





**DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES**  
**POLICY DEPARTMENT FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND**  
**CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS**

**CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS**

# **Countering Terrorist Narratives**

## **STUDY**

### **Abstract**

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, provides an overview of current approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The first and second sections outline the different responses developed at the global and European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four different approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption of propaganda distribution, redirect method, campaign and message design, and government communications and synchronisation of message and action. The final section offers a number of policy recommendations, highlighting five interrelated 'lines of effort' essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communication.

## **ABOUT THE PUBLICATION**

This research paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and was commissioned, overseen and published by the Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs.

Policy Departments provide independent expertise, both in-house and externally, to support European Parliament committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU external and internal policies.

To contact the Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to:

[poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu](mailto:poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu)

## **Research Administrator Responsible**

Kristiina MILT

Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs

European Parliament

B-1047 Brussels

E-mail: [poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu](mailto:poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu)

## **AUTHORS**

Dr Alastair Reed, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Leiden University's Institute for Security and Global Affairs (ISGA)

Dr Haroro J. Ingram, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)

Joe Whittaker, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), Cyberterrorism Project, Swansea University, Leiden University's Institute for Security and Global Affairs (ISGA)

## **LINGUISTIC VERSION**

Original: EN

Manuscript completed in November 2017

© European Union, 2017

This document is available on the internet at:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses>

## **DISCLAIMER**

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

# CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>BACKGROUND INFORMATION</b>	<b>9</b>
Counter-narratives, Alternative Narratives, and Government Strategic Communications	10
Criticisms of counter-narratives	11
<b>1. OVERVIEW OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET UP ON A GLOBAL LEVEL</b>	<b>13</b>
1.1. Introduction	13
1.2. UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED)	14
1.3. Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)/Hedayah Center	15
1.4. Coalition to Defeat Daesh	16
1.5. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC)/Global Engagement Center (GEC)	16
1.6. Sawab Center/Malaysian Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Center (RDC3)	17
1.7. Tech Companies	17
1.8. NATO Centres of Excellence	18
1.9. OSCE/OSCE United	19
<b>2. ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET UP ON A EUROPEAN LEVEL</b>	<b>21</b>
2.1. Introduction	21
2.2. EU Internet Forum	22
2.3. Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech	22
2.4. Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT)/European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN)	23
2.5. Europol	24
2.6. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)	24
2.7. Implementing Organisations: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)/Quilliam Foundation/Moonshot CVE	25
<b>3. PRESENT APPROACHES FROM A SELECTION OF EU MEMBER STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES</b>	<b>27</b>

- 3.1. Disruption Method: Europol – Internet Referral Unit 28
  - 3.1.1. Analysis 29
- 3.2. Redirect Method: Jigsaw and Microsoft 31
  - 3.2.1. Analysis 32
- 3.3. Campaign and Message Design Method – RAN, ISD, and the Hedayah Center 32
  - 3.3.1. Analysis 34
- 3.4. Synchronise Message & Action Method: Governments 35
  - 3.4.1. Analysis 37
- 3.5. Summary 38
- 4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 39**
  - 4.1. Disruption Activities 39
  - 4.2. Campaign & Message Design 40
  - 4.3. Target Audience 41
  - 4.4. Metrics & Evaluation 42
  - 4.5. Synchronisation with Action 42
- REFERENCES 44**

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
<b>C&amp;N</b>	Communications and Narratives
<b>CITRU</b>	Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit
<b>CPS</b>	Crown Prosecution Service
<b>CSEP</b>	Civil Society Empowerment Programme
<b>CSCC</b>	Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
<b>CTED</b>	Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
<b>CVE</b>	Countering Violent Extremism
<b>ESCN</b>	European Strategic Communication Network
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GCTF</b>	Global Counterterrorism Forum
<b>GEC</b>	Global Engagement Center
<b>GIFTC</b>	Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>IRU</b>	Internet Referral Unit
<b>IS</b>	Islamic State
<b>ISD</b>	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
<b>ISPs</b>	Internet Service Providers
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>OSCT</b>	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism

- P2P** Peer-to-Peer
- PVE** Preventing Violent Extremism
- RAN** Radicalisation Awareness Network
- RDC3** Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Center
- RICU** Research Information and Communications Unit
- SSCAT** Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team
- STEER** Safeguarding, Training, Education, Extremism, and Radicalisation
- UAE** United Arab Emirates
- UK** United Kingdom
- UN** United Nations
- US** United States of America



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Global initiatives to counter terrorist narratives are carried out by a number of different actors on the supranational, international, regional, national and sub-national levels. The UN has established itself as a key player in the field of counter-narratives, inspiring related institutions, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Hedayah, to assist states in building concrete plans of action in this field. Other international organisations, such as NATO and OSCE, have implemented initiatives that focus on strategic communications and counter-narratives. States have also increased efforts in countering terrorist narratives through cooperation with other states or non-state institutional partners. Finally, tech companies have taken steps to prevent abuse of their platforms by terrorist actors.
2. The EU has assumed a leading role in counter-narrative efforts through its own agencies and programmes as well as through supporting external initiatives. Europol plays a key role in removing illegal terrorist content from the Internet while the EU Internet Forum provides a platform to disrupt terrorist content and amplify counter-narratives. The EU also facilitates a network of front line practitioners, the Radicalisation Awareness Network, which provides analyses of existing counter-narrative efforts. Finally, there are a number of institutes working at the European level, often in partnership with either the EU or Member States, which facilitate the creation of counter-narratives between governments, industry, and civil society.
3. There are four key trends in current efforts to tackle terrorist propaganda:
  - i. Disruption of propaganda distribution – The key objective is to interfere with the distribution of propaganda, in short, to try and stop propaganda at the source by preventing it from reaching its target audience. In particular, this has focussed on taking down propaganda from social media and deleting offending accounts.
  - ii. Redirect method – Rather than erasing propaganda, this approach seeks to redirect viewers to different messages in an attempt to ‘nudge’ their behaviour. Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE, this project redirects those searching for jihadist material to counter-messaging.
  - iii. Campaign and message design – These projects seek to provide information and skills to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to develop communication campaigns, typically based on counter-narrative or alternative-narrative approaches. Whilst disruption seeks to stop the spread of propaganda, this approach seeks to enable CSOs with the skills to confront and undermine the propaganda.
  - iv. Government communications and synchronisation of message and action - There is a tendency for communication campaigns to be designed in a vacuum, disconnected from events in real life. Synchronisation approaches take a comprehensive perspective and aim to link messages and actions, and to coordinate messaging across government and with international partners. The strength of these approaches is to prevent the undermining of a narrative by exposing its ‘say-do-gap’, through ensuring message and actions are aligned, and through limiting contradictory messaging.

4. Although the idea of counter-narratives is widely supported by governments, think tanks and NGOs, the concept itself is rather underdeveloped and lacks a thorough grounding in empirical research. There is little evidence to support the effectiveness of counter-narratives and many of its underlying assumptions have been called into question. There is a need for greater research in this area and, in particular, effective monitoring and evaluation of current counter-narrative projects in order to be able to ensure that lessons are learned.
5. Counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) strategic communications efforts across various programmes and initiatives can be informed by the following recommendations:
  - i. Disruption of violent extremist material needs to be applied comprehensively and across multiple platforms, in order to avoid displacing terrorist messaging activity between channels. The vacuum created by disruption needs to be filled with a series of messages designed to leverage a range of motivational drivers, in order to resonate with a target audience subject to varying motivations and in order to have a reinforcing cumulative effect on that audience.
  - ii. To ensure coherent messaging over the short, medium and long term, campaign and message design principles need to be synchronised through the establishment of a clear and simple-to-understand, overarching central narrative, which is supported by a thematically diverse array of messages.
  - iii. A clear identification of the target audience is vital to effective strategic communications, taking into account a spectrum of potential consumers of the message (intended, unintended, supporters, adversaries and neutrals). A nuanced behavioural and attitudinal understanding of that audience is needed to persuasively shape attitudes and behaviours.
  - iv. Measuring the efficacy of strategic communications requires assessments that focus on measures of strategic literacy, technical literacy and target audience. These assessments need to be initially performed prior to the commencement of a strategic communications effort in order to establish a baseline measure. Once the baseline metrics are established, these assessments need to be regularly implemented as a means to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of the campaign over time.
  - v. In order to gain trust, credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of a target audience, messaging needs to be synchronised with activities on the ground, thereby reducing the perceived disparity between what one says and does (the 'say-do gap'). The central requirement for improving the synchronisation of messaging and action across bureaucracies is largely cultural. Archaic attitudes that 'actions speak louder than words' contribute to an organisational culture, often reinforced by doctrine, which affords strategic communications an ex post facto role in operations, strategy and policy. Strategic communications should be a key consideration in planning from the beginning of the operational, strategic and policy design process.

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION

### Introduction to Strategic Communications and Counter-Terrorism

Fundamentally, terrorism is communication; acts of terror themselves are propaganda by deed and, as such, strategic communications will always be a central part of counter-terrorism. The rise of the so-called 'Islamic State' (IS) and their successful and prolific use of online propaganda has raised the issue of terrorist propaganda in the public consciousness, in particular in terms of recruitment and radicalisation. In response, governmental actors are keen to understand and counter such communications; they believe that winning the communication war is a vital part of defeating terrorists. Although this has received renewed attention given the contemporary global threat of terrorism, it does not represent a new phenomenon. Rather, "persuasive communications have been partnered with war for millennia,"<sup>1</sup> perhaps as far back as the Mesolithic and Epipaleolithic periods in which cave paintings depicted men fighting.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, "during times of war and peace, state and non-state actors have sought to weld the ever evolving platforms of mass media and communications into instruments of control."<sup>3</sup> In short, it would be wrong to consider the threat posed by non-state actors to the state, or the state's response, anything but a continuation of the ongoing struggle for communication control and the authority of the state. Today, a large part of this task is achieved via message disruption – that is to say either content removal on the Internet, or proscription of illegal speech – however, "there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies."<sup>4</sup> As a result, there has been a renewed interest in countering the narratives of terrorist organisations, rather than purely restricting them.

There are three important levels at which such communications take place – macro, mezzo, and micro – referring to the scope of the message being delivered, each with a specific set of considerations. Macro-level considerations include the reach, relevance, and resonance of the message, while at the mezzo level, one must consider the specific medium, messenger, and the format of the message. Finally, at the micro level, considerations must be made relating to the design of the specific message itself, including rational-choice (based on a cost-benefit analysis of options) and identity-choice (based on considerations of one's identity) messaging, defensive and offensive messaging, and the say-do gap.<sup>5</sup> The latter, simply the differences between what we say and what we do, can serve to undermine the credibility, and in the process, the effectiveness of counter-messaging. A successful

---

<sup>1</sup> Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, "Lessons from History for Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications," *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 4 (2016): 3, <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Haroro J. Ingram, "A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-terrorism Strategic Communications," *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 4, (2016): 6, <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-LATEST.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Kate Ferguson, "Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence," *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research*, March 1, 2016, 7, <http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government?" *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, (2013): 1, <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/444/review-of-programs-to-counter-narratives-of-violent-extremism-what-works-and-what-are-the-implications-for-government>.

