Chapter 2

Terrorism Prevention: Conceptual Issues (Definitions, Typologies and Theories)

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This chapter serves to outline a framework for the analysis of terrorism. Key concepts (prevention, terrorism, extremism, radicalization) are defined and discussed, as are prevention of radicalization and prevention of extremism as alternative frameworks related to terrorism prevention. The difficulty of theory formation is outlined and some promising borrowings from crime prevention theory are introduced. Typologies of terrorism and prevention are presented and a tri-partition into upstream-, midstream- and downstream-terrorism prevention is suggested, illustrated by examples of measures to be taken, or intervention to be made, for each of these phases. In addition to suggesting working definitions for terrorism prevention and preparedness, the chapter also features a short appendix with definitions of prevention in the fields of conflict, crime, and violence.

Keywords: definition, extremism, prevention, preparedness, radicalization, terrorism, theory, typology.
Given the fact that so much has been written about terrorism since 9/11, one cannot help wonder why a major handbook like this one has not been published a long time ago. After all, nobody contests Benjamin Franklin’s dictum that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” (he was talking about medicine, but the idea has been applied to many other fields). Why then did it take such a long time for a comprehensive volume like this one to see the light of day? There are many possible answers. For example, the effectiveness of prevention is difficult to measure in the short term and spending effort and money on something that has not yet occurred and might not happen at all is difficult, given more urgent (though not necessarily more important) demands on scarce resources. This also applies to research on terrorism prevention. While much is written on the subject (see bibliography at the end of this Handbook), it more often than not lacks depth and empirical grounding.

In terms of social science, one problem is that there is no general theory of prevention, since that would necessitate a predictive theory of the future. Rik Peeters has rightly observed, that “prevention takes a not (yet) existing reality as the basis for intervention in the present.” He further noted that:

“prevention implies….a belief in a certain ability to anticipate the future and in a certain ability to choose among alternative courses of action in order to avert this future. It depends on the construction of a causal scheme between future events and actions taken to avoid them. Consequently, prevention implies the potential of backward reasoning to avert a certain imaginable future.”

Such anticipatory reasoning comes more often than not in the form of more or less educated guesses rather than being based on more formal techniques such as scenario-constructions (i.e., best case, worst case and most likely case) depending on the strengths and directions of key drivers. Is there a theory of prevention?

**Prevention: In Search of Theory**

Under the heading “Theories of Prevention,” Ian Gough from the London School of Economics noted in 2013 that such theories “are notable for their absence.” Prevention - independent from the subject area on which it is focused - is a challenging concept. How can one establish a causal relationship between the impact of a set of cautionary interventions or preventive measures and an outcome that is a non-event, namely, in our case, the absence of acts of terrorism? After all, the same non-event outcome might possibly have come about anyway, without active interventions aiming at the removal or mitigation of causes and without targeting presumed drivers of radicalization, extremism and terrorism?

While we are all interested in the future since we are, as someone drily observed, going to spend the rest of our lives there, we only have very limited control over our future. Yet we can control (although never fully) at least some parts of the future, namely those parts we are willing and able to actively shape ourselves, rather than leave that future to the vagaries of free markets, the electoral opportunism of political leaders who dismiss science, or to the phantasies of demagogues and preachers who pretend that their ideology or religion has all the answers.

Rik Peeters also cautioned that “the way you look at the world determines what you see and the action you are likely to take.” In the absence of a realistic understanding of the drivers of change in our societies we might, if we are not careful, be barking up the wrong tree. The best way to approach the subject is by using the instruments of science that allow us to methodologically question our assumptions and develop theories that can be tested. That is easier said than done in the field of prevention. Ian Gough has pointed out that “Prevention policy is built on two basic foundations, both of which are contested concepts. First, scientific
understanding of cause and effect and the possibility of prediction.... Second, prevention policy presumes some capacity for controlled intervention by government in social life.”

In the field of terrorism prevention, there are many more questions than answers. Here are but a few of the questions that deserve closer scrutiny and adequate answers:

- What exactly do we mean by “terrorism prevention”?
- What are the principal causes and drivers of terrorism that need to be addressed and, to the extent possible, neutralized or turned around to achieve effective prevention?
- What sort of measures and interventions are most appropriate for up-, mid- and down-stream terrorism prevention?
- How can one prevent terrorist attacks plotted in one country, executed in a second country against a target belonging to a third country?
- How can one prevent more or less spontaneous single actor attacks against random civilians in public spaces, performed with weapons as common as knives and cars?
- Should we be searching primarily for preventive, tactical operational measures, or aim for structural strategies of prevention?
- Should we be concentrating on reducing the capabilities of terrorists, or diminishing their motivations?
- Should we prioritize the strengthening of the resilience and preparedness of their potential victims and targets?
- Should we prepare for high-impact (but low probability) attacks (e.g. CBRN) or focus mainly on high probability (but low-impact) attacks (e.g. by knife)?
- How should we assess, monitor and evaluate prevention and preparedness efforts?

In this chapter, the main focus is on the first of these questions, “what exactly do we mean by terrorism prevention”? It has been said that a problem well-defined is a problem half-solved. While this is certainly an exaggeration, there is more than a grain of truth in it: conceptual issues need to be taken seriously. Building theories on shaky conceptual foundations is like building on sand.

What then is terrorism prevention? Answers have been sought and given by scholars and government agencies. Here, for instance, is a recent authoritative joint description of the concept of “terrorism prevention” by three key stakeholders in the US government. It represents the joint wisdom of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Trump administration:

What is Terrorism Prevention? Terrorism Prevention, previously known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), is a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, proactive approach against the many forms of terrorism ideology. Terrorism Prevention works to protect our nation from terrorist threats, and remains our highest priority. It utilizes prevention, intervention, and disengagement efforts. The principles and strategies used in Terrorism Prevention are similar to those applied in community policing, counter-drug, and counter-gang initiatives. (...) Violence reduction is a proactive approach to counter efforts by terrorists, and address the conditions that allow for violent extremism. ...The ability to recognize and address possible terrorist activity is critical in the prevention of terrorist attacks.
This official American government definition – if you can call this listing a definition – equates it first with “countering violent extremism” (CVE), a similar concept that was quietly shelved in January 2017 when Donald Trump became the 45th president of the US.9 We can further learn from this definition that the principles and strategies are similar to those applied in counter-drug initiatives. Given the lack of success in nearly fifty years of the American War on Drugs declared by President Nixon in June 1971, this does not bode particularly well.

DHS - one of the three US agencies behind this definition - clarified the issue somewhat in a different document by identifying four lines of activities in terrorism prevention:

- promoting education and community awareness;
- countering terrorist recruitment and propaganda;
- providing early warning of individuals who have radicalized; and responding to cases of radicalization to violence;
- keeping suspects and individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses from returning to violence.10

The emphasis of terrorism prevention here is on ‘soft power’ - tools that reduce the need for more lethal counterterrorism efforts, focusing on activities on individual and community levels.11 In another publication, dating from 2015, DHS referred, when discussing prevention, to its own “risk-based, layered approach” which utilizes new technologies to “detect explosives and other weapons, help protect critical infrastructure and cyber networks from attack [and] build information-sharing partnerships.”12 This points more in the direction of preparedness, the second theme of this volume.

