, p. 41.

186 Ibid., p. 42.


190 Ibid., p. 20.

191 Europol 2020, p. 25.

192 Ibid., p. 26f.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid., p. 32.

195 Ibid., p. 19.

196 Ibid., p. 54.

197 Ibid., p. 69.

198 Ibid., p. 14; p. 68.

199 Ibid., p. 62.

200 Ibid., p. 59f.

201 Ibid., p. 60.

202 Ibid., p. 23.

203 Kudlacek et al. 2017, p. 66.

204 Europol 2020, p. 59.

205 Ibid., p. 40.

206 Ibid., p. 42.

207 Kudlacek et al. 2017, p. 60.

208 Cf. BMFSFJ, Leitlinie Förderung von Demokratiezentren zur landesweiten Koordinierung und Vernetzung sowie von Mobiler, Opfer- und Ausstiegsberatung.[Guideline for promotion of democracy centres for country-wide coordination and networking as well as


See Younes 2018.


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Kudlacek et al. 2017, p. 69.

Ibid., p. 70.

Ibid., 2017, p. 75.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid., p. 25.

Europol 2020, p. 12.

Ibid., p. 18.


Ibid.


Aked 2020, p.8.

Aked 2020, p. 8.


The Scottish equivalent to the Channel Programme that is applied on pre-radicals in England as well as in Wales is named the Prevent Professional Concerns Programme.


See Nye, Catrin, ‘The man who is being deradicalised,’ BBC News, 1 September 2015. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34073367.

See Home Office 2019c.

Aked 2020, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 9; For assessments on this research-field from disciplines other than the therapeutic field, see for instance, Corner, Emily, and Gill, Paul, ‘Is there a nexus between terrorist involvement and mental health in the age of the Islamic State?’ CTC Sentinel, 10(1), 2017, pp. 1-10.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid.

254 Aked 2020, p. 7.

255 Ibid.


258 Aked 2020, p. 25; p. 68.

259 Ibid., p. 7.

260 Ibid., p. 7.


265 See Qureshi 2016.


268 Several examples of Muslims being portrayed as “enemies” of UK are for instance discussed in: Evans, Jonathan, Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust. Address to the Society of Editors, Security Service MI5, 5 November 2007. Available at:


277 Ibid.


282 See Muslim Council of Britain (2015 and 2016), op. cit.; See Prevent Watch, ‘What is Prevent?’ *Prevent Watch.* Available at: https://www.preventwatch.org/joint-statement-on-prevent/.


287 https://www.activechangefoundation.org/.


289 Moaveni 2019, p. 92. Since 2019, Hanif Qadri is working as a consultant for The International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IIJ) for the rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorist fighters. He has strongly criticized governmental plans to save money by closing Youth Centres, where vulnerable young adults can be prevented from being radicalized.

290 Active Change Foundation. Available at: https://www.activechangefoundation.org/.
See BBC Asian Network, ‘Interview with Ahmed Patel, 7/7 bomber’s former brother-in-law: “There were no signs”,’ BBC, 9 September 2016. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p047bv99.


Cf. DERAD (European project towards the prevention of the escalation of radicalization in prisons). Available at: https://www.agenformedia.com/international-projects/derad.

Cf. HERMES. Available at: https://www.traininghermes.eu.


See Moaveni 2019.

Moaveni 2019, p. 271.

Ibid., p.151.


Cf. Hanif Qadir and his former approach ‘Not born radical’; Available at: https://www.activechangefoundation.org; cf. Käsehage 2018, pp. 477f.

Ibid., p. 468.

This approach supports a diverse range of religions, cultures and life-models that are living together in harmony. See, for instance: Bérubé, Maxime, Implementing Montreal’s Centre for the prevention of radicalization leading to violence: Insights from the 2015 TSAS Summer Academy. Université de Montréal, October 2015.

The Good Lives Model assumes that the main aim of an individual is to live a good life without major problems. Therefore, every society should enable citizens to achieve this and thereby avoid being attracted to negative goals. See Marsden 2016, op cit.


Yasmeen 2005, p. 38.


Council of European Union 2020, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 10.

Käsehage 2018, pp. 478f.


Käsehage 2018, pp. 479f.

See Koehler & Ehrt (2018), op. cit.


Gill, Horgan, and Deckert 2014, p. 429.

Koehler 2015a, p. 133; See Horgan 2008 and 2009.

Koehler, 2015a, p. 134.

Ibid., p. 133.

Aked 2020, p. 65.

Ibid. This term indicates a broader approach of the study in terms of patients affected by physical or mental health issues in an appropriate relation to its appearance.

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Web-based Resources

Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization leading to Violence (CPRLV)
Available at: https://info-radical.org/en/

Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at Westpoint
Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/

Council of Europe (HELP Radicalisation Prevention)
Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/help/help-radicalisation-prevention1

Counter Terrorism Group (CTG)
Available at: https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/

DERAD (European project towards the prevention of the escalation of radicalization in the prison) Available at: https://www.agenformedia.com/international-projects/derad

FHAR (Hybrid Training with Religious Community Leaders)
Available at:

German Congress on Crime Prevention (GCOP)
Available at: https://www.gcocp.org/

Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
Available at: https://www.thegctf.org/HERMES
Also available at: https://www.traininghermes.eu

International Crisis Group (ICG)
Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT)
Available at: https://icct.nl/

International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICRS)
Available at: https://icsr.info

PHAROS Available at: https://www.internet-signalement.gouv.fr/PortailWeb/planets/
Accueil! input. action

(European) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Available at:

START (Global Terrorism Database) Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Youth Counselling Against Radicalisation (YCARE) Available at: https://www.ycare.eu