Chapter 24
Prevention of Kidnappings and Hostage-Takings by Terrorists
Alex P. Schmid

This chapter will look into what can be done to prevent kidnappings and acts of hostage taking, focussing on the seizure phase and the negotiation phase, in which the prevention of loss of lives among the hostages becomes paramount. This chapter will present an overview of the recent and contemporary prevalence of kidnappings and hostage takings and the outcome of such acts of terrorism, based on two, partly overlapping, ITERATE datasets. In doing so, this chapter will utilize roughly 4,000 kidnapping and hostage taking incidents over a fifty-year period (1968-2018). This will be followed by a presentation of some of the best practices which have evolved over the years to prevent these crimes and, failing that, to prevent loss of lives during captivity with the help of smart negotiation techniques. Criminal and political acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, local and transnational abductions, and barricade and non-barricade types have their own dynamics and are, therefore, not always comparable. Successful kidnappings (e.g. the kidnappers collected a ransom payment, obtained the release or exchange of prisoners, were granted safe departure, or gained publicity) can encourage imitations and become contagious, thereby trading short-term prevention of loss of lives for long-term higher future risks of further abductions. The chapter’s Appendix reproduces Al-Qaeda’s kidnapping manual while a bibliography lists the most important literature on the subject.

Keywords: hostage-taking, kidnapping, negotiation, prevention, ransom, victims
Acts of terrorist aggression include (suicide) bombings, armed attacks on groups of people by assault rifles or missiles, arson attacks, individual or serial murder, and hijackings and other acts of hostage taking and kidnapping. The majority of terrorist attacks (about 80 percent in the case of transnational terrorist incidents) are single-phased (like in an armed assault or bomb attack) while the remainder (about 20 percent of transnational terrorist incidents) are dual-phased.¹ Single-phased incidents usually occur before first responders arrive at the scene: the shots were fired or the bomb had exploded. Dual-phase incidents are different. Kidnappings involve the unlawful apprehension and abduction of persons against their will, followed by their confinement, usually in an unknown or unreachable hideout for coercive bargaining in order to extort a ransom or force a third party (often a government) to act or abstain from acting in a certain way (e.g., the release of imprisoned terrorists). Such abductions are always criminal in nature, but often have a political component. Above all, they have a strong human component. As one American hostage wrote in his diary of the 325th day of his captivity in Colombia: “Kidnapping. The deliberate creation and marketing of human grief, anguish and despair.”²

Contrary to kidnappings, acts of hostage takings involve the seizure of a group of persons (less often a single person) and detaining them, usually at a known location, while threatening to injure, mutilate or murder some or all of the hostages in an effort to seek compliance to demands addressed to a third party, usually a government. They are not uncommon in insurgent warfare. Common to both kidnappings and hostage takings is that the victims – whether targets of opportunity or specifically selected persons - are seized by abductors and kept in a location, while compliance with demands is expected in exchange for not hurting those held captive and the eventual release of (some of) them. If the location is known and terrestrial, the scene of crime will be surrounded by security forces and the result is a barricade hostage-taking situation. These siege situations differ in important ways from other acts of hostage taking, but statistics sometimes combine barricade situations non-siege types of hostage taking. Locations for all types of hostage taking can be on land (e.g., embassy occupation), on water (e.g., piracy) or in the air (e.g., hijackings). This chapter only deals with terrestrial kidnappings and acts of hostage taking (for skyjackings and attacks on other transportation targets, see chapter 26 authored by Brian M. Jenkins). Its main focus is on kidnappings carried out by terrorists rather than purely criminal abductions. The latter constitute the large majority of kidnappings although they receive far less attention than those by terrorists.

The main strength of the kidnappers and hostage-takers stems from the element of surprise: for a brief moment in time, numerically weak terrorists can establish superiority of force at the scene of crime. In the case of kidnappings and hostage takings, time stretches while surprise diminishes - at least in those cases where the location of victims and perpetrators is or becomes known (such as in a barricade siege situation where the hostage takers use their victims as human shields). Incidents are brought to a conclusion in various ways: negotiations, paying ransom, making political or other concessions, surrender, storming of a hostage site, or the death of perpetrators and/or victims - or a combination of these.

The threat to mutilate or kill one or more hostages if demands are not met by a deadline amounts to blackmail. It also leads to crisis situations where quick life-or-death decisions have often to be made under duress by local crisis negotiators, national governments, hostage negotiators, or other stakeholders. There is considerable variation in hostage takings and kidnappings. For instance, a bunch of armed men might enter a hut in a rural village at night and demand from the parents that their only son joins them for their holy struggle, threatening, in case of refusal, that they would take their daughters with them – a case of coercive extortion for recruitment typical for terrorist organizations like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda or Boko Haram in Nigeria.³

How can such a kidnapping be prevented? The short answer in the case just mentioned is: it cannot be prevented. However, there are other kidnappings and acts of hostage-taking where
a more hopeful answer is possible, depending on such parameters as location, preparedness, and intelligence. A study of nearly 2,000 acts of transnational hostage takings showed that the hostage-takers were successful in capturing the hostages in 82.1 percent of the cases while for kidnappings the success rate of the perpetrators was 75.3 percent. While these are not very comforting figures, the situation is better when one looks at the survival of those taken hostage or kidnapped following negotiations. Here the respective figures for a successful release of those held are hope-giving, especially in the case of hostage barricade situations where the site of crime is surrounded by security forces. Much depends on the rationale behind an act of hostage taking or a kidnapping: is the objective money, political concessions, forced recruitment or sexual slavery? Terrorists also abduct people for publicity and propaganda purposes, for obtaining secret intelligence from the abductee, or a combination of any of these motives.

Prevention is possible when an attack is still in the planning stage, provided precise intelligence is available. More difficult is prevention in the seizure and abduction stage as the terrorists have the element of surprise on their side. Once the hostages are in the hands of the terrorists and kept in a known location - or brought to an unknown hideout - a negotiation process usually ensues. In this situation prevention means prevention of further harm by achieving the safe release of those kept against their will through skilful negotiation techniques involving some concessions.

In the following pages this chapter will sketch the wider picture of kidnapping and hostage taking before returning to the issue of prevention. Kidnappings and hostage takings other than the more overt barricade siege situations are difficult to investigate and those who know most about it are often the least likely to write candidly on the topic. As one insider to the negotiation business told the present author, when he invited him to write this chapter based on his first-hand experience with criminal and political, secular and religious hostage-takers:

“Terrorist kidnappings are an issue that is practically impossible to accurately research from open sources, because what you read is in most cases a crafted legend, and not the real story. The people who were involved will never write about it, as there’s is nothing to be gained by that - client confidence and strict confidentiality is paramount in this business, and no one wants to be seen as sharing information that might be useful to kidnappers. Then there is the issue of ransoms, which people claim to not have paid, but in reality, terrorists never release hostages for free.... There is also the issue of underreporting, and excessive focus on the rare cases of kidnappings of Westerners, rather than locals, who are kidnapped on a much more regular basis. As a result, most academic analyses of the KFR [Kidnapping for Ransom] phenomenon are completely off the mark ....”