After this first look at one government’s definitions, let us turn briefly to a more academic definition of terrorism prevention, one suggested by Peter Romaniuk (currently Executive Director of The Soufan Center) and Naureen Chowdhury Fink (an academic who joined the UK mission to the UN Security Council). They see – or saw, back in 2012 – terrorism prevention as a derivative of the concept of countering radicalization and defined it as “measures designed to counter the ideas, narrative, or message advanced by extremists and complement operational preventive efforts.” Terrorism prevention, Romaniuk and Fink added, aims to “prevent non-radicalized populations from becoming radicalized. The objective is to create individual and communal resilience against cognitive and/or violent radicalization through a variety of non-coercive means.”13

To portray terrorism prevention as prevention of radicalization is one viable approach. However, this is arguably also too narrow a framework since it implies that only radicals commit acts of terrorism. Yet, there is considerable evidence of, for instance, reactionary (counter-) terrorism by opponents linked to the state and of false flag operations executed by agents of rogue regimes; they are decidedly not radicals or radicalized although what they do is “extreme” compared to “normal” politics.14 The link between radicalism and radicalization, and even more so, between radicalism and terrorism, is not always present or direct.15

In addition, radicalism should also not be confused with extremism.16 More recently, some equate terrorism prevention with the prevention of “violent extremism.” Extremism, like radicalization, can and does indeed precede many manifestations of terrorism. Yet prevention of terrorism, prevention of radicalization and prevention of extremism, are, as we shall see in this chapter, not quite the same - although there can, at times, be substantial overlap.

While the problem of terrorism prevention is partly linked to the difficulties related to prevention in general, it also rests on the fact that we have many definitions of “terrorism” which are remarkably different from each other. While the UN has been debating the definition issue – with interruptions - since 1972, no consensus has yet emerged among the 193 members of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) regarding terrorism. We have a few regional definitions of terrorism (e.g., by the European Union or by the African Union) and many more national
definitions (with some governments having more than one), yet we still lack a universal legal definition of terrorism that has the full authority of the UNGA behind it.

Does this matter? Why is it important? The definition problem is also a response problem – the broader a definition, the more terrorism there is that ought to be countered and the more difficult it becomes to prevent it.\textsuperscript{17} If countries have different definitions of terrorism, extradition of terrorist suspects and mutual legal assistance become more difficult and often impossible – a phenomenon sometimes expressed with the misleading phrase “one man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom fighter.”

Definitions are important and part of the lack of success in preventing terrorism has to do with a lack of rigor on the conceptual side. As J.M. Berger, an American researcher, has put it:

“Many factors contribute to the stagnation and inefficacy of the field known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). Among the most important problems are a lack of definitions for key terms, a lack of consensus models for extremism and radicalization, and a lack of interest in understanding extremism as a cross-ideological phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{18}

Let us therefore take a closer look at three key concepts linked in this volume to prevention: terrorism, extremism, and radicalization.\textsuperscript{19}

**Terrorism**

Our object of prevention – terrorism – is a multifaceted phenomenon. Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr, writing in 2005, noted:

“Terrorism, as a political act, stands at once at the nexus between individual and collective action, the emotional and the rational, the conventional and the unconventional. It can be the strongest form of protest, the weakest form of rebellion, or a specialized tactic in a broader process of tyranny or warfare.”\textsuperscript{20}

There are many types of terrorism, the most prominent ones being:

- single-issue terrorism;
- lone wolf/actor terrorism
- vigilante terrorism;
- separatist (ethno-nationalist) terrorism;
- left-wing terrorism;
- right-wing terrorism;
- religious terrorism;
- cyber-terrorism;
- chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism;
- state (or regime) terrorism.\textsuperscript{21}

Should/can terrorism prevention address all of the manifestations above? Or should it go even beyond these ten types of terrorism and also address political violence in general since some governments use terrorism and political violence more or less as synonyms? While terrorism is, in most (but not all) cases, a form of political violence, there is, however, a great deal of political violence and irregular armed conflict activity that is not terroristic - some of it worse, some of it less bad.\textsuperscript{22} If terrorism prevention should cover all the manifestations from
the entire spectrum of political violence as well, including some forms of armed conflict not regulated by international humanitarian law, prevention would become an endless and indeed almost impossible task.

Terrorism not only comes in many variants, as the list above makes clear, terrorism itself has also been defined in many ways. In the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (2011), Joseph Easson and Alex Schmid listed no fewer than 260 different academic, national and regional definitions. However, we still do not, as noted above, have a legally binding definition of terrorism as an international crime, one agreed upon by the UNGA – despite the fact that an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism and a Working Group, established by the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly of the UN, has been looking for more than twenty years for a single definition all 193 UN member states can agree on. All it produced so far is this draft definition which is both broad and vague:

Art. 2.1. of draft UNGA Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism

“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a facility or to the environment; or
c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph (b) of the present article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

The accumulation of “anys” - any person, any means, any act - in this draft definition indicates a lack of precision which can have serious implications when it comes to terrorism prevention. While the UNGA has been unable to reach a consensus definition due, inter alia, to conflicting views on issues like the inclusion or exclusion of “people’s struggle for self-determination” (especially regarding Palestine and Kashmir), an academic definition of terrorism that is not legal but social-scientific in nature has gained a certain measure of acceptance among scholars. Based on three rounds of consultations with some 200 experts and professionals, the following formulation emerged in 2011:

“Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a *doctrine* about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial *practice* of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts:

1. illegal state repression;
2. propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict, and
3. as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors.”
The doctrine referred to in this academic consensus definition was developed in the second half of the 19th century when the inventions of dynamite and the rotary press began to interact. At that time, terrorism – a term originating from the French revolution in 1793-94 and applied first to crimes of state - was called “propaganda of [or:by] the deed” and referred mainly to the revolutionary agitation of anarchists and socialists in Russia, France and some other European countries. Since the 1870s, the upcoming rotary press allowed terrorists to reach the masses through commercial and political party-owned newspapers. Gone were the days when, after an assassination attempt on an oppressive ruler, the terrorists had to place posters on city walls to explain to the people why they did what they did. The newspapers, eager to sensationalize such deeds, would from then on do the job of spreading the news that was terrible to some (the victims and those who identified with them) but not to others (those who shared some of the same goals as those motivating the terrorists) depending on which side of the proverbial political fence they were sitting.

After the 19th century rotary press came, in the 20th century, radio. It became mainly an instrument of state terrorism, as were the news reels shown in cinemas before the main movie in the years between the two world wars and beyond. Later, from the 1950s onwards, television would do the job of spreading propaganda on behalf of non-state terrorists. Today, with the internet, we have, according to Steven Pinker, reached a stage where terrorism has simply become a “by-product of the enormous reach of mass media.” While the situation is not as “simple,” there is considerable truth in this statement. In the 1980s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had already observed that publicity is the oxygen of terrorism. Today’s mass as well as the social media propagated on the internet give contemporary terrorism much of its over-sized punch.

Mass media and social media are major structural factors that facilitate terrorism. They give terrorists attention, spread their grievances and demands and allow them to get respect and, in a few cases, even legitimacy among some of those who share their grievances or their goals, if not necessarily their methods. The core of terrorism is the combination of violence and communication adding up to armed propaganda. The diagram below, depicting the triangle of terrorism, explains the indirect strategy of terrorism - the immediate victim is not the main or ultimate target. Rather, the use of violence against certain individuals and groups of people serves the purpose of agitation, intimidation or coercion, being the message generator to reach an audience much larger than the direct victims and the local witnesses present at the crime scene.

Figure 1. The Triangle of Terrorism
From the point of view of the history of ideas, terrorism is first of all “propaganda by the deed” - a performative communication strategy for psychological manipulation whereby mainly unarmed civilians - who are often complete strangers to the perpetrators of violence - are deliberately victimized in order to impress third parties (e.g. intimidate, coerce or otherwise influence a government or a section of society, or public opinion in general), with the help of portrayals of demonstrative violence in front of witnessing audiences and/or by means of induced coverage in mass and social media.  