<sup>5</sup> Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, "Lessons from History for Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications."

messaging campaign will consider all three levels while producing a diversity of messages, including an overarching narrative, and be disseminated via a number of different mediums.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the fact that terrorist narratives and strategic responses are important to a wide range of groups and ideologies, this report largely focuses on the threat posed by IS and other violent Islamist groups, and the responses to this threat. That is merely indicative of the current political climate and global security issues since the rise to prominence of the group and is not a suggestion that other groups and ideologies do not pose a threat. Rather, the authors encourage a stronger focus on and more research into counter- and alternative narratives against all types of violent extremist groups.

## **Counter-narratives, Alternative Narratives, and Government Strategic Communications**

One problem with the notion of counter-narratives is that it has a wide breadth of meanings, which leads to a considerable amount of ambiguity. It can refer to government-led initiatives, deradicalisation strategies, or grassroots and civil society movements and can be speaking to a number of different audiences – such as extremists, those vulnerable to extremism, members of communities that include extremists, or the general population at large. It can also include a number of different messages, such as those trying to discredit or make fun of extremists, or those trying to empower communities by promoting different stories. As a result of this lack of clarity, Briggs and Feve created the “counter-messaging spectrum” to deconstruct the different kinds of messages (See figure 1).<sup>7</sup> They suggest that there are three types of counter-messages: government strategic communications, alternative narratives, and counter-narratives. Government strategic communications exist to present government policy and strategy in a positive light; this may take the form of a public awareness campaign. Alternative narratives, which are undertaken by either government or civil society, aim to present a new narrative, rather than engaging on the same terms as the extremist content. This may include stories relating to diversity, or tolerance, or social values. Finally, counter-narratives, which are best used by civil society, directly tackle an extremist narrative in an attempt to discredit violent extremists’ messages.<sup>8</sup> As well as the type of counter-narrative, it can also be important to determine the ‘location’ of the audience. For example, ‘upstream’ audiences may be targeted by broad ‘counter-radicalisation’ messages, while ‘downstream’ audiences may include already radicalised individuals.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism.”

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives,” *RAN Issue Paper* (2015): 4-5, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/issue\\_paper\\_cn\\_oct2015\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_cn_oct2015_en.pdf).

What	Why	How	Who
Government Strategic Communications	Action to get the message out about what government is doing, including public awareness activities	Raise awareness, forge relationships with key constituencies and audiences and correct misinformation	Government
Alternative Narratives	Undercut violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we are 'for' rather than 'against'	Positive story about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy	Civil society or government
Counter-Narratives	Directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging	Challenge through ideology, logic, fact or humour	Civil society

**Source:** Rachel Briggs and Sebastian Feve, "Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism: What works and what are the implications for government?" *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, (2013).

### Criticisms of counter-narratives

The idea of countering terrorists' narratives sounds promising in theory, but there are a number of criticisms that point to potential problems. The first is that, put simply, because the study of counter-narratives is a new field, there is a sizeable gap between the volume and quality of counter-narratives and the sophisticated propaganda that terrorist organisations, such as IS, have used since 2014.<sup>10</sup>

Second, the relationship between viewing extremist content and actually engaging in violent extremism is not clear. Although the vast majority of terrorist actors share and engage with extremist narratives, suggesting a correlation, there is still little evidence to support notion that exposure to extremist content has a causal effect on future violent extremism activity.<sup>11</sup> However, as Dr Kate Ferguson, sums up "the picture is somewhat mixed: while there is some evidence suggesting patterns of discourse and communication such as hate speech, dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives (or propaganda) can contribute to conditions where IBV [Identity Based Violence] or VE [Violent Extremism] becomes more likely, the causal relationship remains unproven."<sup>12</sup> In contemporary Terrorism Studies, empirical research suggests that not all those who develop extreme beliefs become terrorists, and that many terrorist actors do not 'radicalise' in any traditional sense.<sup>13</sup> This undermines the notion that extremist narratives have a direct causal effect on extremist actions.

It is important, however, not to oversell this notion. Clearly, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest messaging has an effect on consumers – this has been the premise of television advertising since its inception – it would be wrong to suggest we are completely in the dark. Furthermore, the fact that the most prosperous extremist groups in recent history, such as IS, have invested heavily in propaganda efforts should not be ignored – obviously, they

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>11</sup> Kate Ferguson, "Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies," 9.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Randy Borum, "Rethinking Radicalization," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011). <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/1/>.

believe that it has some impact on their recruitment prospects. However, the dearth of empirical evidence assessing the relationship between extremist propaganda and violent actions should also make us less confident in any conclusions in both this relationship and the efficacy of narratives that counter such propaganda. In short, in a comparatively new field, far more research is needed to better understand these relationships.

Finally, counter-narratives are inherently defensive in nature. That is to say, they “merely respond to the opposition’s message, allowing them to set the ground on which the communication battle will be fought and to maintain control of the narrative.”<sup>14</sup> Although it is neither possible nor desirable to remove defensive messaging from a communication strategy, successful campaigns will be comprehensive, integrated and multi-dimensional, including both offensive and defensive messages. To merely respond to terrorist groups who have relatively sophisticated propaganda strategies is both naïve and doomed to failure.

---

<sup>14</sup> Alastair Reed, “IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?” *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, March, 17 2017, <https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/>.

# 1. OVERVIEW OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET UP ON A GLOBAL LEVEL

## KEY FINDINGS

- Global initiatives to counter terrorist narratives are diverse in a number of ways. Not only are there a number of different actors, but different *kinds* of actors (supranational, international, regional, national, sub-national).
- The UN is a key player and, through different resolutions, strategies and action plans, prescribes that states and regional organisations should develop their own plans of action to counter violent extremism and counter terrorist propaganda.
- Organisations such as the GCTF and Hedayah stem from and are guided by these UN actions and aim to assist states in building such plans of action.
- The Coalition to Defeat Daesh utilises the Global Coalition Communications Cell, housed in the UK Foreign Office, to undermine the group's propaganda in a number of ways.
- The US continues to be a major player in countering terrorist narratives, although the manner in which it delivers such narratives has changed, moving from a direct to an indirect approach, and focusing on facilitating other actors with more credible voices to deliver messages.
- Examples of such actors are the Sawab Center and RDC3, based in the UAE and Malaysia, respectively.
- A number of tech companies also play an important role through organisations such as GIFTC and Tech Against Terrorism, which aim to empower and build the capacity of all tech companies against their platforms being abused by terrorist actors.
- NATO has two Centres of Excellence in Riga and Ankara, which focus on strategic communications against terrorist actors.
- The OSCE, guided by the UN Global Terrorism Strategy and its own counter-terrorism strategy, aims to empower stakeholders in countering violent extremism. This is done by facilitating dialogue between a number of different actors as well as through campaigns, such as the #UnitedCVE campaign.

## 1.1. Introduction

There are a number of global and regional initiatives that exist in the fight against terrorist narratives. These include the numerous resolutions, strategies, and action plans of the United Nations (UN), which prescribe how Member States should counter extremist messages. There are also a number of organisations, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Hedayah, which stem from and are guided by such UN actions. The Coalition to Defeat Daesh

uses numerous methods to degrade the group's propaganda.<sup>15</sup> States, such as the US, also take a central role. In previous years, it had attempted to counter terrorist narratives directly, through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), whereas it now often takes the role of facilitator through the Global Engagement Center (GEC), encouraging other counter-narrative organisations, such as the Sawab Center and Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Center (RDC3), to become the messenger. Many private actors, such as Silicon Valley tech companies, also play an important role through bodies such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFTC) and Tech Against Terrorism, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) Centres of Excellence in Riga and Ankara play an important part in the organisation's counter-narratives against terrorist actors. Finally, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), through the UN and its own counter-terrorism strategies, has a number of methods by which it counters terrorist narratives, such as the #UnitedCVE campaign. These initiatives are by no means exhaustive, but offer an outline of the type of responses in place.

## 1.2. UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED)

The UN and its Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED) have been at the forefront of countering violent extremism since the events of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, which can be seen in a number of documents and resolutions. One example is the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in 2006; the first of its four pillars addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.<sup>16</sup> There are a number of resolutions and plans that relate to this pillar. This includes Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which is concerned with stemming the flow of foreign fighters, and which highlights Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as an essential element in addressing the problem.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, in 2016, the UN published the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), which implored Member States to develop their own PVE plans of action, encompassing a number of stakeholders in society.<sup>18</sup> It also recognised that state-led initiatives are not in themselves sufficient and that "Member States should come together to complement [their national] strategies or adopt new regional or sub regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism."<sup>19</sup> The plan offers a number of suggestions to do this, including via strategic communications, for which Member States should "develop and implement national communications strategies, in close cooperation with social media companies and the private sector, that are tailored to local contexts...to challenge the narratives associated with violent extremism."<sup>20</sup>

In April 2017, the Security Council published a comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives. There were three key foci to this framework: first, relating to legal and law enforcement measures in accordance with states' obligations under international law and UN resolutions; second, encouraging public-private partnerships, especially between Internet gatekeepers, and third, the development of counter-narratives, highlighting the

---

<sup>15</sup> European Commission, "Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism," June 14, 2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education\\_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, "UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Plan of Action," *United Nations Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force*, 2006, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy#plan>.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, *S/Res/2178*, 2014, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178\\_2014\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism," 2015, 12, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.



importance of public-private partnerships and governments acting as ‘facilitators’ rather than direct messengers of counter-narratives.<sup>21</sup>

An example of the CTED’s work in facilitating this is the partnership between the directorate and UN Women, which held two regional workshops in Bangkok, Thailand during the week of 25<sup>th</sup> – 29<sup>th</sup> September 2017 to engage local communities in CVE. During this week, attention was given to effective approaches to countering terrorist incitement and recruitment online, in a special day-long session organised by Facebook, Google and the local non-governmental organisation Love Frankie.<sup>22</sup>

### 1.3. Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)/Hedayah Center

The GCTF was created in 2011 by 29 founding Member States, including the US, the UK, the UAE, the Netherlands, and China, as well as the EU in an informal environment to act on counter-terrorism efforts. The forum “serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.”<sup>23</sup> This includes the above-mentioned UN ‘first pillar’, addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism. Beyond its 30 members, it also “works extensively with non-GCTF members including states, international, regional and sub-regional bodies; and other stakeholders and experts.”<sup>24</sup> This includes a number of UN bodies, the African Union, ASEAN, and INTERPOL. One of the core initiatives of the GCTF is the CVE Working Group, which includes the Initiative on Strategic Communications and Social Media Aspects in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), which “aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of potential approaches and methodologies for governments to counter violent extremism online.”<sup>25</sup>

During the launch of the GCTF in New York in September 2011, there was a widespread desire for the members of the forum to create an international and independent centre of excellence dedicated to countering violent extremism. The UAE offered to host what became known as the Hedayah Center, which was created formally in December 2012 with a focus on “capacity building programs, dialogue and communications, in addition to research and analysis to counter violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations.”<sup>26</sup> Hedayah’s focus on dialogue and communications is aimed at closely engaging “with communities and stakeholders that have only been peripherally involved in CVE in the past... [including] previously under-represented groups (e.g. youth, women, educators and community leaders).”<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, it encourages the design of counter-narrative messages through their “Counter-Narrative Library”, “a comprehensive portal where governments, front-line workers and civil society can access content, toolkits and good practices to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism.”<sup>28</sup> With regard to capacity-building, Hedayah partners with the GCTF and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to implement a task

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, *S/2017/375*, April 28, 2017. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/document/s2017375-comprehensive-international-framework-to-counter-terrorist-narratives/>.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, “UN, CTED and UN Women partner in countering violent extremism in South and South-East Asia,” *United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee*, September 30, 2017, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/2017/09/30/cted-and-un-women-partner-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-south-and-south-east-asia/>.