**Kidnappings and Hostage Takings – General Background**

In the following section, part of the information on kidnappings and hostage takings is derived from information obtained from the ITERATE database, as reproduced in a 2010 study by Alex P. Schmid and Peter Flemming on the one hand, and in a 2020 study by Wukki Kim, Justin George, and Todd Sandler on the other hand. While these data refer only to transnational incidents, and while some of these go back in time to the late 1960s, many of the findings are still relevant and also apply to national incidents where both perpetrators and victims are local persons. The first article was based on an analysis of 1,904 incidents in the period 1968-2005, while the second is based on 1,974 - partly overlapping - incidents which took place from 1978 to 2018. Four types of transnational incidents are covered by the ITERATE data:
1. non-aerial hijackings: 3.3 percent in the period 1978-2006, 0.9 percent in the period 2007-2018;
2. barricade and hostage takings: 7.9 percent in the first period; 3.9 percent in the second period;
3. skyjackings: 17.8 percent in the first period, 4.1 in the second period;
4. kidnappings: 71 percent of total incidents in the first period; 91.2 percent in the second period.9

A quick comparison of the two periods suggests that preventive measures against skyjackings, especially after the 9/11 incidents, have significantly contributed to the reduction of aerial highjackings. On the other hand, kidnappings, mostly linked to the extortion of money, increased from just over 70 percent to more than 90 percent in the same period. Since 1992, kidnappings have become the main type of hostage events and represent a major source of income for many terrorist groups.10 As many kidnappings – especially the purely criminal ones – go unreported, figures about how widespread kidnappings are vary greatly. One report of the Swiss-based ETH Centre for Security Studies from 2013 noted that “… reliable statistics on hostage-takings and ransom payments are not available. According to estimates, between 12,000 and 30,000 kidnappings are carried out every year around the world, with the number of abducted foreigners in particular on the increase.”11

The financial rewards and the success rates of kidnappings in transnational incidents are probably the main incentives behind this form of crime.

Rukmini Callimachi, a reporter for the New York Times, noted on 29 July 2014:

“While European governments deny paying ransoms, an investigation by The New York Times found that Al Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008, of which $66 million was paid just last year.(…) And the business is booming: While in 2003 the kidnappers received around $200,000 per hostage, now they are netting up to $10 million, money that the second in command of Al Qaeda’s central leadership recently described as accounting for as much as half of his operating revenue.(…) In a 2012 letter to his fellow jihadists in Africa, the man who was once Bin Laden’s personal secretary,…[wrote]: “Thanks to Allah, most of the battle costs, if not all, were paid from through the spoils,” wrote Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. “Almost half the spoils came from hostages.”12

In 2004, Al-Qaeda developed its own kidnapping manual which is reproduced in full as an Appendix to this chapter. Since paying ransom allows further terrorist attacks, one way of preventing kidnappings and other acts of hostage-taking would be to refuse to pay money to terrorists. The US and the UK have official no-concession policies. However, that has not spared citizens from these countries from being abducted and killed. One American study from 2017, investigating the question whether to pay or not to pay ransom money, reached two primary conclusions:

“First, countries that do not make concessions experience far worse outcomes for their kidnapped citizens than countries that do. Second, there is no evidence that American and British citizens are more protected than other Westerners by the refusal of their governments to make concessions.”13

What makes kidnappings and hostage takings so tempting for both ordinary criminals and political terrorists is that chances of managing to seize hostages as planned (what is termed
‘logistical success’) are high. Obtaining at least part of what they seek in the ensuing bargaining for the release of the hostages (what is termed ‘negotiation success’) is also quite high. According to ITERATE data analysed by Kim et al, “On average, hostage takers achieve logistical and negotiation (mean) success rates in 82.1% and 27.1% of incidents, respectively. (...) Kidnappings constitute 75.3% of logistical success and 81.1% of negotiation success relative to non-kidnappings.”

While purely criminal kidnappings for ransom – especially the local-to-local variant whereby both perpetrators and victims are from the same country - are much more frequent than terrorist kidnappings, the two forms sometimes overlap, e.g. when criminal abductors kidnap a high-profile person in order to sell the abductee to a terrorist organization which, in turn, seeks to obtain political concessions from a local or foreign government. In terms of modus operandi, there is also overlap in the way victims are selected and abducted. While there is evolution in tactics based on technology (e.g. regarding the ability of tracing a person’s whereabouts via mobile phone signals, or the payment of ransom in bitcoins), some things have not changed much in recent years (e.g. basic negotiation tactics). Therefore, some of the data presented below, reaching back more than forty years, are still of value. However, it has to be stressed that criminal and political acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, local and transnational abductions, and barricade and non-barricade types have their own dynamics and are, therefore, not always comparable. Here then are some illustrative statistics, depicting duration of incidents, perpetrators, and victims.

Length of Hostage Ordeals

Kidnappings and acts of hostage taking are, as mentioned earlier, dual phase incidents. They can stretch out over days, weeks and months as the Table 1 makes clear.

Table 1. Duration of Incidents, 1978 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Incidents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than one week</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One week to one month</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One month to one year</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than one year</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of a long hostage incident was the storming and occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. During this siege, 52 American diplomats and citizens became “guests of the Ayatollah” for 444 days, before being released on 20 January 1981, the same day on which Ronald Reagan became the US’ 40th president. Criminal kidnappings tend to be shorter than political ones, especially if the person kidnapped has anti-kidnapping insurance and the support of a professional hostage negotiator. According to Control Risks, a London-based firm which offers its services for kidnapping negotiations, 80 percent of all kidnappings it recorded in 2019 lasted less than one week, while 6 percent lasted longer than four weeks. The duration of being held in captivity affects the mood of the hostages. In their confinement
victims often experience helplessness, hopelessness, powerlessness, worthlessness, bewilderment, frustration, anxiety, despair, and stress due to their fear of death. Especially in cases of long detention periods, the post-release effects of captivity tend to lead to long-lasting trauma.  

Perpetrators

Survival chances for those abducted and held in captivity depend on the type of kidnappers and hostage takers. There is a considerable variety in perpetrators, as the following typology makes clear. Irvin Goldaber identified nine categories of hostage takers.