If one could eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the communicational spread of the terrorists’ demonstrative public performances of acts of violence for purposes of publicity, terrorism would lose most of its appeal and attraction. However, breaking the communication link between terrorist victims and target audiences would imply some form of censorship which is a very high price to be paid for what in most societies is still more of a nuisance rather than an existential threat. Nevertheless, attempts to block — or at least reduce — terrorist access to mass audiences are on the rise and constitute one of the methods of prevention and control of terrorism, used increasingly by non-democratic regimes. The arrival of the internet which now reaches, and links more than half of mankind has made the task of controlling harmful effects of instant communications of violence for effect much harder for democratic states, despite the fact that the large social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc.) now have thousands of so-called “content moderators” charged with removing terrorist and other undesirable content from the internet. Non-democratic governments (e.g., China) have used more forceful approaches to silence social and other media. Since terrorism is, at its core, violence for communication, prevention of terrorism cannot exclude interventions trying to minimize if not neutralize the communication strategies of terrorism.

On the basis of this communication function, acts or campaigns of terrorism seek to intimidate and terrorize the public or sections thereof, to discipline, control or dissuade targeted (sub)groups or aim to enforce their obedience. On the other hand, some spectacular terrorist acts can also mobilize sympathizers and turn some of them into supporters and new recruits. Acts of terrorism can serve to win specific political concessions (such as the release of prisoners) from the government but can, at times, also serve to provoke over-reactions from the regime in power in the hope of splitting and polarizing communities. In short, acts, and especially campaigns of terrorism are instruments of influence warfare between conflict parties that involve not just the government and rebel forces but also sectors of our communities at home and abroad, all linked by the mass and social media as the nerve system of an increasingly global society. This multiplicity of functions and purposes of terrorism makes its prevention difficult and challenging.

A Typology of Prevention

The prevention literature, which has been spearheaded by the public health field, distinguishes between various intervention points to counter unwanted, harmful occurrences. In the 1960s, R.S. Gordon Jr. introduced in the medical sector a tri-partition of prevention levels, based upon the costs and benefits of delivering the intervention (e.g., inoculation during epidemics of disease) to the target population group:

- **Universal prevention** – aimed at the entire population, involving strengthening public resilience;
- **Selective prevention** – focusing on the sub-population whose risks of developing problems is already at an elevated, above average, group level, specific vulnerable sectors of society;
Indicated prevention – involves a screening process, and aims to identify individuals who exhibit early signs of early conduct problems and/or having an increased risk for such problems, but currently not having any. This basic tri-partition has sometimes also been labelled primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Other names have been: early phase, middle phase, and late phase prevention, or upstream, midstream, and downstream prevention. Unfortunately, there is little correspondence in the literature about the exact boundaries between these terms, i.e., where primary prevention ends, and secondary prevention and later tertiary prevention begins, as Ian Gough has pointed out. The same is true about the phase or the stream prevention models.

This basic tri-partition has also been adopted and adapted in the field of terrorism, radicalization and extremism prevention but, again, there is no consensus where the lines should be drawn between the three stages in the literature on the subject. The Danish Prevention of Extremism Pyramid, for instance, breaks prevention down in three temporal phases:

- Early preventive measures (for everyone): The primary section of the pyramid – the early preventive level – includes initiatives aimed at the whole of society, but focuses predominantly on young people. The purpose of initiatives at this level is to promote well-being, development and active civic citizenship, and to prevent the development of problematic behavior. The goal is to strengthen democratic, critical and social skills, and build resilience among young people without explicitly addressing the challenges of extremism and radicalization.

- Anticipatory measures (for persons vulnerable to radicalization): The secondary “anticipatory” level – the middle part of the pyramid – includes initiatives that target individuals who are already showing signs of concern with regard to radicalization. Measures here largely overlap with crime prevention measures.

- Direct intervention measures (persons in extremist environments): The tertiary level involves direct interventions targeting individuals who are part of an extreme environment and have already committed crimes, or who are at risk of doing so. The purpose here is to prevent (further) crimes and support their disengagement from extremist environments.

The Danish model includes elements of mid-stream prevention while most other models are limited to tertiary or downstream terrorism prevention. This model focusses on the prevention of extremism, rather than the prevention of terrorism, although it treats these terms as more or less overlapping. While much attention has been given to who should be prevented from being radicalized, less attention has been given to who should do the prevention work. Originally, it was held to be the task of the police or the military. Later, a “whole-of-government” approach became popular, which includes departments which focus on education (since radicalization also occurs among school-going youth), the treasury (since the financing of terrorism has to be stopped), as well as other departments. More recently, a “whole-of-society” approach has been propagated, with terrorism prevention becoming a task of all citizens, beginning in the family (where parents have to notice and report signs of radicalization), and progressing to civil society associations (e.g., sport), public health (e.g., mental health institutions) and social media (to report hate speech and glorification of violence). If we look at who prevents acts of terrorism in concrete cases, it becomes clear that the role of civil society is important. A study by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) on how terrorist attacks in 13 countries in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand were averted in the period 2012-2019 showed the following distribution:
Figure 2. Terrorist Attacks Prevented in 13 Western Countries, 2012-2019 (n= 91)

- By the Intelligence/Security Services: 43%
- By the Police: 28%
- By the Public: 18%
- By Public/Private Institutions: 11%

Tips from family and acquaintances of terrorist plotters were contributing to the uncovering of attacks in 10 percent of the cases. In 45 percent of the cases attacks could be prevented as a result of monitoring the online activity of militants. Tips from third parties were the first indicators in 23 percent of the plots. Police uncovered terrorist plots while investigating (other) criminal activities in 10 percent of the cases.42

From these figures it is clear that prevention is not only the work of intelligence services and the police, but results also from the vigilance of parts of the public.

The choice of framework is important: should we focus on the prevention of terrorist crimes, or the prevention of ideological extremism, or the prevention of radicalization of “vulnerable youth”? In terms of theory formation, the prevention of terrorism as crime is most advanced (being an extremist or becoming radicalized is not a crime per se in most jurisdictions). Let us have a brief look at what criminology has to offer before looking at the prevention of extremism and radicalization.

Borrowing from Crime Prevention Theory

When it comes to terrorism prevention, some of the most inspiring ideas have come from the literature on crime prevention. One of the first attempts can be found in the work of Ronald Clark and Graeme Newman. They tried to transfer some principles from situational crime prevention to terrorism prevention. Key to their approach is to reduce opportunities and rewards for crime by applying five principles:

1. Increase the effort: target hardening (including concealing targets) and controlling tools/weapons;
2. Increase the risks, e.g., by reducing anonymity and strengthening formal surveillance;
3. Reduce provocations: reducing frustrations and stress and discouraging imitation;
4. Reduce the rewards: removing targets, disrupting markets, and denying benefits;
5. Remove excuses: setting rules, alerting conscience and assisting compliance.43

Clark and Newman argue that more attention should go to the reduction of the opportunities for terrorist attacks. This can be done by protecting the most vulnerable targets, controlling the tools and weapons needed by the terrorists, and by removing the conditions in our environment that make terrorist attacks easy to perform. “Red Teaming,” or trying to do what terrorists are likely to do as a training exercise, exposes weaknesses in our defenses and allows security agencies to develop better protection where it is most needed, limit accessibility to likely targets, and anticipate the forces needed to counter a potential attack. The situational approach to terrorism prevention looks closely at terrorists’ modus operandi, expertise, and the tools and weapons available to them.