<sup>23</sup> “Members and Partners,” *GCTF*, <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Members-and-partners>.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> GCTF, “Countering Violent Extremism Working Group,” *Working Groups*, <https://www.thegctf.org/Working-Groups/Countering-Violent-Extremism>.

<sup>26</sup> “About us: History,” Hedayah Center, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/about-us/177/history/>.

<sup>27</sup> “Dialogue and Communications,” Hedayah Center, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-do/91/departments/93/dialogue-and-communications>.

<sup>28</sup> “Counter-Narrative Library,” Hedayah Center, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-do/91/departments/98/research-and-analysis/477/counter-narrative-library>.

force for the above-mentioned UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to work with countries that need assistance in building their own national action plans.<sup>29</sup>

#### **1.4. Coalition to Defeat Daesh**

A major role of the global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, which includes 69 states and four institutions (the Arab League, EU, INTERPOL, and NATO), is in strategic communications. There are five mutually reinforcing aspects in the effort to degrade and defeat IS, including two for which counter-narratives are key: impeding the flow of foreign fighters to the region and exposing the group's true nature.<sup>30</sup> The Global Coalition Communications Cell, housed in the UK, was set up in September 2015, for which the UK Foreign Office provided £10 million, bringing all of the coalition partners together behind a single communications initiative.<sup>31</sup> The British government claims that "through the UK's leadership, the Cell has changed the international narrative around Daesh – from one that highlights their atrocities to one which emphasises their failures,"<sup>32</sup> with the ultimate goal of damaging the perception of Daesh and reducing their ability to recruit. The government notes that it provides information packs to Coalition partners which contain facts and figures regarding the degradation of the group. Additionally, an account is maintained on Twitter posting regular updates regarding the conflict against IS, including question and answer sessions from soldiers on the ground in Iraq and Syria,<sup>33</sup> military updates portraying the coalition's successes,<sup>34</sup> and statements portraying the group in a negative light, such as: "Under Daesh, the fine arts school for boys in East Mosul became a factory for suicide belts."<sup>35</sup> The Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh website houses a variety of different counter-narrative content that exposes "falsehoods that lie at the heart of Daesh ideology and...present[s] a positive alternative future for the region,"<sup>36</sup> as well as instructional advice to readers on how to report the group's online propaganda.<sup>37</sup>

#### **1.5. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC)/Global Engagement Center (GEC)**

Established in 2010, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was a US interagency-based unit housed in the State Department. Its remit was to systematise a unified US narrative in an attempt to counter the growing volume and influence of violent extremist ideologies, especially on the Internet. The CSCC had a number of core priorities, including: monitoring and evaluating extremist narratives online, developing and disseminating US strategic communications, identifying trends in extremist narratives, and

---

<sup>29</sup> "Launching the PCVE National Action Plans Task Force," Hedayah Center, 2016, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-31102016141924.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> "The Global Coalition to Defeat IS," US Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/s/seci/>.

<sup>31</sup> UK Parliament, *Appendix: Letter from the Foreign Secretary and Government Response*, June 8, 2016, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmcaff/209/20904.htm>.

<sup>32</sup> "UK Action to Combat Daesh," UK Government, <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about>.

<sup>33</sup> UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), *Twitter*, <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/media>.

<sup>34</sup> UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), "UPDATE: approx 80% of Raqqa is now cleared of #Daesh @CTJFOIR," *Twitter*, (October 8, 2017), <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916965141350141953>.

<sup>35</sup> UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh), "Under #Daesh arts schools were banned, whilst bomb-making factories flourished," *Twitter*, (October 7, 2017), <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916604766435803136>.

<sup>36</sup> "Countering Daesh's Propaganda," *Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh*, February 3, 2017, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/countering-daeshs-propaganda/>.

<sup>37</sup> "How to report Daesh's Terrorist Propaganda," *Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh*, March 21, 2017, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/takedaeshdown-2/>.

collecting relevant data from other US agencies.<sup>38</sup> The Center had three streams of work: gathering and analysis of information, planning and operations (which specialised in non-digital communication), and the Digital Outreach Team. The CSCC and the Digital Outreach Team in particular, was criticised in the years following its establishment for launching strategies that directly interacted with IS militants online in its “Think Again Turn Away” campaign, launched in English in December 2013. Critics claimed that this offered a platform for many who may not otherwise have seen such content and that the campaigns lacked even the most basic understanding of the complex conflict.<sup>39</sup>

The CSCC was replaced by the GEC in March 2016 by Executive Order 13721 of President Obama.<sup>40</sup> Rather than the direct strategy of the CSCC, the GEC takes a more indirect and partnership-oriented approach, attempting to work with local actors, who can provide a more credible voice. The GEC will be discussed in more detail as a specific case study in Section 3.

## 1.6. Sawab Center/Malaysian Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Center (RDC3)

Two examples of local actors that the GEC is partnered with are the Sawab Center and the RDC3. The former is in partnership with the UAE and focuses on exposing IS’s incompetence rather than portraying the group’s brutality, while the latter with the Royal Malaysian Police is aimed at curbing IS ideology online. Both will be discussed further in Section 3.

## 1.7. Tech Companies

A number of private actors, especially those in Silicon Valley, have engaged in strategic communications to counter terrorism on their platforms. Internet gatekeepers have been frequently accused by policymakers of facilitating terrorist narratives on their sites,<sup>41</sup> and have developed a number of responses. One example is the GIFTC, launched in July 2017 by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube, in an attempt to make their services hostile to terrorists and violent extremists. The Forum has three key streams of work: providing technical solutions, commissioning research on counter-speech efforts and knowledge sharing – both with each other and aiding smaller companies in developing successful counter-terrorism measures.<sup>42</sup> Each of the companies have their own individual counter-speech initiatives, such as YouTube’s Creators for Change,<sup>43</sup> Jigsaw’s Redirect Method,<sup>44</sup>

<sup>38</sup> “Counter-Extremism Project,” *Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications*, 2013, <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/404/center-for-strategic-counterterrorism-communications-cscc>.

<sup>39</sup> Rita Katz, “The State Department’s Twitter war with IS is embarrassing,” *Time Magazine*, September 16, 2014, <http://time.com/3387065/IS-twitter-war-state-department/>.

<sup>40</sup> The American Presidency Project, President Obama. *Executive Order 13721 – Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584*, March 14, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=115119>.

<sup>41</sup> Justin Sink, “Obama wants Silicon Valley’s help to fight terror online,” *Bloomberg Politics*, December 7, 2015, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-07/obama-wants-silicon-valley-s-help-as-terrorists-embrace-social>; Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, “Facebook and Twitter have ‘social responsibility’ to help fight against terrorism, says David Cameron,” *The Guardian*, January 16, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/cameron-interrupt-terrorists-cybersecurity-cyberattack-threat>; Richard Ford, “Home Secretary Amber Rudd will tell web giants to fight terrorism,” *The Times*, August 1, 2017, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/home-secretary-amber-rudd-will-tell-web-giants-to-fight-terrorism-dgbhd0zq0>.

<sup>42</sup> Facebook, “Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism to hold first meeting in San Francisco” *Facebook Newsroom*, July 31, 2017, <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/07/global-internet-forum-to-counter-terrorism-to-hold-first-meeting-in-san-francisco/>.

<sup>43</sup> “Creators for Change,” YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators-for-change/>.

<sup>44</sup> “Redirect Method,” The Redirect Method, <https://redirectmethod.org/>.

Facebook's P2P Challenging Extremism,<sup>45</sup> and Microsoft's partnership with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.<sup>46</sup> The Jigsaw and Microsoft initiatives will be discussed in more detail in Section 3. The new Forum will allow these initiatives "to learn from and contribute to one another's counter speech efforts, and discuss how to further empower and train civil society organisations."<sup>47</sup>

The GIFTC is part of a wider initiative in partnership with the UN CTED and Swiss foundation ICT4Peace called Tech Against Terrorism, whose members include the above four actors, and others, such as Telefonica, Soundcloud, Askfm, Snapchat, and Justpaste.it.<sup>48</sup> The aim of the project is to provide operational support to willing actors to prevent their communication technology from being exploited. This includes a four-step process of carrying out a risk assessment, offering tools to protect the platform, receiving a certified "trust mark", before being invited to access a knowledge sharing platform for extremist content.<sup>49</sup> Tech Against Terrorism also organises workshops around the world for "constructive action-focused discussions on specific issues."<sup>50</sup> In 2017, there have been, or are scheduled to be, events in Paris, London, Jakarta, and New York.

## 1.8. NATO Centres of Excellence

NATO regards countering terrorism as one of the fundamental security tasks facing the union today. In fact, the one and only time in which NATO has triggered Article Five of the Washington Treaty – referring to collective self-defence – was after the events of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001.<sup>51</sup> NATO hosts a number of "Centres of Excellence" in different Member States, including two that relate specifically to countering terrorist narratives. First, the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia, which was established in 2014, is a dedicated operation that focuses on the dissemination of content via a number of channels, including "traditional media, internet-based media and public engagement, to build awareness, understanding, and support for its decisions and operations."<sup>52</sup> Although the Centre originally focused on hybrid warfare from Russia, it has begun to take a focus on terrorism and CVE recently. Included in the Program of Work for the Centre in 2017 is to research the topic of "Violent Extremism as an emerging threat for NATO nations" as well as a number of projects researching the use and abuse of social media.<sup>53</sup> The Centre also hosts a number of different pieces of research for better understanding terrorists' narratives, including research on IS's doctrine of information warfare and analysis of Foreign Fighters on YouTube.<sup>54</sup>

The second relevant NATO Centre of Excellence is Defence Against Terrorism, based in Ankara, Turkey. Its mission is to provide decision-makers with realistic solutions to terrorism and counter-terrorism challenges. Courses and conferences provided by the Ankara Centre

---

<sup>45</sup> "Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism," EdVenture Partners, <https://edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-challenging-extremism/>.

<sup>46</sup> "Microsoft partners with Institute for Strategic Dialogue and NGOs to discourage online radicalization to violence," Microsoft, April 18, 2017, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/>.

<sup>47</sup> "Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism," Twitter, June 26, 2017, [https://blog.twitter.com/official/en\\_us/topics/company/2017/Global-Internet-Forum-to-Counter-Terrorism.html](https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/Global-Internet-Forum-to-Counter-Terrorism.html).

<sup>48</sup> Tech Against Terrorism, <https://techagainstterrorism.org/>.

<sup>49</sup> "Why Join?" Tech Against Terrorism, <https://techagainstterrorism.org/why-join/>.

<sup>50</sup> "Events," Tech Against Terrorism, <https://techagainstterrorism.org/events/>.