Table 2. Typology of Hostage-takers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of hostage taker</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suicidal person</td>
<td>wants someone else to fulfil his death wish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vengeance seeker</td>
<td>wants to gain revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbed individual</td>
<td>wants to achieve mastery and solve his problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornered perpetrator</td>
<td>wants to effectuate escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggrieved inmate</td>
<td>wants to obtain freedom or bring about situational change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felonious extortionist</td>
<td>wants to obtain money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protestor</td>
<td>wants to bring about social change or obtain social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Zealot</td>
<td>wants to redress a grievance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Extremist</td>
<td>wants to obtain political change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list is incomplete, as it excludes incumbent rogue state actors as well as insurgents and guerrilla movements (which can be designated terrorist organisations) engaged in civil wars. While state-sponsored international abductions are rare, domestic hostage taking in civil wars are not. Prisoners of war are sometimes kept as hostages and used for prisoner exchanges. However, in these cases they are usually not treated according to the rules of international humanitarian law. Non-combatants are sometimes also seized to create terror and submission. A major example of the use of abductions by insurgents are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A recent fact-finding report on the FARC described:

“…. hitherto undisclosed details of the conditions in which the FARC kept some of the 21,396 hostages they took from 1990 to 2016. The guerrillas who claimed to be fighting for a more just society, seized rich and poor alike. They beat and starved the hostages. Many were forced to urinate in their clothes and not allowed to clean themselves for months. Some were locked in wooden boxes barely larger than their bodies. The rebels ordered some to dig their own graves as a form of psychological torture.”

Other terrorist groups, e.g. Boko Haram in Nigeria, kidnap young men and women in schools and dormitories not just for ransom, but also for sexual slavery or for fatal operational tasks – coercing some of them to become suicide bombers. The Nigerian government has paid ransom for the release of abducted girls in high profile cases and also provided the rebels with vehicles as part of secret deals it made. Boko Haram’s mass abductions have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee north-eastern Nigeria.

Types of Victims
When it comes to the prevention of kidnappings and acts of hostage taking, it is, first of all, important to know who is likely to become a victim. As Table 3, based again on ITERATE data covering transnational incidents only, makes clear, about half of the victims were ‘private parties’ while about one-fifth were corporate officials with most of the others either being local or foreign government officials. The latter are often “protected persons” – protected by kidnapping insurance which makes it more likely that they can be bailed out by a ransom payment.

Table 3. Type of Immediate Victims of International Hostage Incidents 1968 - 2005\(^{24}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Immediate Victim</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host government officials</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign diplomats or official, nonmilitary</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host government military</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign military</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation officials</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominent opinion leaders</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private parties</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected terrorists</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,904</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The harsh truth is that a broad range of persons can become victims of kidnappings and hostage taking. However, the lethality of kidnappings and acts of hostage-taking, when compared to the one of other types of terrorist incidents, is less in terms of total fatalities (Table 4). In the case of barricade situations, victims were sometimes killed when government troops tried to storm the hostage site (e.g. in Beslan, North Ossetia, 2004). However, there have also been cases where the hostage takers came to kill rather than negotiate and found themselves surrounded by security forces before they could escape (e.g. Westgate, Nairobi, 2013).

Table 4. Fatalities per Attack across Tactics, 1970-2014 (N = 113,770)\(^{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Fatalities per Attack</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hijacking</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>3,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Armed assault</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>126,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hostage-taking (barricade)</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Bombing/explosion</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>85,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>20,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hostage-taking (kidnapping)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>7,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Unarmed assault</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Facility/infrastructure attack</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>6,031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Attacks that used more than one tactic are included in this table for each tactic (2,688 attacks with unknown tactics are excluded).

There are various types of kidnappings and abductions and prevention is hardly possible in some of them. To give four examples:
1. **Express kidnapping**: “Express kidnapping,” for instance, as are frequently reported from Mexico, involve the abduction of a person on the street or in a taxi and holding that person until he or she has emptied her or his own bank account from publicly accessible ATM machines and handed all the money over to the kidnappers. Express kidnappings last only as long as there is money on the bank account and then the robbed person is normally drugged and released unharmed at some desolate place.

2. **Miracle fishing**: Another type of abduction, popular in Colombia, was “miracle fishing” (Pesca Milagrosa): erecting illegal roadblocks in a rural area, using fake police or military uniforms in order to stop buses and cars and force the travellers out of the vehicles for identity card controls. Some of them are “arrested” after having been assessed for their likely ransom worth. The perpetrators take the most promising ones into captivity, the end result being a regular kidnapping. The poor-looking travellers are allowed to continue their journey.  

3. **Enforced disappearances**: Yet another form of abduction are so-called (enforced) “disappearances.” Victims, usually political activists, are snatched at their homes or at their workplaces or on the way between these places by plainclothes state agents, brought to a secret prison, tortured and finally disposed of, e.g. by dropped them, with arms and legs tied, from a helicopter into the high sea, as happened in Argentina in the 1970s. In recent years, the Syrian government has used the tactics of disappearances in more than ten thousand cases against suspected enemies of the Assad regime.

4. **Tiger kidnappings**: Yet another form of kidnapping is so-called “Tiger kidnappings.” One of more family members e.g. parents, children) are abducted and kept in captivity until another family member (e.g. a father or son) has committed a crime on behalf of the kidnappers – e.g. placing a car bomb in a location to which that person has easy access while the kidnappers themselves have not. This tactic was used by the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.

These particular types of kidnappings and abductions are hard, if not impossible, to prevent. In the following sections we will explore what can be done in terms of prevention and preparedness, focussing on two points in time: prevention of being abducted and held by the captors and prevention of being harmed in the course of a hostage detention situation. We will explore each of these two scenarios in turn.

### Prevention in the Planning and Abduction Phase

Most of the existing guidelines about what a person in danger of being kidnapped can do to prevent being taken hostage refer to other types of kidnapping than the four sketched above. These guidelines usually focus on high-level expatriates (e.g. diplomatic personnel and foreign businessmen) who live in unsafe countries and crime-ridden cities, but do not have personal round-the-clock protection from armed bodyguards like ambassadors or corporate chief executive officers. However, some of the recommendations formulated for these expats are also useful for ordinary citizens as well as for ordinary foreigner visitors.