Clarke and Newman’s approach does not rely on changing the “hearts and minds” of terrorists – the aim of deradicalization – but focuses on exploring how rational terrorists seek to accomplish their tasks. Once that is understood, their opponents have to (i) increase the effort involved; (ii) face the increased risks of failure; (iii) seek a reduction in the rewards of
terrorism; and (iv) have fewer temptations, provocations and excuses to do what they originally wanted to do.44

Based on these (and other) principles, Prof. Tore Bjørgo from the University in Oslo, published a brief, but seminal, study of terrorism prevention in 2013. It is also based on proven crime prevention mechanisms and measures.45 Prof. Bjørgo uses the concept of “prevention” in this context as referring to “…reducing future act of terrorism or other crimes, or reducing the harmful consequences of such acts, by proactive measures.”46 Here are his nine mechanisms for preventing terrorism:

1. Establishing and maintaining norms to delegitimize terrorism and the use of violence;
2. Reduce violent radicalization and emergence of terrorism;
3. Deterring involvement in terrorism by threat of retaliation or punishment;
4. Pre-emptive disruption of planned terrorist attacks;
5. (Incapacitation of (potential) terrorists by removing their capacities for carrying out violent action;
6. Protecting vulnerable targets by increasing difficulties, costs and risks for (potential) terrorists;
7. Reducing harmful consequences of terrorist acts;
8. Reducing rewards for carrying out terrorist attacks;
9. Disengagement from terrorism by making individuals and groups discontinue their involvement in terrorism.47

Bjørgo’s volume Strategies for Preventing Terrorism is an excellent starting point to advance our thinking on the subject.48 He introduces not only these nine preventive mechanisms, but also outlines the measures that need to be taken to implement these and explains in his book who has to take them against whom and what the up- and downsides of each of the proposed measures are.49

However, a narrow crime prevention framework for terrorism prevention, useful as it is, tends to neglect the political or ideological dimension of terrorism – the latter of which is sometimes referred to as “extremism.” It is to this we turn to next.

**Terrorism Prevention as Prevention of Extremism**

Since the international community – meeting in the General Assembly of the UN – could not agree on a definition of terrorism, the term has, in political discourse, often been replaced with the broader and even more vague concept of “violent extremism.” This evades – but does not solve – the definition problem. The concept “violent extremism” originated in UK policy circles around the time of the attacks on the London transport system on 7 July 2005.50 It gained wider currency in US policy making circles where a distinction was introduced between “violent extremism” and “non-violent extremism.”51 The concept of violent extremism served to avoid offending Muslims in the US and Arab regimes allied with the US that did not wish “peaceful Islam” be associated with terrorism.52 In recent years, extremism and its prevention has led to a great deal of research. As of mid-March 2019, no less than 12,013 papers dealing with “preventing violent extremism” could, for instance, be downloaded from a website storing academic papers.53

Since there is a widely held – and often correct – assumption that terrorism is encouraged, if not caused, by extremism, we need to look into this assumption more closely. Again, we face a definition problem. There are several definitions of extremism around - though not nearly as many as for terrorism. The Danish government, for instance, defined extremism in 2016 in this way:
“Extremism refers to persons or groups that commit or seek to legitimise violence or other illegal acts, with reference to societal conditions that they disagree with. The term covers e.g. left-wing extremism, right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism.”

While this is a practical definition, it still falls short of addressing adequately the ideological dimension. What then is “extremism”? Unlike radicalism, which has a long history in politics, extremism has a shorter, but darker history, closely linked to the rise of fascism and communism in the Western world and emerging in reaction to the catastrophe of the First World War with its 20 million deaths (half of them civilians) and its 21 million wounded - a war that had brought about the fall of four empires (Russian, Ottoman, German and Austrian-Hungarian). Among the losers of the First World War, poisonous nationalist revanchism emerged, partly in the form of Fascism. Some of the surviving returning soldiers from the front were more attracted to Communism which came to power in Russia in late 1917. The American political scientist Manus Midlarsky studied the rise of extremist political movements after World War I and offered this definition of political extremism:

“the will to power by a social movement in the service of a political program typically at variance with that supported by existing state authorities, and for which individual liberties are to be curtailed in the name of collective goals, including the mass murder of those who would actually or potentially disagree with that program. Restrictions on individual freedom in the interests of the collectivity and the willingness to kill massively are central to this definition: these elements characterize all of the extremist groups considered here.”

More recently, J.M. Berger came up with an elegant and more concise definition of extremism:

“Extremism refers to the belief [that] an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group…. Hostile action can range from verbal attacks and diminishment to discriminatory behavior, violence, and even genocide…. Extremism can be the province of state or nonstate actors…Violent extremism is the belief than an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for violent action against an out-group (as opposed to less harmful acts such as discrimination or shunning). A violent extremist ideology may characterize its violence as defensive, offensive, or pre-emptive.”

Neither Midlarsky’s nor Berger’s definitions made a special reference to the definition of religious extremism which, arguably, has some peculiar characteristics. I therefore tried to fill this void, coming up with this definition of religious extremism:

“The pursuit, usually by a fanatical sect or cult, but occasionally also by a political ‘party of God’, a terrorist organization, or an official ‘religious establishment’ of a program of societal renewal which usually involves some form of social cleansing. The use of violence is justified by reference to a divine authority, an absolute truth, or a literal interpretation of texts deemed sacred. Specific groups of people such as non-believers, pagans, apostates or heretics are identified as enemies and as such earmarked for being subjugated, punished, expelled or killed in the name of one or
another sacred cause. Religious extremists want to purify the world from alleged forces of evil and establish a theocratic regime run by a religious leader or council. True believers who adhere to such a religious ideology tend to be prepared for martyrdom (suicide) operations, often expecting great rewards in afterlife for their sacrifice.”

Religious terrorism, with its fanaticism and being based on the conviction of its believers that martyrdom operations will be rewarded with a place and special pleasures in paradise is especially hard to prevent. One way to counter it is to promote a culture of moderation in religion as well as in politics – in other words: upstream prevention.

The prevention of extremism in politics presupposes clarity on non-extremism and on the opposite of extremism – moderation. Strangely enough, little attention has been paid to the conditions for the presence and flourishing of political moderation which, by definition, can, if successful and pervasive in society, prevent political extremism. An exception are the writings of the political scientist Aurelian Craiutu. Based on his work, moderation in politics can be said to involve ten rules of conduct:

1. Moderates have a commitment to civility in dealing with all parties in the political arena;
2. Moderates are skeptical of ideologies and oppose ideological and religious intransigence; they acknowledge that no single party is in possession of absolute truth or has definitive solutions for society’s problems;
3. Moderates are flexible and open-minded, willing to look at all sides of a divisive political issue before taking a position;
4. Moderates accept the existence and legitimacy of a plurality of viewpoints in multicultural societies, are opposed to polarizing policies, and do not wish to silence legitimate voices;
5. Moderates are bridge-builders: they search for common ground in political controversies and seek to balance and harmonize the interests of opposing political parties and social forces through dialogue, negotiation, and compromise, aiming for conciliation wherever that is possible;
6. Moderates are opposed to violent confrontation and prefer reform to revolution;
7. Moderates, in an effort to preserve and re-establish social harmony, seek to keep lines of political dialogue open and reach out for political opponents in an effort to come closer to a consensus;
8. Moderates are practical, pragmatic, flexible, rational and prudent when determining the most appropriate course of action and seeking realistic solutions;
9. Moderates are opposed to fanaticism, zealotry and extremism;
10. Moderates are tolerant – but know that tolerance is counter-productive when confronted with those who are intolerant and intransigent.

If one manages to strengthen the forces of moderation in state and society, at home and abroad, one automatically weakens the forces of extremism, provided one sticks to the last, somewhat paradoxical, tenth rule - one cannot be tolerant against the intolerant without digging one’s own grave. The cultivation of moderation in politics then, is a major form of upstream prevention of extremism.