<sup>51</sup> "Collective Defence – Article Five," NATO, March 22, 2017, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_110496.htm).

<sup>52</sup> "About Strategic Communications", NATO StratCom COE, <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-communications>.

<sup>53</sup> "Program of Work" NATO StratCom COE, <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/program-work/>.

<sup>54</sup> "Online Library," NATO StratCom COE, [https://www.stratcomcoe.org/online\\_library/](https://www.stratcomcoe.org/online_library/).

include topics such as: terrorist use of cyberspace, radicalisation and countering violent extremism, and terrorism and the media.<sup>55</sup> The Centre also publishes the biannual "Defence Against Terrorism Review", an academic journal focusing on a number of different counter-terrorism topics. Recent topics include: countering radicalisation and recruitment in the context of radicalisation "hubs,"<sup>56</sup> IS propaganda on the Internet,<sup>57</sup> and countering ideological terrorism.<sup>58</sup>

## 1.9. OSCE/OSCE United

The world's largest regional security association, the OSCE, also has a number of ways in which it fights terrorism. It consists of 57 different states across Europe, Asia, and North America.<sup>59</sup> The OSCE's principles in countering terrorism are guided by and support the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – which includes addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism as one of its four pillars – as well as its own OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism, which includes the promotion of CVE and stemming recruitment to terrorist organisations.<sup>60</sup> To achieve this, the organisation works with a number of governments, practitioners, researchers, and civil society representatives, which focus on community-based preventative measures "such as youth and women's engagement and what rule community policing can play."<sup>61</sup> This stream of work also organised events, such as the OSCE-wide conference on this topic in Vienna in May 2017, which brought together approximately 550 participants from participating states.<sup>62</sup> Further strategic foci of the OSCE's counter-terrorism activities include countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and facilitating a public-private partnership between states and the private sector (including tech industries), as well as civil society and the media.<sup>63</sup> An example of both of these in action can be seen in the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016, in which a series of short courses were arranged on the use of the Internet and social media and how to develop successful counter-narratives in innovative ways.<sup>64</sup>

One of the key campaigns undertaken by the OSCE, called #UnitedCVE, was developed in July 2015, initiated by the OSCE Secretary General and the OSCE Serbian Chairmanship. In line with the OSCE's focus on P/CVE and radicalisation that leads to terrorism, the multi-platform campaign, which has both online and offline elements, aims to raise awareness of issues related to extremism while offering an engagement platform for members of civil society. This is done by "promoting tolerance, mutual respect, pluralism, inclusion, and cohesion."<sup>65</sup> In the first 18 months of the campaign, #UnitedCVE reached more than 16 million people online, engaging both those in OSCE-participating states and beyond. An

<sup>55</sup> "2017 Activity Plan," NATO COE-DAT, [http://www.coedat.nato.int/2017\\_Activity\\_Plan.pdf](http://www.coedat.nato.int/2017_Activity_Plan.pdf).

<sup>56</sup> Daniel Heinke, "Countering Radicalization and Recruitment of so-called Jihadists – Proscription of Radicalization Hubs," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 8, (2016): 89-97, [https://works.bepress.com/daniel\\_heinke/74/](https://works.bepress.com/daniel_heinke/74/).

<sup>57</sup> Luna Shamieh, and Zoltán Szenes, "The Propaganda of IS/Daesh through the Virtual Space," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 7 no. 1 (2015): 7-31.

<sup>58</sup> Bassam Tibi, "Countering Ideological Terrorism," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 1, no. 1 (2008): 101-136.

<sup>59</sup> "Who we are," OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/who-we-are>.

<sup>60</sup> "Decision No. 1063 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism," OSCE, December 7, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/pc/98008?download=true>.

<sup>61</sup> "Countering terrorism, Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism," OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/107807>.

<sup>62</sup> "Recommendations from the 2017 OSCE-wide Countering-Terrorism Conference on 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terror, 23-24<sup>th</sup> May 2017,'" OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/315886?download=true>.

<sup>63</sup> "Countering terrorism," OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism>.

<sup>64</sup> "Developing counter narratives to combat online violent extremism content, in focus of OSCE-supported course in Bosnia and Herzegovina" OSCE, February 5, 2016, <http://www.osce.org/bih/221261>.

<sup>65</sup> "OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism #UnitedCVE Campaign," OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/204751?download=true>.

example of this was the hosting of the final of the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Challenging Extremism competition, sponsored by the US State Department and Facebook, in which university students from around the world “identify, develop and pitch a digital or social initiative, product or tool to educate and empower their peers to challenge violent extremism.”<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup>“OSCE #UnitedCVE and Peer-2-Peer final: students challenging extremism,” *OSCE*, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/285826>.

## 2. ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROJECTS SET UP ON A EUROPEAN LEVEL

### KEY FINDINGS

- The EU Internet Forum facilitates dialogue between the Commission and tech companies to develop a safer web, both by disrupting terrorist content and by amplifying counter-narratives. The former is done in partnership with Europol while the latter in cooperation with the CSEP, which builds capacity on countering narratives for those vulnerable to extremism.
- While not always a topic explicitly linked to terrorism, the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online is posited as an important document in stemming online dialogue that could lead to terrorism. It includes commitments to review most flagged content within 24 hours, educate and raise awareness, and promote counter-narratives.
- Europol removes illegal terrorist content from the Internet, analyses such content and provides a platform for dialogue among practitioners and academics.
- The RAN is an important part of the EU's fight against terrorist narratives, connecting over 3000 practitioners, reviewing practices, as well as organising workshops to aid those engaging in counter-narratives. It also hosts an impressive collection of CVE practices online to aid those who build their own campaign.
- There are a number of institutes working regularly with the EU or particular Member States on this topic. The ISD aims to build the capacity of locally-run CVE campaigns; the Quilliam Foundation offers consultancy to those building strategies against such narratives; Moonshot CVE takes a technology-driven approach to assist digital campaigns.

### 2.1. Introduction

There are a number of different projects that work in coordination with the EU to counter terrorist narratives. The EU Internet Forum is a platform that exists to bridge between the EU and tech industries to keep the Internet safe, both by removing content and by empowering partners to create and amplify alternative and counter-narratives. The Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online is also posited as an important part of disrupting potential terrorist narratives online, compelling consenting IT companies to act in an appropriate manner to such speech. A further project is the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT), which later became the European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN), created to help stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremists by providing strategic communications advice and support. Europol plays an important role with its content-disrupting IRU, among other roles, such as analysis and facilitating dialogue. The EU also facilitates a network of front line practitioners – the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) – which provides analysis of existing counter-narrative efforts as well as other activities in a number of working groups. Finally, there are institutes, which work at the European level, often in partnership with either the EU or Member States, such as the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), the Quilliam Foundation,

and Moonshot CVE. As with the previous section, this represents only a highlighted number of initiatives at the European level.

## 2.2. EU Internet Forum

In 2015, the European Commission created the EU Internet Forum in an attempt to stop the abuse of the Internet by international terrorist groups. This includes the focus on the best methods to counter extremist propaganda.<sup>67</sup> The Forum acts as a platform between industry and the EU, but is careful to retain a focus on working with smaller Internet companies that do not have the same resources as the largest players in the online social media market to prevent abuse of their platforms.

The Forum has two different approaches to its work. First, it aims to reduce the amount of terrorist content available on the Internet, for which it liaises with Europol and the Internet Referral Unit (which will be discussed in Section 3). Second, it empowers civil society partners to amplify counter- and alternative narratives to such content.<sup>68</sup> This is achieved by the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP), an initiative under the umbrella of the EU Internet Forum, launched in 2015. The CSEP works through partnering civil society organisations with social media companies, providing training and building capacity as well as “supporting campaigns designed to reach vulnerable individuals and those at risk of radicalisation and recruitment by extremists.”<sup>69</sup> There have been 28 workshops in 2017 as part of this initiative in different member states, covering topics such as creating online counter-narratives, campaigns, lessons learned, and target audiences.<sup>70</sup>

## 2.3. Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech

In May 2016, the European Commission and a number of the largest players in online content, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft – ‘the IT companies’ –, announced a new Code of Conduct to tackle the spread of illegal hate speech online in Europe. Although hate speech and terrorism are topics that are often acted upon separately, both the commission and the IT companies deliberately and explicitly addressed the link between the two. At the launch, Věra Jourová, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, suggested that the recent terror attacks in Europe highlight the need to address online hate speech, while respecting the values of free speech and democracy.<sup>71</sup> The Code of Conduct includes commitments to have in place clear and effective processes to review illegal hate speech; review the majority of valid notifications within 24 hours; for companies to educate and raise awareness among their users about the types of content that is not permitted; and to help identify and promote independent counter-narratives and educational programmes that encourage critical thinking.<sup>72</sup> One year into the programme, the amount of

---

<sup>67</sup> “Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism,” European Commission, June 14, 2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education\\_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf).

<sup>68</sup> “EU Internet Forum: Progress on removal of terrorist content online,” *European Commission*, March 10, 2017 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-544\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-544_en.htm).

<sup>69</sup> “EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme,” *European Commission*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme_en).

<sup>70</sup> “Training dates & material,” *European Commission*, last modified November 6, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme/training\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme/training_en).

<sup>71</sup> “European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on illegal online hate speech,” *European Union*, May 31, 2016, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-16-1937\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm).

<sup>72</sup> “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,” *European Commission*, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/sep/eu-com-illegal-content-online-code-of-conduct.pdf>.



removed content had more than doubled; the number of responses within 24 hours had improved from 40% to 51%, and cooperation with civil society leaders had increased, which has led to a higher quality of notifications.<sup>73</sup>

## 2.4. Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT)/European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN)

In the wake of a growing number of foreign terrorist fighters leaving the EU, the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT) was established in January 2015 as an eighteen month-project to tackle the “national and local communications challenges in discouraging their citizens from travelling to Syria or other conflict zones... [to] participate in terrorist activities.”<sup>74</sup> The SSCAT’s tasks include the sharing of information and best practice of 25 EU Member States on topics such as research, social media training, and communications strategies to support counter-narratives.

As the SSCAT’s remit of 18 months came to an end, the project was transitioned into the European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN) to continue to make use of the information-sharing services to better understand radicalisation and polarisation around Europe.<sup>75</sup> The ESCN, which began in October 2016, is a year-long project, which focuses “its work on a group of selected Member States and support[s] them on how to apply a strategic communications approach to develop their own domestic capacity to challenge violent extremist influence at the pace and scale required.”<sup>76</sup> Unlike other EU-led initiatives, both the SSCAT and the ESCN do not operate in the public sphere and, as such, there is little information about either project.<sup>77</sup>

One of the key partners of both the SSCAT and ESCN is the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), run by the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office of the United Kingdom. Established in 2007, it aims to coordinate strategic communications to counter violent extremism. RICU provides “consultancy services to the ESCN...as well as providing a bespoke consultancy service to network members.”<sup>78</sup> RICU and the European Commission both work with public relations company Breakthrough Media to design campaigns that “tackle some of the world’s toughest social issues, helping [their] clients counter misinformation, [and] prevent violent extremism.”<sup>79</sup> The group’s body of work include the campaigns Educate Against Hate,<sup>80</sup> My Former Life<sup>81</sup> – telling the life stories of

<sup>73</sup> “Countering Online Hate Speech – Commission initiative with social media platforms and civil society shows progress,” *European Commission*, June 1, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1471\\_en.htm/](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1471_en.htm/).