Guidelines developed by the German Criminal Office (BKA) and distributed by EUROPOL offer, among other recommendations, the following measures that can be taken by a prospective victim. Preventive measures for those likely to become victims of abductions include:

- Developing security awareness
- Identifying your own vulnerabilities
- Be alert and observant
\begin{itemize}
  \item Avoiding going to unsafe areas
  \item Avoiding providing criminals with opportunities
  \item Watching out for individuals or vehicles following you
  \item Keeping a low profile
  \item Avoiding routines, vary the time you depart for, and return from, work
  \item Varying your route and take detours
  \item On the road, avoiding stopping next to vehicles you cannot see into (like delivery vans)
  \item Being aware that unusual incidents, such as an injured person at the side of the road, may in fact be the cover of a trap.
  \item Knowing about exits, escape routes and safe places on your everyday routines
  \item Preventing being harmed in the abduction/capture phase.\(^{30}\)
\end{itemize}

For the abductee the danger to life and limb is highest in the first hour of the kidnapping when the hostage-takers are nervous and aggressive, fearing the intervention of security forces or bystanders. To minimize being hurt or killed in that early detention phase, the same BKA/Europol guidelines suggest that victims follow these rules.

Preventive measures while in captivity: \(^{31}\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item If you cannot escape immediately and successfully, you must accept your situation for the time being.
  \item Try to gain control over your shock, fear and agitation by staying calm and following the instructions of the kidnappers/hostage-takers.
  \item Take a passive role, do not argue, do not make direct eye contact. Refrain from making accusations and appearing hostile or arrogant.
  \item Now your aim is to stabilise the situation. Try to establish a personal relationship with the offenders without going too far.
  \item Stay politically neutral. Avoid controversial issues such as religion or politics.
  \item Try to keep your dignity and self-respect.
  \item Do not negotiate with the offenders - this will be done by others. The offenders will make their demands to a third party.
  \item Follow the instructions of the offenders if you are allowed to make a phone call, even if they tell you to lie.
  \item Be patient. Do not give up and think positively! You can be assured that everything possible is being done for you.
\end{itemize}

Such instructions for the benefit of the victims ought to be juxtaposed by the instructions which the hostage-takers get from their organization. Their instructions indicate that the abductors are aware of the content of such victim protection guidelines. The reader can find those from Al-Qaeda’s kidnapping manual in the Appendix to this chapter. They make for sombre reading, making also clear that the hostages are considered mere bargaining chips – expendable human beings.

The first phase of kidnapping – seizure and abduction – is usually followed by a phase where little seems to be happening. The hostages are usually aware that negotiations are going on, that threats are issued and that an ultimatum has been set. In barricade siege situations a few hostages (e.g. women and children) might be released in return for food and drinks, but in other types of hostage taking, some hostages are sometimes mutilated or shot in order to put more pressure on the government to make concessions. Hostages can generally do little to improve their fate, but they can sometimes do something to prevent it from getting worse based on skills developed in survival trainings\(^{32}\) until a settlement or a rescue changes the circumstances. However, their fate is now in the hands of others.
Prevention of being Harmed and Killed in the Detention and Negotiation Phase

Once seized, the fate of those kidnapped or taken hostage is primarily in the hands of the perpetrators and the authorities opposing them. Both are eager to negotiate – or at least to communicate. Some countries, (e.g., the US, the UK, and Canada), have an official no-concession policy with terrorists. Nonetheless, there is almost always some form of communication taking place between a government and the terrorists. Although, no-concession policies are publicly upheld by many countries, several of them do not, in fact, adhere to this strategy, as they are making secret deals with the perpetrators, often with the help of a third party.

The negotiator is the liaison between terrorists and authorities. In barricade siege situations, time is on the side of the authorities as negotiators can take turns. The hostage takers might take amphetamines or other drugs to stay awake and alert, but these drugs also tend to make them very volatile. As a consequence, the bargaining process can become highly emotional and less rational. If the government has no idea where hostages are, time tends to be on the side of the hostage-takers as long as the latter feel secure their location has not been compromised. For the hostages, the longer an incident lasts, the greater the post-traumatic stress tends to be for those who survive the ordeal.

Contrary to kidnapping situations where the kidnappers’ own lives are not in direct danger, in hostage-barricade situations the outcome of the negotiations – or of the breakdown of these – is a matter of life and death, not just for the hostages, but also for the hostage-takers. They are afraid of being targeted by snipers or surprised by a special assault forces and, therefore, often use the hostages as human shields. For instance, in the case of the 2004 Beslan school siege, one of the hostage-takers, Ruslan Khuchbarov, sent a hand-written note to the security forces surrounding the school: “If they kill any of us, we will shoot fifty people to pieces. If they injure any one of us, we will kill twenty people. If they kill five of us, we will blow up everything. If they turn off the light, even for a minute, we will shoot to pieces ten people.”

In combination with maximalist demands (in this particular case demands along these lines: “We insist that Putin immediately resigns from his post as President of the Russian Federation”35), the task of the hostage negotiator is not an enviable one as he often has very little to offer which might soften the stance of the hostage-takers.

The negotiator (often a “he” since the hostage takers are generally males, but female hostage negotiators are also trained by Western governments although some jihadists might not want to deal with a female negotiator) is caught between intransigent terrorists and sometimes almost as intransigent authorities making his or her space for manoeuvring very small. The negotiator, while buying time, is on the one hand expected to put pressure on the hostage-takers and, on the other hand, keeping their hope alive that at least some of their demands are met. As mentioned, he or she is the liaison between the government and the terrorists, and often has nothing better than a phone line to analyse and judge the situation and make a decision on, if, and how to move forward in the negotiation process. If the negotiations are progressing well, the negotiator might notice that the hostage takers’ spokesperson speech is less excited and loud, that deadlines are allowed to pass without hostages being hurt or shot, and that some mutually satisfying outcome is within reach. On the other hand, if things tend to go wrong, he or she will notice language that has death as its main theme, not just for the hostages, but also for the hostage-takers.36 If the negotiator – or rather negotiators since it is usually a team effort of 4-5 experts – signals such a deterioration in a hostage-barricade situation to superiors, they might decide that a rescue operation by force might be the only option left.

Various guidelines for hostage negotiators have been developed.37 One of the more useful ones is based on interviews with professional negotiators, collecting their common wisdom.
They refer mainly to criminal hostage situations in the US and are based on the insights of 50 negotiators. This common wisdom on hostage negotiations is discussed in terms of percentage of hostage negotiators (n = 50) agreeing or strongly agreeing with the following statements:

- A key function in hostage negotiations is buying time while attempting to defuse the situation (100 percent).
- A hostage negotiator must be on the constant lookout for a “suicide ritual” by the hostage taker (100 percent).
- The main objective in a hostage situation is the preservation of human life, including that of the hostage takers (96 percent).
- The “Stockholm Syndrome” applies not only to hostages, but also to hostage takers and hostage negotiators as well (94 percent).
- The most dangerous time for hostages is the first minutes after being taken hostage (90 percent).
- In a hostage situation, it is important for the hostage negotiator to try to find a face-saving solution for the hostage taker (88 percent).
- The key to successful hostage negotiations is flexibility (86 percent).
- Nothing is owed to the hostage takers and if an opportunity to safely liberate the hostages becomes available, it should be taken (84 percent).