Prevention of extremism as a way to prevent terrorism has been paralleled to some extent by efforts to prevent radicalization. The basic underlying idea is the same - as terrorism presupposes the existence of extremism, in this alternative framework it presupposes a prior
radicalization before seemingly peaceful people turn to one form of political violence called terrorism.

**Terrorism Prevention as Prevention of Radicalization**

The term radicalization was hardly used before 9/11. It was the Dutch intelligence service AIVD which introduced it in connection with countering terrorism. The concept gained traction after Al-Qaeda’s bomb attacks on trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004 (causing 191 deaths and around 2,000 injured) and has become a key concept in European official circles in the fighting against terrorism. The term “Radicalization” allowed a discussion of the causes of terrorism that put the blame for terrorism on vulnerable individuals who had allowed themselves to be attracted, mobilised and recruited by professional jihadist veterans or who were apparently self-radicalizing under the influence of terrorist propaganda distributed by social media.

The European Commission defined radicalization in 2004 as,

“Individuals or groups becoming intolerant with regard to basic democratic values like equality and diversity; as well as a rising propensity toward using means of force to reach political goals that negate and/or undermine democracy.”

If one takes this definition literally, radicalization to terrorism only takes place in democracies. In 2016, the European Union came up with a formulation that did not contain this reference to democracy. Yet it still remains vague:

“The EU firmly believes in eradicating terrorism at its source. Therefore, preventing terrorist attacks by addressing and stopping terrorist radicalization and recruitment is a priority for the EU, as outlined in the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action. Radicalization in this sense is understood as a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.”

This formulation is circular in that radicalization is explained in terms of people embracing radical ideology. The irony is that European democracies owe much to 19th century radical ideologies and the movements and political parties which were inspired by ideas of the 18th century Enlightenment with its idea of progress and the emancipation of common people. Ideas like the right to vote for all men (not just those who possessed property) as well as women, separation of church and state and republicanism rather than monarchy were typical political demands of radical parties. Those 19th century radicals were fighting for democracy and we owe much to the struggle of radical suffragettes and others who helped to bring democracy to the common men and women.

Questionable as a direct linking of radicalization to radicalism is in terms of the history of ideas, the term radicalization has gained such widespread currency that it is unlikely to disappear. I therefore tried in 2013 to re-conceptualize radicalization in a way that is more balanced:

“An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad...
in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging.

These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion; (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism; or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes.

The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.”

With the help of such a reconceptualization, it becomes possible to look at radicalization not just at the individual micro-level but also at the group and societal meso-level and at structural factors linked to the state and the international system (macro-level). It allows us to go beyond the one-sided use of the term radicalization for non-state actors only and also breaks the direct link between radicalism and radicalization. Radicalization does not have to end in violence when pushed to extremes; it can also become a force for good as has recently been pointed out in the award-winning dissertation by Ken Reidy “The Accidental Ambassadors: Implications of Benevolent Radicalization.” He showed that one may radicalize in a malevolent manner (resulting in terrorism and/or extremism) but also in a benevolent manner (resulting in becoming a voluntary humanitarian aid worker in the same war zones that also attract foreign fighters). 64

While this is a useful expansion of the concept of radicalization, most studies on radicalization and its prevention have a narrow focus that is insufficient to explain and tackle terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The link between radicalization and terrorism, and even more so, between radicalism and terrorism is not always direct and sometimes totally absent. 65

**Analytical Framework for Exploring Terrorism Prevention**

For the purpose of this *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness*, the editor – after receiving feedback from some other contributors to this volume – proposed the following typology related to terrorism prevention and preparedness.

Terrorism prevention can be broken down into taking pro-active, precautionary measures at three moments in time:

- **Upstream, primary (early) prevention:** reducing the risk of the formation of a terrorist group or organization,
- **Midstream, secondary (timely) prevention:** reducing the risk of such a group or organization being able to prepare a terrorist campaign and
- **Downstream, tertiary (late) prevention:** reducing the risk of execution of individual terrorist operations by foiling and deterring these.

In other words, if terrorist group formation cannot be forestalled in an early phase by taking appropriate upstream measures, the focus should be on preventing the preparation of terrorist campaigns and, if that also fails, prevention should seek to obstruct the occurrence of individual terrorist attacks.
Based on these considerations, the editor of this volume suggested to the contributors of the various chapters the following working definition of “Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness:”

**Prevention of terrorism** involves the anticipation of risk factors giving rise to terrorist group formation, terrorist campaign initiation and/or specific attack preparations and responding to these by: **Preparedness**, that is, taking proactive and preemptive measures to reduce risks and threats and, if that turns out to be insufficient, reduce the negative impact of terrorist attacks through a set of planned precautionary measures aimed at strengthening governmental readiness and societal resilience.\(^{66}\)

For each of these three phases (upstream, midstream, downstream), a number of preventive actions can be taken. The examples provided below are illustrative rather than comprehensive and systematic.

**Upstream Terrorism Prevention**

When the editor of this Handbook was working for the United Nations as Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) at the beginning of this century, he proposed four upstream measures for terrorism prevention, arguing that these should be the four pillars on which successful preventive national anti-terrorism measures should build.\(^{67}\)

Upstream prevention on the national level:

- **Good Governance**, because when governance is bad, resistance against corrupt rule gains followers and support and might take the form of terrorism;
- **Democracy**, because when unpopular rulers cannot be voted away by democratic procedures, advocates of political violence find a wider audience;
- **Rule of Law**, because when rulers stand above the law and use the law as a political instrument against their opponents, the law loses its legitimacy and credibility, and encourages people to turn to alternative normative systems;
- **Social Justice**, because when long-standing injustices in society are not addressed but allowed to continue for years, without any light in sight at the end of the tunnel, desperate people, and some others championing their cause, are willing to die and to kill for what they perceive to be a just cause.\(^{68}\)

This short list of upstream drivers addressing situations that might act as triggers encouraging the formation of terrorist groups/organizations found later some statistical confirmation in social science research by the University of Maryland’s START project that looked at the correlations of terrorism.\(^{69}\)

Given the communicative purpose of terrorist performances, other crucial upstream drivers of terrorism are mass media and, more recently, social media, since they offer non-state terrorists the opportunity to make their agitation and propaganda tactics work. Yet another upstream driver for some forms of terrorism is religion, or rather, some manifestations of religion as currently witnessed most strongly by the fanaticism among certain Salafist sectors of Sunni Islam. Another major upstream driver is armed conflict (insurgency and counterinsurgency at home and armed interventions, overt and covert, abroad, often accompanied by military occupation). This usually provokes rebellion and resistance, partly manifesting itself in acts of terrorism.
Given the increasingly transnational nature of terrorism, national preventive measures are of limited use when major drivers of the problem are abroad and migration, porous borders and internet-based communication and radicalization come into play. Therefore, upstream prevention has also to address, difficult as it is, foreign drivers such as these:

- Address conflict formations and sources of conflict perpetuation abroad by offering to mediate between government and opposition groups to avoid further bloodshed and conflict escalation;
- Contribute to UN and regional peace-keeping and peace-building efforts to reduce the operational territory of armed non-state groups in weak and failed states;
- Counter cross-border financing of terrorism by investigating and blocking sources of income of terrorist groups;
- Strengthen moderate civil society actors abroad against religious and other fanatics.

Globalization has helped to make terrorism near global while counterterrorism and preventive measures across borders have been lagging behind.

Where it is not possible to effectively address upstream drivers that can lead to the formation of terrorist groups and organizations, enhanced emphasis has to be placed on midstream measures.