<sup>74</sup> “Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the Commission,” *European Union Parliament, Parliamentary Questions*, May 12, 2016, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016-000505&language=EN>.

<sup>75</sup> “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments and of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism” EUR-Lex, December 15, 2016, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016XG1215\(01\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016XG1215(01)).

<sup>76</sup> “Detailed description of recent and planned CT/CVE related activities,” European Union Council, December 25, 2016, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14260-2016-ADD-1-EXT-1/en/pdf>.

<sup>77</sup> Mariya Gabriel, “The Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT) and the role of counter-narratives in preventing radicalisation,” *European Union Parliament, Parliamentary Questions*. January 25, 2016, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016-000505+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.

<sup>78</sup> “Communications from the Commission: Eighth progress report towards an effective and genuine security union,” European Commission, July 18, 2017, [http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2017/07/10930\\_17.pdf](http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2017/07/10930_17.pdf).

<sup>79</sup> “About us,” Breakthrough Media, <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#what-we-do>.

<sup>80</sup> “Educate against Hate,” Breakthrough Media, <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#our-work>.

<sup>81</sup> “My Former Life,” Breakthrough Media, <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#our-work>.

former violent extremists, and Ummahsonic<sup>82</sup> – a multi-media platform providing help and support to UK Muslim communities across the Midlands.

## 2.5. Europol

Europol is one of the primary actors in strategic communications of counter-terrorism at the EU level. Its most prominent strategic use of communication is the content disruption of the IRU (to be discussed more thoroughly in Section 3), which aims to minimise the quantity of terrorist material on the Internet, first by identifying it, and then through informing the Internet service providers (ISPs), which remove illegal content from their domain as well as analysing the content for strategic purposes. Europol also works closely with academics and practitioners on the use of the Internet by terrorist actors. An example of this is the Advisory Group on Online Terrorist Propaganda, consisting of 15 selected members with backgrounds in ICT and Social Network Analysis, terrorist propaganda, and psychiatry.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, Europol hosted the Online Terrorist Propaganda conference on the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> April 2017, bringing together 150 participants from a wide range of backgrounds to share ideas on how to halt the exploitation of online communications for terrorist narratives.<sup>84</sup> Academic output from the conference included research on deconstructing identity concepts in IS's Propaganda,<sup>85</sup> the role of instructional material in al-Qaeda and IS magazines,<sup>86</sup> and the response on Twitter to the release of the fifteenth issue of IS's magazine Dabiq.<sup>87</sup>

## 2.6. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

Another actor in the fight against violent extremism is RAN, created in 2011 by the European Council. It is a "network of frontline practitioners from across Europe who work on a daily basis with people who have already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation."<sup>88</sup> This includes those who work in the criminal justice system, teachers, community workers, and civil society representatives. The thought underlying the network is that "fighting terrorism and violent extremism involves more than surveillance and security"<sup>89</sup> and that the most effective prevention strategies are those which stop actors from becoming involved in the first place. The network connects over 3000 front line practitioners and has peer-reviewed over 100 different anti-radicalisation practices, while at the same time organising over 167 events including workshops, study visits and thematic conferences.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> "About us," Breakthrough Media.

<sup>83</sup> "Members Selected for the ECTC Advisory Group on Terrorist Propaganda," *Europol*, September 9, 2016, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/members-selected-for-ectc-advisory-group-terrorist-propaganda>.

<sup>83</sup> "Europol hosts conference on online terrorist propaganda," *Europol*, April 12, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-hosts-conference-online-terrorist-propaganda>.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> J.M. Berger, "Deconstruction of identity concepts in Islamic State Propaganda: A linkage-based approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications," *Europol*, June 9, 2017, [https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/bergerjm\\_deconstructionofislamicstatetexts.pdf](https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/bergerjm_deconstructionofislamicstatetexts.pdf).

<sup>86</sup> Alastair Reed and Haroro J. Ingram, "Exploring the Role of Instructional Material in AQAP's *Inspire* and ISIS' *Rumiyah*," *Europol*, 2017, [https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/reeda\\_ingramh\\_instructionalmaterial.pdf](https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/reeda_ingramh_instructionalmaterial.pdf).

<sup>87</sup> Daniel Grinnell, Stuart Macdonald and David Mair, "The response of, and on, Twitter to the release of Dabiq Issue 15," *Europol*, May 1, 2017, [https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds\\_maird\\_grinnelld\\_responseofandontwittertodabiq\\_15.pdf](https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds_maird_grinnelld_responseofandontwittertodabiq_15.pdf).

<sup>88</sup> "The Radicalisation Awareness Network," European Commission, November 9, 2016, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/fight-against-radicalisation/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network\\_09112016\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/fight-against-radicalisation/radicalisation_awareness_network_09112016_en.pdf).

<sup>89</sup> "Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)," *European Union, Migration and Home Affairs*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en).

<sup>90</sup> "The Radicalisation Awareness Network," *European Commission*.

The hub of the network is the RAN Centre of Excellence, which is responsible for logistical and administrative matters, connecting a number of umbrella organisations, including a number of working groups focusing on topics such as education, deradicalisation, and communications and narratives (RAN C&N).<sup>91</sup> The C&N working group focuses on utilising technology to its fullest potential in the pursuit of CVE, delivering both online and offline strategic communications to offer alternative and counter-narratives to those being espoused by extremists. It gathers and disseminates insights on four different parts of counter-narratives: the content of such narratives, the target audiences, the credibility of messengers, and the different methods of dissemination.<sup>92</sup> The working group hosts a number of “Ex-post” papers, which highlight lessons learned after different RAN activities and working group meetings.<sup>93</sup> One of the most important roles of the network is the “RAN Collection” (discussed in Section 3), which hosts an in-depth study of different approaches to the prevention of violent extremism, having reviewed over 138 practices in a regularly updated document for readers to draw inspiration from.

Another important working group is RAN EXIT, which focuses on deradicalisation and disengagement. That is to say, rather than dissuading actors that are merely vulnerable to extremist narratives, attempting to reintegrate those who have already adopted extremist beliefs and actions. As well as providing an alternative to extremism, the EXIT working group also works on practical arrangements, such as education and housing, and develops evidence-based interventions with other deradicalisation and disengagement programmes.<sup>94</sup> The EXIT group, too, hosts a number of “Ex-post” papers, such as lessons learned from adjacent fields<sup>95</sup> and how former members of extremist groups should be utilised in PVE/CVE work.<sup>96</sup>

## 2.7. Implementing Organisations: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)/Quilliam Foundation/Moonshot CVE

There are a number of implementing organisations, which help to facilitate the creation of counter-narratives between governments, industry, and civil society. The London-based ISD has, for over a decade, “responded to the rising challenge of extremist movements and the ideologies that underpin them, delivering cutting edge programmes built from world-leading expertise in communications and technology, grassroots networks, knowledge and research, and policy advice.”<sup>97</sup> Central to the ISD’s mission is the notion that credible and independent community groups are the most effective messengers in delivering counter-narratives, but

<sup>91</sup> “RAN Working Groups,” *European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran_en).

<sup>92</sup> “Communication and Narratives Working Group (RAN C&N),” *European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n).

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> “EXIT working group (RAN EXIT),” *European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-exit\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit_en).

<sup>95</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Lessons learned from adjacent fields: cults,” *Ex Post Paper*, June 27-28, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/lessons\\_from\\_adjacent\\_fields\\_cults\\_bordeaux\\_27-28\\_06\\_2017\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/lessons_from_adjacent_fields_cults_bordeaux_27-28_06_2017_en.pdf).

<sup>96</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Dos and don’ts of involving formers in PVE/CVE work,” *Ex Ante Paper*, June 26-27, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/dos\\_and\\_donts\\_involving\\_formers\\_in\\_pve\\_cve\\_work\\_bordeaux\\_27\\_06\\_2017\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/dos_and_donts_involving_formers_in_pve_cve_work_bordeaux_27_06_2017_en.pdf).

<sup>97</sup> “Who we are,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/>.

that they can be aided by organisations such as the ISD, who can build capacity and offer resources to facilitate their work. The ISD works with a number of different EU governments, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, as well as with the Commission itself. They also operate with a number of communication and technology companies, including Facebook, Google, Twitter, Jigsaw, M&C Saatchi, and Microsoft.<sup>98</sup> The aim is to serve as a bridge between these large-scale operations and local communities to enhance collaborative community-based solutions.<sup>99</sup> One example of the ISD's work is the Counter-Narrative Toolkit,<sup>100</sup> an online resource aimed to inspire would-be local campaigns by offering advice on how to plan, create content, and promote counter-narratives (discussed in Section 3). Another example is the Extreme Dialogue programme, which "uses the stories of real people, told in their own words, raw and unscripted, so that young people can learn from those whose lives have been profoundly impacted by extremism."<sup>101</sup> The ISD also publishes a number of reports on different topics relating to CVE<sup>102</sup> and organises events, which foster engagement with stakeholders.<sup>103</sup>

The Quilliam Foundation, also based in London, claims to be the world's first counter-extremism organisation, having spent over a decade aiming "to generate creative, informed and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism"<sup>104</sup> while engaging both with governments and civil society networks. The foundation offers advisory services to governments who are developing a counter-extremism strategy or building CVE programmes<sup>105</sup> and provides STEER (safeguarding, training, education, extremism, and radicalisation) training, which equips public sector workers with tools to identify those at risk of radicalisation within communities.<sup>106</sup> Quilliam also conducts and publishes a significant amount of research, such as reports on engaging families in North Africa to counter violent extremism,<sup>107</sup> radicalisation and counter-radicalisation on the Internet,<sup>108</sup> and IS's online propaganda strategy.<sup>109</sup>

A final organisation which develops counter-narratives against terrorism is Moonshot CVE, which focuses on a more technology-oriented plan, using data-driven innovations to build digital capacity in countering violent extremism and to assist counter-messaging campaigns.<sup>110</sup> An example of their work is the partnership with Jigsaw in the Redirect Method (discussed in Section 3), which uses targeted advertising for users that are using keywords associated with violent extremism and redirecting them to a curated YouTube library of anti-IS videos.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> "Partnerships," *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/partnerships/>.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> "Counter-narrative Toolkit," *Counternarratives*, <http://www.counternarratives.org/>.

<sup>101</sup> "Extreme Dialogue UK Launch," *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <https://www.isdglobal.org/event/extreme-dialogue-uk-launch/>.

<sup>102</sup> "Publications," *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/research-insight/publications/>.

<sup>103</sup> "Upcoming Events," *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <https://www.isdglobal.org/events/>.

<sup>104</sup> "About," *Quilliam Foundation*, <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/about/>.

<sup>105</sup> "Consultancy," *Quilliam Foundation*, <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-global/consultancy/>.

<sup>106</sup> "Steer," *Quilliam Foundation*, <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/steer/>.

<sup>107</sup> Yassine Souidi, Julia Ebner, and Saeida Rouass, "FATE: Engaging Family to Counter Violent Extremism in North Africa," *Quilliam Foundation*, 2016.