Negotiations with jihadist hostage takers in the 21st century ask for new measures. A very thoughtful set of principles for hostage negotiators that goes beyond traditional checklists like the one above, has been suggested by two seasoned hostage negotiators, Adam Dolnik and Keith Fitzgerald.

New Rules for Hostage-Barricade Situation Negotiations, by A. Dolnik and K. Fitzgerald:

- Always keep in mind that negotiation is not just about reaching “deals” and making quid pro quo exchanges; it is also about exercising influence over the thinking, behaviour, and decision making of others. Any information gained in conversation – and the very act of having the conversation itself – may present such opportunities at any time.
- Be (and remain) self-diagnostic: understand your own biases and constantly question your assumptions about the hostage takers, their motives, and their willingness to negotiate (keeping in mind that there is a big difference between self-diagnosis and self-doubt). Do not cling to conclusions out of frustration or disgust, or you will miss important clues and opportunities.
- Do not negotiate with the “terrorist,” negotiate with the rational human being who, for some set of reasons, has chosen – or felt forced into – an extreme, violent course of action.
- Use an active listening approach to the negotiations, not just a bargaining approach; focus at least as much on asking good questions, learning, and understanding grievances and motives as on making quid pro quo substantive deals.
- Ask for as many details as possible about the reasons/justification the perpetrators use to explain their actions. The answers will provide criteria that may be useful in other ways later.
- Look for empathetic ways to acknowledge or validate legitimate grievances behind the terrorists’ actions while differing with the action themselves. This will make it harder for them to label you as unreasonable, it will create chances to de-escalate the situation emotionally, and it may help you to create a wedge between their grievances and their actions, which in turn may help them to question the connection.
- Brainstorm with them. Rather than simply trying to stall with the “good cop, bad cop
routine”, genuinely look for ways to address the more legitimate grievances in ways that do not require unwise, unreasonable, or impossible concessions.

- Make sure someone is looking at the bigger picture, beyond the incident.38

Hostage negotiations require exceptional professional communication skills and cultural sensitivity. If the hostage negotiator does not manage to achieve a surrender or a solution requiring few concessions from the government, pressure to solve the situation by bringing in special forces to storm the hostage site will be mounting. Unfortunately, there is some statistical evidence that more hostages have been killed during rescue attempts than in cold blood by the terrorist themselves.39 To give an example: When Russian special forces tried on 3 September 2004 to liberate over 1,200 people (777 of them children) in a school in Beslan, (North Ossetia) 331 died on the third day when the special forces intervened, more than half of them (171) were children.40

However, the data on chances of survival for those held captive are not all bad. Much depends on the type and place of an abduction and the policy of the government in attempting to solve the crisis. In Western Europe, in particular, the outcome has been generally better, thanks to honed hostage negotiator skills and, perhaps as much if not even more so, thanks to the concessions made by governments. One study from the early 1980s, surveying 146 incidents of political hostage-taking in Europe over a twelve-year period found that 94 percent of the hostages were released, regardless of whether all demands were met or not.41

What can a skilful hostage negotiator do to prevent loss of lives? He or she has to be a non-judgmental listener and empathetic in the communication process. During the negotiations he or she has to build trust with the hostage takers and develop in dialogue with them a face-saving solution for both sides.42 However, the government must give the negotiating team something to bargain with. If the location of the hostage takers is encircled by security forces, the bargaining position of the negotiator is much better than in a kidnapping situation where the location of the hostages is not known. The negotiator can then suggest to the hostage takers that he is the only person that can prevent an assault. In exceptional cases, he might even be able to promise them a safe conduct – the so-called Bangkok solution named after an incident where four Palestinian Black September terrorists were granted a safe passage to Egypt in exchange for the release of the six hostages they had taken in the Israeli embassy in Thailand in December 1972.43 As the Table 5 makes clear, it is not a very frequent solution to hostage crises.

How many hostages survive their ordeal and are freed? That depends very much on the actor and the location. Given the fact that far from all cases are made public, it is difficult to make firm statements. The kidnapping negotiation and insurance industry keeps records and claims that in about 90 percent of cases the hostages are successfully ransomed.44 That figure might, however, be too optimistic since the majority of hostages cannot not afford insurance and many, perhaps the majority of hostage takings, especially the purely criminal ones, do not enter records and may never have been reported.45 With a fanatical organization like ISIS, hostage survival rates would be much lower than 90 percent while with many other groups, especially criminal groups, it may be closer to 95 percent – considering not only negotiated releases, but also escapes and rescues. As long as negotiations go on, it is rare for kidnap victims to get killed except when they try to escape or in failed rescue attempts. Yet the picture has many shades of grey between the black of death and the white of unharmed release as Table 6, based on the ITERATE database makes clear.

This table makes clear that prevention in the first phase – (7,8,14) amounts to 4.8 percent of all cases in transnational acts of kidnappings and hostage taking. However, prevention in the form of “Incident forestalled by authorities before initiation” (13) worked in another 1.8 percent of cases, bringing the total prevention score for phase one to 6.6 percent of 1,410 incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking.
The success rate in the detention/negotiation phase is much better: Adding categories 1, 2, and 12, brings the total to a respectable 57.9 percent for the last phase.

Table 5. Types of Government Responses, 1978 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitulation</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalling, with compromise on demands</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok solution</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No compromise, no shootout with the perpetrators</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shootout with the terrorists</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government double-cross</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massive nationwide search, with no compromise</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant, negotiations were not established</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown, indeterminate</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.410</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Hostage Fate, 1978 – 2005, according to ITERATE data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fate of Hostage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 No damage or casualties, hostages released, no capitulation</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No damage or casualties, hostages released, capitulation or compromise</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Victims killed, no target capitulation</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Victims killed, capitulation or compromise by targets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Damaged material, no target capitulation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Victim killed while attempting escape after initial capture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Victim successfully avoided capture</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Victim successfully avoided capture after incident began</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Hostages killed in shootout</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Hostages killed, no provocation, during negotiations</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Hostages killed during negotiations, deadline had passed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Hostages rescued by authorities</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Incident forestalled by authorities before initiation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Victim escaped after initial capture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Irrelevant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Unknown, indeterminate</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.410</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the downside, the cases where hostages were killed by either terrorists, rescue forces, or in the crossfire between them (3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 in Table 10) add up to 10.7 percent of the 1,410 cases.

In sum, prevention in the first and the last phase of kidnappings and acts of hostage-taking add up to 64.5 percent – almost two thirds of all cases. However, these figures are only referring to transnational terrorism and might not be representative for other types of kidnappings and hostage taking.