### Midstream Terrorism Prevention

When it comes to midstream terrorism prevention, an important role relates to deficient socialization and education of young people in their own immediate surroundings, especially when children are exposed to violence at home. Domestic violence within the family rarely stays at home but, sooner or later, often tends to spill over into society. Since nobody is born a terrorist, push and pull factors during adolescence and acts of commission and omission from parents, schools, and communities during the formative years of a child play a large role in turning young people to harmful and problematic behaviors when the immediate environment cannot satisfy the basic human needs of young people.

Experience with, and exposure to, violence in early life tends to produce, if untreated, life-long traumas and can also lead to new cycles of violence which, in most cases, are not terrorist in nature but relate to crime and violence as well as mental health problems in general. In order to prevent young people from becoming attracted to harmful forms of pseudo self-actualization (namely, drug and alcohol abuse, joining a youth gang involved in crimes, escapism into the virtual world of violent internet games, joining religious sects, or becoming part of militant extremist groups engaged in acts of terrorism at home or abroad), a number of midstream preventive measures should be put in place:

- Providing parents with infrastructures and opportunities that allow them to take good care of their children until they can stand on their own feet;
- Providing young people with affordable and good quality education to learn skills and develop their talents so that they can find their place in society;
- Offering young people challenging extra-curricular activities to keep them away from criminal gangs or religious sects;
- Provide young people with formal and informal opportunities to engage with the opposite sex in a responsible and respectful way;
- Facilitate cultural exchanges to allow young people to learn about, and tolerate, other ways of life.

If young people are neglected and/or abused, they will seek unhealthy opportunities for self-actualization. Much can be done to prevent this. However, rather than subsuming this under labels like radicalization prevention, it is better that it should fall under general
prevention in the form of, for instance, positive parenting initiatives such as: kindergarten (nursery school) initiatives for extra-family socialization; school-based programs emphasizing fair play, empathy and solidarity; community-based programs enhancing integration and social cohesion; providing young people with positive role models via alternative media; and opening up real avenues for upward social mobility for young people through education and civil service programs for those who cannot otherwise find their place in society.\textsuperscript{71}

Midstream terrorism prevention should be broader and involve elements such as community policing and other measures - not just focusing on “vulnerable individuals” but also on neglected neighbourhoods with high levels of unemployment and ill-assimilated immigrant diasporas exposed to discrimination and humiliation. The goals should be broader than simply focusing on the prevention of radicalization and recruitment by terrorist cells eager to prepare a terrorist campaign. A broader approach of better caring for youth has other benefits such as crime reduction and fewer mental health problems in society.

\textbf{Downstream Terrorism Prevention}

When one thinks of terrorism prevention, what first comes to mind are downstream preventive measures - such as not allowing guns and explosives to be brought on board of commercial airliners. Below are a number of typical measures that can be taken downstream.\textsuperscript{72} Again, this list has only illustrative character and applies only to certain types of terrorism but not others. In this sample, measures are divided into passive and active measures.

\textit{Passive Prevention}

- Gun and explosive materials detection instruments at airports;
- Border and travel documents controls (including entry and exit control systems);
- Deterrence: threatening retaliation and punishment;
- Target hardening (e.g. using bomb blast resistant window films)

\textit{Active Operational Tactical Prevention}

- Surveillance of suspects and bugging of their homes, cars, and meeting places;
- Neutralization through infiltrations into terrorist groups;
- Prevention through entrapment of extremists suspected of being on the point of preparing acts of terrorism;
- Preventive detentions or house arrests of dangerous extremists, based on court orders.

Tore Bjørgo distinguishes between “long-term preventive strategies” and “short-term preventive strategies.” Some of the latter overlap with the downstream measures listed above:

- Deterrence by threat of retaliation or punishment;
- Pre-emptive disruption of planned terrorist attacks;
- Incapacitation;
- Protecting vulnerable targets.\textsuperscript{73}

Should upstream, midstream and downstream prevention fail, mitigating measures ought to be in place to reduce the impact of terrorist attacks through contingency planning and preparedness led by a governmental response-and-recovery apparatus that is geared to reduce harm and also serves to strengthen societal resilience.\textsuperscript{74}
Conclusion

As the experience of the last two decades has made clear, it has proven difficult to de-radicalize terrorists and to counter violent extremists. This has led to a certain bifurcation of anti-terrorism in recent years. On the one hand, there has been a return to a hardline armed response to counterterrorism and, on the other hand, a renewed interest in the prevention of terrorism, sometimes in the form of prevention of radicalization and at other times in the form of prevention of extremism.

In this volume, we adhere to the concept of terrorism prevention, although we recognize the importance of preventing radicalization and extremism since these are partly co-extensive with the object of investigation here. A major reason for adhering to terrorism prevention is that the alternative terms, radicalization and extremism, are even less well defined than terrorism, the first one being too narrow and the second one being too broad. Current efforts at the prevention of radicalization are focusing too much on the individual level, while efforts to prevent violent extremism focus too much on the ideological level, while at the same time often excluding certain state-sponsored religions as drivers. However, if radicalization is re-conceptualized as suggested earlier in this chapter, it can provide a framework that goes beyond the “vulnerable individual” and also enables us to see positive sides to radicalization, namely when it is benevolent rather than malevolent, and “activist” but not “terrorist” in nature. When it comes to extremism, the widely used distinction between violent and non-violent extremism is of dubious value since it has nothing to do with classical non-violence in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. The opposite of all extremism is moderation and the prevention of extremism ought to take the form of strengthening moderation in both politics and religion.

Prevention is a difficult field of study because it is based on the anticipation of a future that is impossible to know with certainty. In this sense, terrorism poses a “wicked problem.” A “wicked problem” has been defined as

“…. a social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible to solve for as many as four reasons: incomplete or contradictory knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the large economic burden, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems.”

There is no simple, clear-cut solution to wicked problems. Modern non-state terrorism has been around for 150 years and while the level of attacks has waxed and waned, terrorism is highly unlikely to ever go away. Complete prevention is impossible short of closing down open societies and sealing borders but preventive measures can have measurable effects over time – there are no quick fixes. A better understanding of the problem of terrorism and its prevention, however, is within our reach once we have some basic agreement about the exact object of prevention and greater clarity about the methods to bring this about. The conceptual discussion of this chapter has sought to contribute to this and encourage the contributors of this Handbook to further elaborate new approaches to the problem and suggest better ways to address it.

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Appendix I

Selected Definitions of Prevention with Regard to Conflict, Crime, Extremism, Radicalization, Terrorism, Violence

“Nowhere is there agreement about quite what prevention is, while everywhere there is agreement that it is a good thing.”

R. Freeman, 1992

Conflict prevention (Schmid, 2000): A broad concept which refers to anticipation and aversion of escalation and violence in social, political and international conflicts.

It covers:

A. Primary prevention (minimizing chance of occurrence of violent conflict):

1. Proactive measures to prevent the emergence of conflict formation between parties; and
2. Prophylactic measures to prevent the likely outbreak of a conflict between parties.

B. Secondary prevention (containment and mitigation):

1. Active measures to prevent the vertical escalation of existing conflicts;
2. Reactive measures to limit horizontal escalation of already on-going conflict to other areas; and
3. Palliative measures to mitigate the consequences of an outbreak of conflict.

C. Tertiary prevention (preventing the recurrence of armed conflict):

1. Revalidation measures aimed at preventing the renewal of the conflict cycle in the post-conflict phase.

Crime prevention (US National Crime Prevention Institute, 2001): “The formal definition of crime prevention as adopted in several countries is: the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it.”