<sup>108</sup> Ghaffar Hussain and Erin M. Saltman, "Jihad trending: A comprehensive analysis of online extremism and how to counter it," *Quilliam Foundation*, 2014.

<sup>109</sup> Charlie Winter, "The Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State's propaganda strategy," *Quilliam Foundation*, 2015, <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy/>.

<sup>110</sup> "About us," *Moonshot CVE*, <http://moonshotcve.com/>.

<sup>111</sup> "Redirect Method," *The Redirect Method*.

### 3. PRESENT APPROACHES FROM A SELECTION OF EU MEMBER STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES

#### KEY FINDINGS

- Europol and the IRU are among the leading actors in disrupting terrorist communications from the Internet, and have, in recent years, seen a marked increase in the amount of content removed.
- Despite this being an important part of strategic communications, and there being evidence to suggest it is having an impact on IS's ability to function online, it is insufficient alone. Other strategic communication techniques, both online and offline, are important, too.
- Jigsaw and Microsoft's Redirect Methods take a more nuanced approach by using targeted adverts for users that are searching for extremist content online, redirecting users to counter- and alternative narratives. However, there are few metrics to assess the success of this method beyond "views" and "click through rates".
- A number of organisations, such as RAN, ISD, and Hedayah, offer insight into the design of messages and campaigns, building libraries for would-be campaigners to draw inspiration from. However, there are questions as to the empirical basis of such campaigns and limited evidence on their effectiveness.
- Some states engage in "Synchronised Message & Action" techniques, in which, rather than delivering the message themselves, they facilitate third parties to do so. The GEC uses this technique, partnering with the Sawab Center and the RDC3.
- While this represents a more sophisticated approach than previous state-led counter-messaging campaigns, such as the CSCC, there are a number of problems that relate to the credibility of the messenger, governments being short-term in outlook, and the volume of such messages.

This section outlines some of the key approaches currently being pursued in the field, but as in the preceding sections, it does not present an exhaustive list of approaches. It is organised around four key themes that are indicative of the main trends in tackling IS's propaganda and supported by drawing on case studies of specific projects. Each theme is followed by a short analysis. The four themes are:

1) Disruption – The key objective is to interfere with the distribution of propaganda, in short to try and stop propaganda at the source, by preventing it from reaching its target audience. In particular, this has focussed on taking down propaganda from social media and delete offending accounts.

2) Redirect method – Rather than erasing propaganda, it seeks to redirect viewers to different messages in an attempt to 'nudge' their behaviour. Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE, the project redirects those searching for jihadist material to counter-messaging.

3) Campaign and message design – These projects seek to provide information and skills to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to develop communication campaigns, typically based on counter-narrative or alternative-narratives approaches. Whilst disruption seeks to stop the

spread of propaganda, this approach seeks to enable CSOs with the skills to confront and undermine the propaganda.

4) Government communications and synchronisation message & action – There is a tendency for communication campaigns to be designed in a vacuum, disconnected from events in real life. Synchronisation approaches take a comprehensive perspective and aim to link messages and actions, and to coordinate messaging across government and with international partners. The strength of these approaches is to prevent the undermining of a narrative by exposing its 'say-do-gap', through ensuring message and actions are aligned, and through limiting contradictory messaging.

### **3.1. Disruption Method: Europol – Internet Referral Unit**

One of the primary tactics of strategic communication is the disruption of other actors' interactions. The most prominent contemporary example of this tactic can be seen by Europol's IRU, which hosts a team that systematically monitors the flow of terrorist communications on the Internet. The idea is based on an initiative set up by the British Government, which, in 2010, created the Counterterrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), which "acts on tips from the public, the police, and intelligence services. Websites that are suspected of being in breach of the law...are examined by a team of specialists and members of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)."<sup>112</sup> If the CPS concludes that the extremist content is in breach of terror laws, then the sites which are hosting the material are informed, and it is removed on the basis of being in breach of the sites' terms of service.<sup>113</sup> As well as being involved in 'take-down' activity, "the unit develops and shares new technologies to assess and process Internet content, and to improve the effectiveness of the police response to unlawful material."<sup>114</sup>

Europol's IRU has a similar *raison d'être*, established for the purpose of "reducing the level and impact of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda on the internet... [identifying] and refer[ring] relevant online content towards concerned internet service providers and support[ing] member states with operational and strategic analysis".<sup>115</sup> Similar to the CTIRU, it has two core foci, both the removal of content and the provision of operational support and strategic analysis to member states and other actors. A third focus is to strive "to become a European Centre of Excellence by strategically enhancing partnerships with cooperating partners and investing resources in Research & Development Coordination...in the field of counter-terrorism."<sup>116</sup> The IRU does not explicitly identify its target audience, yet makes several references to the goal of "countering online radicalisation and recruitment efforts by terrorists,"<sup>117</sup> implying that it is not only those currently engaging in terrorist acts, but also those vulnerable to propaganda. Furthermore, rather than trying to proactively police all

---

<sup>112</sup> Peter R. Neumann, "Options and strategies for countering online radicalization in the United States," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 6 (2013): 440. doi: [10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568).

<sup>113</sup> "250,000 piece of online extremist/terrorist material to be removed," *Metropolitan Police*, December 23, 2016, <http://news.met.police.uk/news/250000th-piece-of-online-extremist-slash-terrorist-material-to-be-removed-208698>.

<sup>114</sup> Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon, "Pathways to Violent Extremism in the Digital Era," *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 5 (2013): 46, doi: [10.1080/03071847.2013.847714](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.847714).

<sup>115</sup> "Europol's Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist propaganda," *Europol*, July 1, 2015, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda>.

<sup>116</sup> "EU Internet Referral Unit, one year report, highlights," *Europol*, July 1, 2015, 4, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-report-highlights>.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

content on the web, the IRU tactically targets the aftermath of high profile terrorist incidents, and their “primary objective is to be relevant during the ‘viral’ time of the propaganda.”<sup>118</sup>

The IRU has a number of metrics by which success could be measured. Since the Unit’s creation, they have held a number of campaigns in which large operations aimed at securing the quick removal of online material. In such campaigns, as many as 1,800 pieces of extremist content are assessed in collaboration with other dedicated units and experts from EU member states.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, Europol also claims that the total number of pieces of content assessed increased over tenfold in the first year of its establishment (1,079 to 11,050), as well as a fifteenfold increase in proposals to online service providers (690 to 9787) and an increase from 74% to 91% in the success rate of this content being removed.<sup>120</sup> As part of their goal of providing operational support and strategic analyses, the IRU wrote 3 chapters as part of the 2016 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report as well as two chapters in a handbook on self-radicalisation.<sup>121</sup>

### 3.1.1. Analysis

Whilst the evidence indicates that disruption approaches do have a measurable impact on the spread of terrorist propaganda, it is not a silver bullet, but only part of a solution and not without limitations. Many commentators have criticised disruption as a futile game of ‘whack-a-mole’, in which one account taken down is simply replaced by another account.<sup>122</sup> However, as JM Berger and numerous other scholars have demonstrated in a number of empirical studies, suspension and suppression of suspected twitter accounts lead to reductions in activity and reach of Violent Extremists.<sup>123</sup> However, while disruption may be successful in reducing activity on targeted platforms, it risks displacing activity from the likes of Facebook and Twitter to other platforms. Research conducted in 2017 found that pro-IS accounts on Twitter linked to 39 different platforms or content hosting websites.<sup>124</sup> Newer platforms, such

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>119</sup> “Europol joins UK appeal to report extremist and terrorist material online using red “STOP” button,” *Europol*, April 21, 2016, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-joins-uk-appeal-to-report-extremist-and-terrorist-material-online-using-red-stop-button>; “Europol joins forces with counter-terrorism experts to undermine online terrorist propaganda,” *Europol*, December 6, 2016, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-joins-forces-counter-terrorism-experts-to-undermine-online-terrorist-propaganda>; “Europol coordinates fifth joint operation to flag online terrorist content,” *Europol*, July 11, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-coordinates-fifth-joint-operation-to-flag-online-terrorist-content>.

<sup>120</sup> “EU Internet Referral Unit, one year report, highlights,” *Europol*: 5, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-report-highlights>.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>122</sup> Julianna Goldman, “Fighting ISIS online a game of digital whack-a-mole,” *CBS News*, September 13, 2014, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/combating-isis-online-campaign-a-game-of-digital-whack-a-mole/>; Ben Makuch, “Banning Islamic State Jihadists From Twitter Is Like Playing Whack-a-Mole,” *Motherboard*, August 21, 2014, <http://motherboard.vice.com/read/isis-twitter-whack-a-mole>; Charles Arthur, “Taking down ISIS material from Twitter or YouTube not as clear cut as it seems,” *The Guardian*, June 23, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/taking-down-isis-youtube-twitter-google-video>.

<sup>123</sup> J.M. Berger, “Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption,” *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 5 (2016). <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf>; J.M. Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How suspensions are limiting the social networks of English-speaking ISIS supporters,” *GW Program on Extremism Occasional Paper*, February, 2016, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/downloads/JMB%20Diminishing%20Returns.pdf>;

Daniel Grinnell, Stuart Macdonald and David Mair, “The response of, and on, Twitter to the release of Dabiq Issue 15,” *Europol*, May 1, 2017, [https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds\\_maird\\_grinnell\\_d\\_responseofandontwittertodabiq\\_15.pdf](https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds_maird_grinnell_d_responseofandontwittertodabiq_15.pdf).

<sup>124</sup> Maura Conway, Moign Khawaja, Suraj Lakhani, Jeremy Reffin, Ander Robertson, and David Weir, “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring takedown of online terrorist material and its impacts,” *VOX-Pol*, 2017, [http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol\\_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf](http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf).

as Telegram, which has become IS's platform of choice,<sup>125</sup> often lack the internal capabilities to take down terrorist content that have been learned by the more established rivals<sup>126</sup> – although it would be wrong to suggest that they do not remove content at all.<sup>127</sup> However, this migration away from mainstream social media accounts is not without benefit, as “the private and secure nature of Telegram does not offer the same momentum and ability to reach new recruits in the way that Twitter did.”<sup>128</sup> The use of hashtags and an open interface allowed both the organisation to spread its message easily as well as allowing those curious to find such content with greater ease. Telegram requires enough knowhow, potentially, to dissuade those without sufficient interest or technical capabilities.

One of the flaws of this approach is that it focusses solely on online cyber-structure as a means to prevent radicalisation. However, a number of studies have demonstrated that “radicalisation rarely happens exclusively online,”<sup>129</sup> but rather that the decisive factor in moving from extremist beliefs to becoming a terrorist is having access to offline social networks.<sup>130</sup> Hence, focusing on disruption in the online world will only ever address part of the picture. Ultimately, the most success disruption approaches can have is to prevent extremist content from being available online. However, this simply creates an information vacuum, and vacuums will always be filled. Whilst disruption is one side of the coin, the other necessary side is an effective communication strategy to control what fills the vacuum.