There is a dark, unknown side to that seemingly high success rate: where terrorists got away with a ransom, managed to release imprisoned fellow terrorists as the government made concessions, that money and those prisoners might be the source of new acts of kidnapping and hostage taking in the future. In addition, their “success” in obtaining high ransoms might inspire others to also enter the business of kidnapping and hostage taking.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have identified two phases of kidnapping and hostage-taking where prevention is possible (though not easy). First, in the phase preceding the abduction/detention and, second, in the negotiation phase while hostages are being held in captivity. In the first phase, the potential victim is the main preventer. In the second phase it is the hostage negotiator, because he has the ability to save lives. However, in those cases where ransom was paid by governments and the killing of hostages could be prevented, some of the money obtained in this predatory crime is likely to be invested in organizing further kidnappings. In other words, conceding to the terrorists’ demands (i.e. paying ransom) might encourage terrorists to carry out more kidnappings and hostage takings. The contagiousness of kidnappings and acts of hostage-taking following successful abductions and after securing hefty ransoms is well documented.

However, the inclination to avert immediate and certain death of innocent people taken hostage is for governments, under the pressure of public opinion, – especially in liberal democracies – often greater than the desire to avert a higher risk of more acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking in the future. Deterrence of kidnappings and other acts of hostage-taking by denying concessions can be effective, but only in some cases. If the terrorists are not willing to negotiate, but only take hostages to murder them in front of rolling video-cameras (as in the case of some of ISIS’ acts of terrorism), there is little that can be done beyond admonishing the mass and social media not to broadcast such violence in vivid details. If terrorists are suicidal and wish to die accompanied by as many of their “enemies” as possible, deterrence does not work either. However, these are still exceptional situations rather than the rule.

Prevention is possible. However, successful preventive measures are not feasible without preparedness in the first phase of kidnappings and hostage-takings, or without professional negotiation skills and some room for manoeuvre for the negotiator in the final phase. Prevention is a remedy that always ought to be tried. There is often a price to prevention, especially when kidnapping insurance fees and ransom money are paid. That price might be high, but so is the life of an innocent human being facing a terrorist ultimatum.

In the second chapter of this volume, we distinguished between up-stream-, mid-stream, and down-stream prevention. In this chapter we have focused on the admittedly limited possibilities of downstream prevention. In terms of the mid- and upstream prevention, some of the broader counter-measures against terrorism discussed in chapter 2 might apply. Yet, their exact effect on downstream phenomena is hard and sometimes impossible to assess.

If we look at up- and mid-stream prevention measures not in terms of their presence, but their absence, the importance of these mid- and up-stream measures becomes clear. What
“Kidnapping in Chechnya was perpetrated by all segments of Chechen society: criminal gangs, clans, bandits and rebel groups, even top-level government officials were suspected of involvement. (…) However, this tradition [of historical hostage taking in Chechnya – APS] mutated into a new phenomenon during the first Chechen war of independence in 1996, as a result of the Russian Federation’s practice of detaining civilians for questioning. Described as ‘arbitrary detention and extortion’, detainees could be bought back by paying a ransom to Russian authorities. (…) The practice of buying civilian detainees was counterbalanced by exchanging captured federal soldiers. Often, Russian soldiers who were captured in battle were killed immediately only sparing a minority in order to sell for exchange. Hence, the relatives of a detainee could buy a federal soldier from a rebel group and then ransom him for their family member. Tishkov (2004) explained the process in which a family could visit a ‘hostage market’ and place an order to buy a captive. The families had the ability to choose in advance the category of hostage they required, whether it was a businessman, an officer, or a civil servant. (…) Extreme violence was a common feature in the Chechen negotiation process; kidnappers tortured or maimed hostages on video, by using various cruel methods of torture. (…) Typically, hostages were abducted by smaller criminal groups, valued and then sold along the supply chain to larger criminal or rebel organizations. Once the hostage reached the end of the supply chain, the commodities were then stored in purpose-built prisons equipped with torture chambers.”

Situations like these are exceptional, but have been approached in other places where foreign intervention and civil war nearly destroyed state and society; Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion is a striking example hereof. Civil war, foreign intervention, absence of good governance, widespread corruption, economic misery, black markets, unpunished crime and lack of rule of law and human rights are some of the up- and mid-stream factors that are likely to contribute to down-stream kidnappings and acts of hostage taking.

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Authored by Abdel Aziz Al Moqrin

Kidnapping

Reasons for detaining one or more individuals by an enemy:

1. Force the government or the enemy to succumb to some demands.
2. Put the government in a difficult situation that will create a political embarrassment between the government and the countries of the detainees.
3. Obtaining important information from the detainees.
4. Obtaining ransoms. Such was the case with the brothers in the Philippines, Chechnya, and Algiers. Our brothers from Muhammad’s Army in Kashmir received a two-million-dollar ransom that provided good financial support to the organization.
5. Bringing a specific case to light. This happened at the beginning of the cases in Chechnya and Algeria, with the hijacking of the French plane, and the kidnapping operations performed by the brothers in Chechnya and the Philippines.

Requirements needed in forming a kidnapping group:

1. Capability to endure psychological pressure and difficult circumstances. In case of public kidnapping, the team will be under a lot of pressure.
2. Intelligence and quick reflexes in order to deal with an emergency.
3. Capability to take control over the adversary. The brother is required to possess fighting skills that will enable him to paralyze the adversary and seize control of him.
4. Good physical fitness and fighting skills.
5. Awareness of the security requirements, prior to, during, and after the operation.
6. Ability to use all types of light weapons for kidnapping.

Types of Kidnapping

Secret Kidnapping: The target is kidnapped and taken to a safe location that is unknown to the authorities. Secret kidnapping is the least dangerous. Such was the case of the Jewish reporter Daniel Pearl, who was kidnapped from a public place, then transferred to another location. It is also the case of our brothers in Chechnya who kidnap the Jews in Moscow, and the kidnapping operations in Yemen.