Crime prevention (United Nations, 2002): “...is defined as comprising all measures that seek to reduce the risk of crime occurring by intervening in its multiple causes.”

The [UN] guidelines distinguish four main categories of crime prevention:

1. Social crime prevention, including early intervention
2. Community-based crime prevention
3. Situational and victim-oriented crime prevention
4. D. reintegrating offenders.

“...crime prevention” comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. The enforcement of laws, sentences and corrections, while also performing preventive functions, falls outside the scope of the Guidelines, given the comprehensive coverage of the subject in other United Nations instruments.

Prevention (Schmid, 2011): “The taking of long-term proactive measures to remove the causes of an undesirable development or to obstruct the occurrence of an unwanted situation; social and technical engineering to reduce individual or collective harm or damage by
inhibiting, dissuading or deterring potential offenders, also by creating environments where criminal activity is made more difficult (situational crime prevention).”

Crime prevention (Oxford Handbook of Crime Prevention (2012): “Crime prevention has come to mean many different things to many different people. In one of the first scholarly attempts to differentiate crime prevention from crime control, Peter Lejins espoused the following: ‘If societal action is motivated by an offense that has already taken place, we are dealing with control; if the offence is only anticipated, we are dealing with prevention’ Crime prevention is best viewed as an alternative approach to reducing crime, operating outside the formal justice system. Developmental, community, and situational strategies define its scope. Developmental prevention has emerged as an important strategy to improve children’s life chances and prevent them from embarking on a life of crime Community crime prevention benefits from a sound theoretical base….The theoretical origins of situational crime prevention are wide ranging and robust.”

Violence prevention (World Health Organization, 2014): “….violence can be prevented. Interventions to address violence are delivered as part of a four-step public health approach that includes 1) defining the problem; 2) identifying causes and risk factors; 3) designing and testing interventions, and 4) increasing the scale of effective interventions.”

Radicalization and extremism prevention (Austrian government, 2018): “In the context at hand, prevention refers to the identification and conception of strategies and measures which aim at containing the risk of radicalization and extremism.”

Terrorism prevention (RAND, 2019): “…for the purposes of our work, we constructed a baseline definition that drew on elements from definitions in the literature and from discussions with interviewees:

“Terrorism prevention policy seeks to reduce the incidence of violence inspired by ideology and extremist causes, and to expand the range of options for responding to that risk. It includes efforts – either alone or in collaboration – by such government entities as law enforcement, social services, and mental health agencies; non-governmental organizations; civil society; community groups; and the private sector.

By building options beyond the traditional criminal justice tools of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration – and involving organizations and capabilities outside the organizational boundaries of government – terrorism prevention programs seek to enable action earlier, before individuals have taken illegal actions that could pose imminent danger and have lasting consequences both for themselves and others.”

Our definition focuses specifically on violence rather than beliefs because individuals’ freedom of beliefs, religion, and political views is protected”. Terrorism prevention policies and programs are aimed at reducing the risk of terrorism in ways other than investigating and incarcerating the individuals suspected of planning or directly supporting violence. The tools for doing so span the entire life cycle of terrorism, from preventing recruitment by terrorist groups to limiting the influence of terrorist messaging to intervening with individuals who are at risk of radicalization to violence. Such tools also include programs to preclude recidivism for those incarcerated for terrorist-related violence.”
Appendix II

A Note on Prevention by Removing Root Causes of Terrorism

We like to think in terms of cause and effect and often assume that by removing the cause we can prevent the – in our case – unwanted effect, namely terrorism. Unfortunately, it is not that easy. It has not been easy either in other areas of prevention (e.g., the prevention of crime, war, or cancer).

Why is this so? To begin with, a cause can have several effects, some desirable and others not, and the price of preventing one undesirable effect – terrorism in our case – among many more desirable ones is a price that one might not be willing to pay. On the other hand, one single effect may have more than one cause.

A second problem is that there are many definitions of terrorism and depending on how this contested term is defined, the causes are also likely to differ. Then there are also many types of terrorism – from ‘lone wolf’ terrorism to ‘cyber-terrorism’ – and different forms of terrorism also tend to have different causes.

If we look at the vast literature on terrorism as well as at statements on terrorism made by terrorists, politicians, and other influencers, we find a bewildering variety of alleged root causes. Some are broad and general, others narrow and specific. Many have not been tested and are in fact empirically untestable because these alleged “causes” are too vague. Some have been proven wrong (e.g. poverty as cause) but are still turning up in political rhetoric. Others are only contributing factors to the emergence of terrorism under specific circumstances. Some “root causes” might be necessary but are not sufficient conditions.

Here are a number of causal factors which can be found in the media and in academic and other journals. For brevity’s sake, a source is only specified for the last example.

Alleged Root Causes, Pre-conditions, and Contributing Risk Factors Associated with Terrorism

Globalization; rapid modernization; Western alliances with Middle Eastern dictatorships; foreign intervention and/or occupation; unjust world order; failed or weak states; lack of freedom and democracy; oppression and repression; illegitimate or corrupt governments; violation of basic human rights; growing racial or social inequality; ethnic or religious discrimination; ethnic diversity; social polarization; feelings of injustice; extremist ideology; mental illness; radicalization in prisons or refugee camps; alienation; grievances; political discontent; frustration about absolute or relative deprivation (e.g., poverty); unemployment; youth bulge; ideological radicalization; desire for revenge, retribution, punishment; desire to (re-)gain sense of significance; desire to dramatize injustices and create impetus for reform; Alienation from, and discrimination in, host country; rage in response to humiliation; feelings of powerlessness and deprivation; feelings of marginalization and exclusion; disillusionment over impossibility of bringing about change by other means; bitter hopelessness and desperation, with terrorism being weapon of last resort; ideological radicalization to extremist ideology; desire for national self-determination; instrument to accelerate “history”; tool to reinstate, reinforce supremacy of own group; no other choice (weapon of the weak); absence of alternative channels of influence; to obtain access to mass media (propaganda of the deed); to unblock blocked society (no democratic change possible); to press for solution in unresolved conflict; tactic of provocation to trigger repression that will bring new recruits; easy availability of targets and weapons in open democratic societies; shortcomings in preventive measures; weak border/perimeter controls allowing access to targets; mimetic urge to do likewise
(contagion); outcome of a learning process; fanaticism; religious duty rewarded by place in paradise; defense of the community (Ummah); defense of the prophet; divine command.

Clearly, many of these “causes” are difficult if not impossible to remove (e.g., the last one: divine command). Like in the case of (non-political) crimes, the spectrum of the phenomenon of (political) terrorism is wide, especially if one not only looks at the means (stabbing, shooting, assassination, IED bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, suicide attacks, vehicle ramming attack etc.) but also at the multiple ends, motives and intentions which are often hard to separate. All this makes the prevention of terrorism a difficult and complex task.
Endnotes


3 Ibid., p. 7.


6 Peeters 2013, p. 7.

7 Gough 2015, p. 3.


9 CVE has, in the US context, for lack of an official definition, been defined by Caitlin E. Ambrozik as “a collection of non-punitive policies and programs that aim to either prevent violent extremism and disrupt an individual or group’s reliance on violent extremism by attempting to address the root causes of violent extremism… In practice, there are four main components that practitioners and scholars typically associate with CVE: prevention, intervention, deradicalization, and disengagement. Each component can include a variety of different programs that operate in the non-criminal or criminal spaces of public policy.” Ambrozik, Caitlin E., *Countering Violent Extremism Locally*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018, p. 3.