Finally, disruption approaches also raise a number of human rights and free speech issues. Whilst in principle it may seem a straightforward approach to take down extremist content, this raises the more complex question of what actually constitutes extremist content? And importantly, who decides this and on what basis? As the tech companies point out, determining what is extremist content is not simple. For example, one of the London Bridge attackers was said to have viewed videos by the American radical preacher Ahmad Musa Jibril, but, “YouTube says that they don't break its rules because they are religious sermons containing no call to violence, so they remain online. Furthermore, the US authorities have not sought prosecution of Jibril, so it is not clear on what basis his videos could be removed from a global platform.”<sup>131</sup> The line where free speech ends and extremist content starts is ultimately subjective and a much-debated question. In the cyber-domain this is further complicated, where the boundaries between free speech and extremist content vary between countries.<sup>132</sup> There are, of course, precedents and provisions for geo-blocking specific content

---

<sup>125</sup> Mia Bloom, “Navigating ISIS's Preferred Platform: Telegram,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (2017), doi: [10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695).

<sup>126</sup> Nick Robbins-Early, “How Telegram became the App of choice of ISIS,” *Huffington Post*, May 24, 2017, [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis-telegram-app\\_us\\_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis-telegram-app_us_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5).

<sup>127</sup> Miron Lakomy, “Cracks in the Online “Caliphate”: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11, no. 3, (2017), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/607>.

<sup>128</sup> Amy-Louise Watkin and Joe Whittaker, “Evolution of terrorists' use of the Internet,” *Counterterror Business*, October 20, 2017, <http://www.counterterrorbusiness.com/features/evolution-terrorists%E2%80%99-use-internet>.

<sup>129</sup> Paul Gill, et al., “Terrorists' use of the Internet by the numbers,” *Criminology & Public Policy* 16, no. 1 (2017), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12249/pdf>; Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon, “Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism,” *RAND* (2013), [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND\\_RR453.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf).

<sup>130</sup> “Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet: A Working Paper of the PPN,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 2011, <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/11/ppn-working-paper-radicalisation-the-role-of-the-internet/>; Emily Dreyfuss, “Blaming the internet for terrorism misses the point,” *Wired*, June 6, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/06/theresa-may-internet-terrorism/>; Kate Ferguson, “Countering violent extremism through the media and communication strategies.”

<sup>131</sup> Rory Cellan-Jones, “Something must be done...but what?” *BBC*, June 7, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40190440>.

<sup>132</sup> Alexander Babuta, “Online Radicalisation: The need for an Offline Response,” *RUSI*, 25 September, 2015, <https://rusi.org/commentary/online-radicalisation-need-offline-response>; Lee Rowland, “Turning Tech Companies Into Spies Won't,” *TIME*, December 11, 2017, <http://time.com/4144762/social-media-terrorism/>.



where it may be in violation of local law, but they often involve long and drawn-out legal battles that make the speedy enforcement of local law difficult.<sup>133</sup> In short, when states and tech companies are working in harmony, it can be an effective method, but when this unison breaks down it can result in significant logjams.

### 3.2. Redirect Method: Jigsaw and Microsoft

Many actors may consider the removal of content a blunt instrument for *all* problematic content on the Internet for ethical and practical reasons – such as where one draws the line between extremist content and political speech. To this end, initiatives have been created which offer counter-speech, via online advertising. The “Redirect Method” has been piloted by Jigsaw, an initiative by Google, in partnership with Moonshot CVE, Quantum Communications, and a team of counter-narrative researchers. The purpose of the method was to “ensure that those browsing the Internet with precise questions around violent extremism and the Caliphate get answers from the many voices debunking ISIS recruitment narratives.”<sup>134</sup> Rather than creating any actual counter-narrative content themselves, they draw upon an existing catalogue of English and Arabic videos, which are linked to in three different ways when an actor is searching specific keywords related to extremism: text adverts, image adverts, and skippable video adverts. The reason for this is credibility – it is unlikely that multinational organisations are seen as impartial actors by many of those who are susceptible to extremist propaganda online, whereas they found “plenty of authentic, credible, powerful and relevant video content to curate.”<sup>135</sup> The target audience of the method is explicitly stated as “reaching the slice of ISIS’ audience that was most susceptible to its messaging and actively seeking to engage with ISIS produced content.”<sup>136</sup>

Jigsaw ran a pilot campaign for the Redirect Method, which lasted for eight weeks. This resulted in 500,070 minutes of watched video from a total of 320,906 individuals. They claim that because this is the first instance of such an initiative taking place, there are no suitable base-rates to compare to their data, but note that they are sharing their results for future projects to be evaluate against.<sup>137</sup> The “click through rate”, one of the most widely used metrics in online advertising, was tested against a control group of adverts that ran on similar search terms in the twelve months prior to the launch of the pilot. For the English language adverts, it was 76% higher and for Arabic language, it was 79% higher.<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, there has been active industry engagement. In July 2017, YouTube expanded on the work of the Redirect Method in four ways: Increasing the number of languages in search queries in languages other than English; using machine learning to dynamically update search terms, working with experts to design new counter-narratives, and expanding the redirect method in Europe.<sup>139</sup>

In April 2017, Microsoft announced a similar project in partnership with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Like the Redirect Method, it focuses on advert-based interventions, but

---

<sup>133</sup> Emily Greenhouse, Twitter’s speech problem: Hashtags and hate, *The New Yorker* (25 January 2013), <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/twitters-speech-problem-hashtags-and-hate>. See also: Richard Waters, “Yahoo loses Nazi memorabilia case”, *Financial Times* (13 January 2006), <https://www.ft.com/content/81127f12-83cb-11da-9017-0000779e2340>.

<sup>134</sup> “The Redirect Method: A blueprint for bypassing extremism,” *The Redirect Method*, 2, <https://redirectmethod.org/downloads/RedirectMethod-FullMethod-PDF.pdf>.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>139</sup> “Bringing new Redirect Method features to YouTube,” *YouTube Official Blog*, July 20, 2017, <https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/07/bringing-new-redirect-method-features.html>.

on the Bing search engine, run by Microsoft. The aim of the project is to “help us and NGOs to better understand the problem, devise an effective and proportionate response, and offer individuals a positive alternative to violence and extremism.”<sup>140</sup> The year-long pilot, which is currently taking place, places adverts in response to certain searches that relate to extremism and will “test the efficacy of different types of messaging and video content selected to deter people from radicalization.”<sup>141</sup> The first set of adverts will be targeted to an audience in the UK in English, with later programs including a wider audience in both English and Arabic. Both this and the Jigsaw projects will interact with each other in the new Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, announced in June 2017, which allows the different initiatives to “learn from and contribute to one another’s counterspeech efforts.”<sup>142</sup>

### 3.2.1. Analysis

In terms of the standard advertising metric of click through rate, the Redirect method has been a success. However, this metric only really shows how successful the advertisements were at gaining views, but sheds little light on whether they actually had any effect or even the desired effect on the viewer. This mirrors the most substantial problem in terrorism research online; there is a plethora of data relating to the content available to users online, but very little that relates to how this content actually affects users.<sup>143</sup> This highlights one of the key issues of the difficulty in measuring effectiveness and the subsequent lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation.

Unlike other approaches, the Redirect Method is well targeted. As Yasmin Green, Jigsaw’s head of research and development, explains, “The Redirect Method is at its heart a targeted advertising campaign: Let’s take these individuals who are vulnerable to ISIS’ recruitment messaging and instead show them information that refutes it.”<sup>144</sup> Whilst the redirect method has identified an effective way to target those vulnerable to IS messaging, its effectiveness still relies on the “information that refutes it”, essentially on message design and content – addressed below. While messaging reaching the target audience is a necessity, in order to be effective, it still must resonate and be relevant to that audience.<sup>145</sup>

## 3.3. Campaign and Message Design Method – RAN, ISD, and the Hedayah Center

A different approach to counter-narratives is to target those who deliver such narratives. There are a number of platforms, which host and disseminate information to aid those who are building responses to terrorist narratives. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was created in 2011 by the European Council with the above as one of its primary responsibilities. The objective of the network’s Centre of Excellence is to act as “a hub for

---

<sup>140</sup> “Microsoft partners with Institute for Strategic Dialogue and NGOs to discourage online radicalization to violence,” *Microsoft*, April 18, 2017, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/>.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> “Microsoft, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube announce formation of Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism,” *Microsoft*, June 26, 2017, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/>.

<sup>143</sup> Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon, “Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism.”

<sup>144</sup> Andy Greenberg, “Google’s Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits,” *Wired*, July 9, 2016, <https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/>.

<sup>145</sup> For a discussion of Reach, Relevance and Resonance in strategic communications, see: Haroro J. Ingram and Alastair Reed, “Lessons from History for Counter-terrorism Strategic Communications,” 11.

connecting, developing and disseminating expertise... [supporting] and coordinating RAN, and foster[ing] an inclusive dialogue between practitioners, policy-makers and academics."<sup>146</sup> RAN recognises that there is often a sizable gap in quality between the propaganda being disseminated by groups such as IS and the corresponding counter-narratives, which is often caused by the lack of government, civil society and industry partnerships.<sup>147</sup> As a result, RAN has a number of goals, including the facilitation of partnerships, delivering a series of products to aid practitioners, and delivering direct support.<sup>148</sup> The most notable product that is produced is the *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices* collection, which over 434 pages offers seven categories of approaches to countering extremism: Training for first-line practitioners, exit strategies, community engagement and empowerment, educating young people, family support, delivering counter- or alternative narratives, and multi-agency approaches. Each of these categories includes the aims, lessons learned, and practices from a number of implementations.<sup>149</sup> There are a total of 138 practices which are reviewed in the collection and it is ever-growing and regularly updated and is intended for readers to draw inspiration from, find examples adaptable to their local/specific context, and identify counterparts to exchange on prevention experiences.<sup>150</sup>

The RAN also houses a instructions *specifically* aimed at delivering counter- or alternative narratives.<sup>151</sup> It offers a number of important suggestions for the aims and methods of a counter-messaging, including a disaggregation of what is meant by counter and alternative narratives, as well as government strategic communications, as well as discussing different audiences and best methods of reaching them, and lessons learned from past campaigns. It also focuses on the different types of messengers: government, civil society, religious leaders, former extremists, and victims, and to which role they are best suited and which roles they should refrain from entering. For example, governments are well suited towards political counter-narratives, but "should steer clear of religious counter narratives,"<sup>152</sup> which are better tasked to religious leaders. The document also offers an analysis of seventeen different practices of counter- and alternative narratives with key information, such as a description, approach, target audience, deliverables, evidence and evaluation, and sustainability and transferability. The analyses practices include The Abdullah-X Project<sup>153</sup> – a YouTube campaign focused on building a resistance to young Muslims against the allure of

---

<sup>146</sup> "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices," European Union, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), September 2017, 11, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran\\_collection-approaches\\_and\\_practices\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf);

Radicalisation Awareness Network, "Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives," *RAN Issue Paper: 2*, 2015, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/issue\\_paper\\_cn\\_oct2015\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_cn_oct2015_en.pdf).

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>149</sup> "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices," European Union, Radicalisation Awareness Network, September, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran\\_collection-approaches\\_and\\_practices\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf).

<sup>150</sup> "Collection of inspiring practices," *European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs*, last modified November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices_en).