Public Kidnapping: This is when hostages are publicly detained in a known location. The government surrounds the location and conducts negotiations. The authorities often attempt to create diversions and attack the kidnappers. That was the case of the theater in Moscow, and the Russian officers’ detention by Shamil Basayev and the Mujahideen brothers. A counter-terrorism officer once said: “There never was a successful kidnapping operation in the world.” This saying was intended to discourage the so-called terrorists. History is full of facts proving the opposite. Many operations by the Mafia, or the Mujahideen were successful. There are examples of many successful operations, such as those of Muhammad’s Army, and Shamil in Moscow. Although not all the goals were met, some of them were. The leader Shamil Basayev’s operation was 100% successful, because it brought the case back to the attention of the international scene, therefore the Mujahideen got their reward, thanks to God.
Stages of Public Kidnapping

- Determining the target: A target must be suitably chosen, to force the government to achieve your goals. Therefore, it is mandatory to make sure the kidnapped individuals are important and influential.
- Gathering enough information on the location (kidnapping stage), and the people inside it. For example:
  - If the people are inside a building: A thorough study of the fences around the building as well as the security and protection teams and systems. A plan of the building with information on its partitions should be reviewed. The kidnappers could use cars that enter the building without inspection to smuggle their equipment. They should also spot individuals who are exempt from inspection when entering the building. When the cars are parked outside the building, the driver could be kidnapped while parking, or the important people when entering with their cars. High places overlooking the building could be set for snipers, and to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of those strategic spots.
  - If the people are on a bus: It is essential to know the nationalities of the people on the bus, as nationalities determine the effect of the operation. All information concerning the bus routing, stops for fuel or rest, protection procedures, the program set for the tourists, and other information should be obtained in order to determine the weak spots, and allow easy control of the group.
  - If the target is on a plane: It is important to determine the destination of the plane. A connecting flight is a better option. Transit areas are more vulnerable where little inspection is provided. Our brothers in Nepal took advantage of such situation, put the weapons on the Indian plane, and hijacked it. Hijackers must be creative in bringing weapons or explosives on a plane. They must also be familiar with the inspection process at airports.
  - If the target is in a convoy: The same rules for assassination in a convoy apply for kidnapping.

Besides specifying the targets, and gathering information on them, leaders must put together a suitable plan made at the level of the weakest team member. It has been said: “A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.”

Execution of the abduction: The abductors’ roles vary, based on the location of the kidnapping operation. They are grouped in three categories: 1) Protection group whose role is to protect the abductors. 2) The guarding and control group whose role is to seize control of the hostages, and get rid of them in case the operation fails. 3) The negotiating group whose role is extremely important and sensitive. In general, the leader of this group is the negotiator. He conveys the Mujahideen’s demands, and must be intelligent, decisive, and determined.

Negotiations: The enemy uses the best negotiator he has, who is normally very sly, and knowledgeable in human psychology. He is capable of planting fear in the abductors’ hearts, in addition to discouraging them. Kidnappers must remain calm at all times, as the enemy negotiator will resort to stalling, in order to give the security forces time to come up with a plan to storm the hostage’s location. The duration of the detention should be minimized to reduce the tension on the abducting team. The longer the detention is, the weaker the willpower of the team is, and the more difficult the control over the hostages is. One of the mistakes that the Red Army made in the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru - where they detained a large number of diplomats - was to allow the hostage situation to continue for over a month. In the meantime, the storm team excavated tunnels under the Embassy, and was able to liberate the hostages and end the kidnapping. In case of any stalling, starting to execute hostages is necessary. The authorities must realize the seriousness of the kidnappers, and their dedicated resolve and credibility in future operations.
Hostage Exchange Process: This is a very delicate stage. If the enemy submits to the demands, and the purpose of the operation is to release our imprisoned brothers, it is essential to make sure that the brothers are in good and healthy condition. If the purpose of the kidnapping is to obtain money, you have to ensure that all the money is there, that it is not fake, nor traceable. You must be sure there are no listening or homing devices planting with the money. The brothers must be constantly on alert for possible ambushes. In Bosnia, the UN set up an ambush for the brothers during the exchange; however, the brothers were prepared for it, and prepared a counter-ambush. When the enemy realized that the brother’s readiness and high sense of alert, they let the hostages go without interception. Our Jihadi operations have proven that security forces are not capable of completely seizing control inside the cities. Therefore, the brothers should find ways to transport their liberated brothers even under tight security measures.

Hostage Release: The Brothers should be careful to not release any hostage until they have received their own people. It is essential for the brothers to abide by our religion and keep their word, as it is not allowed for them to kill any hostage after our demands and conditions have been met.

Withdrawal Process: For the withdrawal, some hostages - preferably the most important - must be detained until the brothers have safely withdrawn.

Security measures for public kidnapping

- Detention must not be prolonged.
- In case of stalling, hostages must be gradually executed, so that the enemy knows we are serious.
- When releasing hostages such as women and children, be careful, as they may transfer information that might be helpful to the enemy.
- You must verify that the food transported to the hostages and kidnappers is safe. This is done by making the delivery person and the hostages taste the food before you. It is preferable that an elderly person or a child brings in the food, as food delivery could be done by a covert special forces’ person.
- Beware of the negotiator.
- Stalling by the enemy indicates their intention to storm the location.
- Beware of sudden attacks as they may be trying to create a diversion which could allow them to seize control of the situation.
- Combating teams will use two attacks: a secondary one just to attract attention, and a main attack elsewhere.
- In case your demands have been met, releasing the hostages should be made only in a place that is safe to the hostage takers.
- Watch out for the ventilation or other openings as they could be used to plant surveillance devices through which the number of kidnappers could be counted and gases could be used.
- Do not be emotionally affected by the distress of your captives.
- Abide by Muslim laws as your actions may become a da’wa [call to join Islam].
- Avoid looking at women.

Stages of secret kidnapping

They are very similar to the stages for public kidnapping and include:

- Specifying the target.
• Collecting enough information on the target.
• Setting the plan and providing appropriate training.
• The execution team must be formed of 5 groups:
  o The alarming group that reports the movements of the target;
  o the protection group that protects the kidnappers from any external intervention;
  o the kidnapping group which kidnaps the target and delivers him to a sheltering group;
  o the sheltering group whose role is to keep an eye on the hostage until it is time for exchange or get rid of them;
  o the pursuit deterring group which will ensure the shelter group is not followed or watched.
• Transporting the target to a safe place.
• Getting rid of the target after the demands have been met by transporting him to a safe place out of which he can be freely released. The hostage should not be able to identify the place of his detention.

Security measures for secret kidnapping

Security measures for secret kidnapping include:

• The location where the hostage is transferred to must be safe.
• Beware of the Police patrol.
• While the hostage is being transported, you must beware of Police patrols by identifying their points of presence, to avoid sudden inspection.
• Look for listening or homing devices that VIPs often carry on their watches or with their money. VIPs could have an earpiece microphone that keeps him in touch with his protection detail.
• Everything you take from the enemy must be wrapped in a metal cover and should only be unwrapped in a remote place far from the sheltering group.
• Never make contact from the location where the hostage is detained and never mention him during phone calls.
• Use an appropriate cover to transport the hostage to and from the location. At some point in time the “Allat” party were drugging the hostage and transporting him in an ambulance.
• It is imperative to not allow the hostage to know where he is.
  o In this case, it is preferable to give him an anesthetizing shot or knock him unconscious.