16 Radicalism, in the European tradition, was, in the 19th century, situated ideologically between socialism and liberalism and is rooted in the 18th century enlightenment and linked to the idea of progress and the emancipation of the underprivileged. Radicalism differs from extremism which is supremacist rather than egalitarian, rejects pluralism and denies human rights to members of the out-group.
19 What is omitted here is a discussion of the literature on the prevention of violence and aggression, which is very extensive, ranging from prevention of bullying to prevention of nuclear war.
24 Despite serious shortcomings, this draft definition has been left unchanged for many years as the members of the Ad Hoc Committee quarrel over some of the other 27 paragraphs of the draft for a Comprehensive Terrorism Convention - mainly those dealing with the scope of the convention (should it also apply to the armed forces of UN member states? And should the activities of non-state “parties” (e.g. Hamas) fighting for “national liberation” be excluded from the application of the convention?). For a discussion, see: Schmid, Alex P. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London and New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 50-60; and Saul, Ben, ‘Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield’; in: Chenoweth, Erica et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 34-49. See also Margariti 2017, pp. 159-166.
25 Schmid 2011, pp. 86-87. For a fuller version of the Academic Consensus Definition, see the online journal ‘Perspectives on Terrorism,’ 6(2), 2012. Available at: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism. For an expanded explanation, see Schmid, Alex P., ‘The Definition of Terrorism’; in: Schmid, Alex P. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London and New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 39-98 and the Appendix 2.1: ‘250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions’. Earlier the author of this academic consensus definition had also suggested a legal definition to the UN which was, however, not accepted. He had proposed, in 1992, to extend the uncontroversial definition of ‘war crimes’ from war times to peace times, defining acts of


29 Ibid., p. 258.


32 There are ten main audiences: 1) adversary(-ies) – usually government(s); 2) society of the adversary(-ies); 3) direct victims and their relatives and friends; 4) others who have reason to fear that they might become targets; 5) members and supporters of terrorist organizations; 6) other rival terrorist or political party organizations; 7) constituency terrorists claim to represent/act for the terrorist/terrorist group; 8) potentially sympathetic sectors of domestic and foreign (diaspora) publics; 9) ‘neutral’ distant publics which have not (yet) taken sides; and last, but not least; 10) the media. By the way, the terrorist audience can also be the terrorist him or herself – a perverse form of self-glorification.


34 Schmid and de Graaf, 1982.


37 Gough 2015, Table 1. Varying definitions of primary, secondary and tertiary forms of prevention.

38 Jackson et al. 2019, p. 40 (Figure 3.1. Radicalization and Mobilization States, with Phases of Terrorism Prevention).


40 Gough 2015, Table 1.

41 The Danish model of extremism prevention evolved from a pilot model developed in the city of Aarhus to counter radicalization in 2007. By 2014, it had become Denmark’s nationwide approach and since then it has become an often-cited example for other European countries. See Nationalt Center for Forebygglese af Ekstremisme, *Knowledge Synthesis. Mapping of Knowledge on Extremism and Prevention of Extremism*. Copenhagen, 2018, p. 39. Available at: https://stopekstremisme.dk/en/prevention.

In three percent of the cases, explicit threats led to the prevention. Unspecified other cases amounted to ten percent.


Bjørgo 2013, p. 5.

Bjørgo, Tore, ‘Strategies for preventing violent extremism and terrorism,’ Oslo: C-REX, n.d. (powerpoint presentation, slide 5). Also in Bjørgo, Tore, Preventing Crime: A Holistic Approach. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. It should be noted that the wording has changed slightly between 2013 and 2016 in his work. In Bjørgo’s conceptualization, “preventive mechanisms” refer to how do these mechanisms reduce (future) acts of terrorism, while measures refer to the instruments used to activate these mechanisms. For instance, when it comes to mechanisms to reduce radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and violent extremism, the recommended measures are conflict resolution, political processes, social development, non-discrimination, rule of law, social work, etc. See Bjørgo, Tore, ‘Strategies for preventing violent extremism and terrorism,’ Oslo: C-REX, n.d. (powerpoint presentation, slide 7).

Ibid., pp. 11-12.

Passage taken from Foreword by Alex P. Schmid to Bjorgo’s volume (p. viii).

Ambrozik 2018, p. 3.


56 Berger 2018, pp. 44-46.
57 Presentation by Alex P. Schmid, 25 May 2018, the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) Oslo.
63 Schmid 2013.
65 Schmid 2013.
66 This definition is based on a number of sources, including those cited in the appendix, e.g.: National Crime Prevention Institute (USA), Understanding Crime Prevention. Woburn, WA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001, p. 3. One definition of crime prevention adopted by several countries is “the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it.” Tore Bjørgo uses the term prevention to refer to “…reducing future acts of terrorism or other crimes, or reducing the harmful consequences of such acts, by proactive measures.” See Bjørgo 2013, p.5. See also: the glossary in Schmid 2011, p. 676.
68 Ibid. Wording slightly modified here.
69 The START study, ‘Correlates of Terrorism,’ based on the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland, which by now includes over 190,000 incidents (150,000 in 2011) found in 2012 that higher levels of terrorism were strongly associated with the following factors: 1) higher levels of group grievances; 2) lower levels of intergroup cohesion; 3) higher levels of organized conflict; 4) higher levels of political (state) violence; 5) lower human rights standards; 6) higher numbers of refugees and internally displaced people; 7) lower levels of political stability; 8) lower levels of negative peace, and (ix) lower levels of internal peace. START, Global Terrorism Index 2012. College Park: University of Maryland, 2012, p. 34. See also Parker, Tom, Avoiding the Terrorist Trap. Why Respect for Human Rights is the Key to Defeating Terrorism. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2019. See also the chapter by McAllister, Bradley and Alex P. Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’; in: Schmid, Alex P. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, New York and London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 201-279.


A Danish literature survey noted in 2016, “it must be emphasized that researchers and practitioners do not have a collective understanding of the terms radicalization and extremism.” Nationalt Center for Forebygglse af Ekstremisme, 2016, p.6.


Most of these “causes” are from Appendices 4.1 and 4.2 of Schmid, Alex P. (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.* New York and London, 2011: Appendix 4. 1: Psychological, Political, Economic, Religious and Cultural (Root) Causes of Terrorism, According to Scholars Gathered at the Club de Madrid Conference of 2005 (pp.272-275) and Appendix 4.2: Insights and Hypotheses on Causes of Terrorism Identified on the Basis of a
Survey of the Literature on Terrorism, by Brynjar Lia (pp.276-279). Other causal factors are from the chapter “Theories of Terrorism” by Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid in the same volume (pp.201-271). Additional “causes” are from Goodwin, Jeff, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ in: Chenoweth, Erica et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, chapter 17, pp. 253-267. The first seminal study on causes was Crenshaw, Martha, ‘The Causes of Terrorism,’ Comparative Politics, 13 (4), 1989, pp. 379-399.

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Web-based Resources

_Deutscher Präventionstag, Islamismus und Terrorismus – Möglichkeiten der Prävention._
Available at: https://www.praeventionstag.de/nano.cms/vortraege/id/134.


Society for Prevention Research. Available at: www.preventionresearch.org

Scrivens, Ryan, Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on CVE, PVE and TP, _Perspectives on Terrorism_, 6(2), February 2019. Available at: https://www.universiteit.leiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2019/issue-1/scrivens.pdf.


US National Criminal Justice Reference Service: 500 title on ‘Terrorism Prevention’. Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/AbstractDB/AbstractDBSearchResults.aspx?Title=&Author=&Journal=&NCJNum=&General=Terrorism+Prevention&StartDate=&EndDate=&SearchMode=All&fromTopics=&sortBy=2&offset=0&SelectedRange=init&SelectedSearchItems=init