How to deal with hostages in both kidnapping types

• You must check the hostages and take possession of any weapon or listening device.
• Separate the young people from the old, the women and the children. The young people have more strength, hence their ability to resist is high. The security forces must be killed instantly. This prevents others from showing resistance.
• Dealing with the hostages within the lawful control.
• Do not approach the hostages. In case you must, you need to have protection, and keep a minimum distance of one and a half meters from them.
• Speak in a language or dialect other than your own, in order to prevent revealing your identity.
- Cover the hostage’s eyes so that he cannot identify you or any other brothers.
- Wire the perimeter of the hostage location to deny access to the enemy
Endnotes

1 Kim, Wukki, Justin George, and Todd Sandler. Introducing Transnational Terrorist Hostage Event (TTHE) Data Set, 1978 to 2018. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1-23, 2020, p. 4 (quoted from pre-print version). The authors note: “… hostage-taking attacks constitute only 16.9% of transnational terrorist attacks during 1978-2018. This percentage increased over time as terrorists increasingly resort to kidnappings. Hostage-taking attacks represent the following percentages for three select intervals: 13 %, 1978-1989; 18.1%,1990-2001; and 22.3%, 2002-2018.” The Global Terrorism Database of the START project at the University of Maryland put the percentage of kidnappings as part of all terrorist acts at 15.8 per cent for 2016 - a steep rise from the average of 6.9 per cent for the period 1970-2010. – Cit. UNODC. The Doha Declaration. Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness. Module 16: The Linkage between Organized Crime and Terrorism, p. 1.


4 Kim et al. 2020, p. 16. (quoted from pre-print version). A well-known hostage negotiator commented on these figures as being ‘unreliable’, without, however, being able to offer alternative ones (private communication).

5 Adam Dolnik and Keith Fitzgerald wrote in this regard: “Built on nearly forty years of historical experience, crisis negotiation protocols for managing barricade hostage incidents are well established, and their standard application has, over the years, yielded a staggering 95 per cent success rate.” - Dolnik, Adam and Keith M. Fitzgerald. Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 5.

6 Terrorist researcher who became a hostage negotiator in kidnapping cases. Name withheld by author.


8 Kim et al. 2020.

9 From Kim et al.’s online appendix and replication material. Available at: http://jcr.sagepub.com

10 Kim et al. 2020, p. 20 (quoted from pre-print text).

11 “Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding.” Zürich: ETH, October 2013 (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No.141). The report noted that in the first half of 2013, “half of the global kidnapping cases were carried out in just four countries: Nigeria (26 per cent), Mexico (10 per cent), Pakistan (9 per cent), and Yemen (7 per cent). Under-reporting of kidnappings is a serious problem. Everard Phillips, writing in 2009, noted.” It is generally accepted within the security and crisis management community that 10% of kidnappings are actually reported; however, Merking and Davis (2001) suggested a conservative self-report figure of 50% of kidnap for ransoms.” - Phillips, Everard, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom”; in: David Canter (ed.) *The Faces of Terrorism. Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p.191n. – Ann Hagedorn Auerbach wrote in 1998 that “Worldwide the annual kidnap total during the 1990s has been as high as 20,000 to 30,000, counting both political and criminal cases, according to studies by private industry and government groups. By 1997, most experts agreed that the countries most afflicted, starting


14 Regarding the lure of ‘success’, Ann Hagedorn Auerbach noted: “But perhaps the primary factor feeding the crime of kidnapping has been the alluring image of its success. Although only 10 to 30 percent of kidnappings are reported in many countries, the big cases – with big names or big ransom demands – typically are headline news.” Auerbach, Ann Hagedorn, *Ransom. The Untold History of International Kidnapping*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1998, p. 29.

15 Kim, W. et al 2020, p. 16 (quoted from pre-print text).


17 Source: ITERATE data (Mickolus 2006); as quoted in Schmid & P. Flemming 2010, Table 2.5, p. 53.


22 “Colombia. The Terrible Truth”, *The Economist*, 6 February 2021, p. 34. The report was issued on 28 January 2021 by an institution with the acronym JEP ("special jurisdiction for


24 ITERATE 2006; as quoted in A.P. Schmid & P. Flemming 2010, Table 2.4, p. 52.


31 Ibid.


33 For instance, the official US policy has, until 2015 when President Obama introduced more pragmatic and flexible policies, been one described in these words: “The US Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of US citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is US Government policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.”


37 See bibliography to this chapter.


39 A RAND study from the 1970s noted that in 66 hostage situations, “Of the total 348 hostages, only 3 per cent were “executed” in cold blood, while 12 per cent died during assaults by security forces.” Brian Michael Jenkins, Janera Johnson, David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations From 77 International Hostage Episodes (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), p. 27. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5905.html


45 What Brian Jenkins wrote in 1994 is still largely true: “There are no reliable international statistics on kidnappings. Fear of retribution, incompetent or corrupt police, or laws that prohibit the payment of ransom, provide powerful disincentives to reporting an abduction, and governments themselves, seeking foreign investment or tourism, have little incentive to broadcast a kidnapping problem. As a result, there may be great disparities between official statistics and informed estimates. The numbers are useful only in identifying high-risk areas and spotting long-term trends.” – Cit. Ann Hagedorn Auerbach 1998, p.23.

46 ITERATE Data as quoted in: Schmid, A.P. and P. Flemming 2010, p. 56, Table 2.10.

47 ITERATE Data; A.P. Schmid and P. Flemming 2010, p. 58, Table 2.16.
Ann Hagedorn Auerbach arrived in her study from 1998 at similar figures regarding survival rates, citing “One five-year study, beginning in 1992, showed that of the foreign nationals kidnapped, 66 percent were eventually released after some sort of negotiation, 20 percent were rescued, 9 percent were killed or died in captivity, and 5 percent escaped. Roughly half of the captives were held from 1 to 10 days, a quarter were held from 11 to 50 days, and the rest from 50 to over 100 days.” Ann Hagedorn Auerbach. Ransom. The Untold History of International Kidnapping. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1998, p. 35.

This was, for instance, the case in Chechnya in the 1990s. One analyst reported: “…between January 1997 and August 1999, 1,094 civilians were kidnapped for ransom, the average settlement ranged from $5,000 to $145,000 per hostage. The income was used for purchasing weapons and modern armaments during the conflict, and was also reinvested to fund further kidnappings so as to maintain the business.” Phillips, Everard, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom”; in: David Canter (ed.) The Faces of Terrorism. Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009, p. 201. (The analyst Phillips referred to is Mukhuna, author of: I. Mukhuna (2005): “Islamic terrorism and the question of national liberation, or problems of contemporary Chechen terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28, pp. 515-532). See also: Ann Hagedorn Auerbach 1998, p. 23.


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1 With many thanks to Judith Tinnes from whose larger unpublished bibliography many of these titles were taken.


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