<sup>151</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), "Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Delivering counter- or alternative narratives" (2017), [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/delivering\\_alternative\\_narratives\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/delivering_alternative_narratives_en.pdf).

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6

<sup>153</sup> EU Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, "Abdullah-X Project", [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7475\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7475_en).

radicalisation; Terrorism: How about listening to what victims have to say?<sup>154</sup> – which focuses both on teaching schoolchildren and restorative justice of prison inmates engaging in dialogue with victims of terrorism; and No-Nazi.net<sup>155</sup> – which focused on training young people between the ages of 13-18 to counter extremism online.

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue also has an initiative focused on the design of a counter-narrative campaign called the “Counter Narrative Toolkit”, based online.<sup>156</sup> There are four key elements to the Toolkit: How to plan a campaign, how to create content, how to promote a campaign and a series of case studies in which users can browse. Each stage includes a number of different interactive sections, including video tutorials, step-by-step instructions, and frequently asked questions. The target audience is for non-experts “with little or no previous experience of counter-narrative campaigns.”<sup>157</sup> In 2016, the Hedayah Center launched their own counter-narrative library to encourage governments, practitioners and members of civil society to observe best practice in countering all forms of violent extremism. The multi-media library contains “videos, movies, TV shows, cartoons, books, websites, magazines, blogs, social media campaigns, articles”<sup>158</sup> and is split into two collections – the Daesh Defector Collection – featuring narratives of returning foreign terrorist fighters, and the South East Asia Collection, featuring counter-narratives specific to violent extremism in that region.

### 3.3.1. Analysis

The goal of such Campaign and Message Design projects is to provide the tools to CSOs to be able to develop their own grass roots communication campaigns to counter the terrorist propaganda threat. However, there are a number of issues to be raised.

Most of these projects focus on the idea of counter-narratives. As noted in the introduction, there is little evidence to support the effectiveness of counter-narrative approaches,<sup>159</sup> and the theory is based on a lack of empirical research.<sup>160</sup> However, this does not mean that counter-narratives do not work, but rather that there is a need to prioritise research into whether and how they work. Further, research should examine the impact of different types of counter-narratives, seeking to identify which work and which do not, and importantly, why? It is only by strengthening our understanding and the empirical foundation of counter-narratives approaches, that it will be possible to develop more effective communication campaigns. In practical terms, echoing the section above, this further highlights the need to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of counter-narrative projects.

There is often a focus almost exclusively on the online world, and social media in particular, leading to a focus on online messaging to the detriment of other mediums of communication. However, lessons from the past have shown the importance of using multiple mediums of

---

<sup>154</sup> EU Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Terrorism: How about listening to what victims have to say?”, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7481\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7481_en).

<sup>155</sup> EU Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “No-Nazi.net”, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7482\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7482_en).

<sup>156</sup> “Counter-Narrative Toolkit,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, <http://www.counternarratives.org/html/home>.

<sup>157</sup> Henry Tuck and Tanya Silverman, “The Counter-Narrative Handbook, 2016,” *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 2016, 2, [http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook\\_1.pdf](http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf).

<sup>158</sup> “Launch of the Counter Narrative Library,” *Hedayah Center*, <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/activities/80/activities/511/2016/665/launch-of-the-counter-narrative-library>.

<sup>159</sup> Kate Ferguson, “Countering violent extremism through the media and communication strategies.”

<sup>160</sup> Andrew Glazzard, “Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-narrative and Violent Extremism,” *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague* 8, no. 8 (2017), <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf>.

communications (online and offline) to enact effective communication campaigns.<sup>161</sup> Further, counter-narratives are inherently defensive, merely responding “to the opposition’s messages, allowing them to set the ground on which the communication battle will be fought and to maintain control of the narrative”.<sup>162</sup> Historical evidence points to successful campaigns combining both defensive and offensive communications. Hence, while counter-narratives may play a part in a successful communications campaign, they should be seen as only one part of a comprehensive messaging strategy.<sup>163</sup>

Often counter-narrative campaigns are in reality counter-messaging campaigns, in that they focus on addressing and rebutting a particular theme in IS propaganda. However, this fails to realise the underlying strength of IS propaganda, which is that the group interweaves multiple messages on multiple themes to create a coherent, interlocking and re-enforcing narrative. As such, focussing on individual themes is unlikely to dismantle the overall narrative it aims to counter.<sup>164</sup>

Many of these approaches have been based on countering IS ideology. However, it is questionable whether engaging in direct counter-ideological debates is the most effective approach, given that western actors are unlikely to have the necessary credibility.<sup>165</sup> The focus on ideology has been argued by some to in fact be counter-productive, and has instead “further polarize[d] opinion and relations between Muslim immigrant minorities and non-Muslim majorities”, in the process “fuelling a right-wing backlash and increasing tensions in our communities.”<sup>166</sup>

### 3.4. Synchronise Message & Action Method: Governments

The final category of approaches is Government Communications and its evolution to use networks, which not only create and deliver counter-narratives, but do so in a coordinated manner; not only to avoid duplication but to be mutually reinforcing in nature. That is to say, using different messages adhering to the same grand narrative. Furthermore, successful messaging campaigns must avoid creating a ‘say-do-gap’, or else be at risk of being undermined. One example is the US State Department-run Global Engagement Center (GEC). Its predecessor, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), failed in trying to engage directly with Islamist extremists online,<sup>167</sup> in part because its content was

---

<sup>161</sup> Alastair Reed, “Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications: Back to the Future: Lessons from Past and Present,” in *Terrorists’ Use of the Internet*, IPS ebook, 269-278, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/FINAL-Reed-CTSC-Back-to-the-Future.pdf>; Haroro J. Ingram, “A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-terrorism Strategic Communications.”

<sup>162</sup> Alastair Reed, “IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?” *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague*, March 17, 2017. <https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/>.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.; Alastair Reed, “Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications: Back to the Future: Lessons from Past and Present”; Haroro J. Ingram “A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-terrorism Strategic Communications.”

<sup>164</sup> For an analysis of the structure of IS narrative, see: Haroro J. Ingram, “An analysis of *Inspire* & *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State’s propaganda war,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 51, no.3 (2016), <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551>.

<sup>165</sup> Rachel Briggs, Sebastian Feve, “Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism: What works and what are the implications for government?”

<sup>166</sup> Paul Bell, “ISIS and Violent Extremism: Is The West’s Counter-Narrative Making the Problem,” *Influence*, June 25, 2015, <http://influence.cipr.co.uk/2015/06/25/isis-violent-extremism-wests-counter-narrative-making-problem-worse/>.

<sup>167</sup> Patrick Tucker, “Analysts are quitting the State Department’s Anti-Propaganda Team,” *Defense One*, 12 September 12, 2017, <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/analysts-are-quitting-state-departments-anti-propaganda-team/140936/>; Rita Katz, “The State Department’s Twitter war with ISIS is embarrassing.”

branded with the official State Department seal, and as a result "fell on deaf ears."<sup>168</sup>

On 14<sup>th</sup> March 2016, President Obama enacted Executive Order 13721, creating the GEC and revoking the CSCC. The Center's primary goals are to coordinate, integrate, and synchronise "government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad in order to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist organizations."<sup>169</sup> The GEC works in four key areas: First, by offering partnerships with a global network of positive messengers operating at a local level – as "many experts recognize it is doubtful that direct messages from the government will deter potential [terrorist] recruits."<sup>170</sup> Second, in using data analytics to better understand radicalisation dynamics online as well as polling operations, target audience studies and academic research. Third, by perusing collaborative, thematic campaigns in coordination with other members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, in which *unbranded* content is created for global partners. Finally, the Center coordinates the different US-based agencies' day-to-day operations for a more complementary approach.<sup>171</sup>

One such partnership is between the GEC and the United Arab Emirates, who together created the Sawab Center,<sup>172</sup> a counter-messaging campaign aimed specifically at young Arabs in the region, whom they believe to be the most vulnerable to IS's propaganda. Unlike previous counter-narrative initiatives, such as the CSCC, which focused on the group's brutality, the Sawab Center emphasizes the group's incompetence, undermining "the idea of ISIL's 'caliphate' by highlighting their inept governance, crumbling infrastructure and poor health services."<sup>173</sup> An example of this is their #deludedfollower campaign, focusing on the issue of foreign fighters, which in January 2016 earned 163 million impressions on Twitter.<sup>174</sup> Other campaigns include #MercyToTheWorlds to "convey a global message of Islam's merciful and tolerant principles... [clarifying] that violent and radical actions by extremists bear no relation to the real teachings of Islam"<sup>175</sup> and #UnitedByEid, celebrating the diversity "regardless of one's nationality, ethnic group, tribe, sect or gender."<sup>176</sup> The latter campaign of September 2017 represented the 19<sup>th</sup> proactive social media campaign by the Sawab Center. As well as focusing on IS as part of the output, the Centre also monitors and analyses the propaganda output of the group to assess "what is resonating with the small demographic subsets targeted by the extremists so that the coalition can produce more research-based messaging."<sup>177</sup> The Center's strategy is based around its social media arms, which have a variable level of support: Facebook (1.5 million followers), YouTube (596 followers, 162 videos with over 800,000 views), Twitter (500,000 followers), and Instagram (75,000 followers and 2000 posts).

---

<sup>168</sup> "The power of the swarm, where next for counter-messaging?" ICSR, July 12, 2016, <http://icsr.info/2016/07/icsr-insight-power-swarm-next-counter-messaging/>.

<sup>169</sup> The American Presidency Project, President Obama, *Executive Order 13721*.

<sup>170</sup> Holly, K. Hall, "The new voice of America: Countering foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act," *First Amendment Studies*, (2017): 4.

<sup>171</sup> "Global Engagement Center," *US Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/r/gec/>.

<sup>172</sup> "United Against Terrorism," *Sawab Center*, <http://80.227.220.174/>.

<sup>173</sup> Taimur Khan, "Abu Dhabi counter-terrorism centre to battle ISIL's online lies," *The National*, July 7, 2015, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isil-s-online-lies-1.45777>.

<sup>174</sup> "#DeludedFollowers campaign targets Daesh recruits," *Gulf News*, May 1, 2017, <http://gulfnnews.com/news/uae/media/deludedfollowers-campaign-targets-daesh-recruits-1.2019890>.

<sup>175</sup> "Sawab Centre Launches Campaign to Refute Daesh's Theological Claims," *Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh*, February 14, 2016, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/sawab-centre-launches-campaign-to-refute-daeshs-theological-claims/>.

<sup>176</sup> "Sawab Centre launches social media campaign," *Gulf News*, August 31, 2017, <http://gulfnnews.com/news/uae/government/sawab-centre-launches-social-media-campaign-1.2082973>.

<sup>177</sup> Taimur Khan, "Abu Dhabi counter-terrorism centre to battle ISIL's online lies," July 7, 2015, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isil-s-online-lies-1.45777>.

A similar project has been announced in association with the GEC and the Malaysian Royal Police, which will operate online and adopt a two-pronged 'hard' and 'soft' approaches based on content removal and counter-narratives, respectively, called the Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Center (RDC3). The purpose of the Centre is to "curb the spread of extremist ideology and the influence of Islamic State in the cyberworld."<sup>178</sup> It was initially rolled out in just ASEAN states but will be expanded to include China.<sup>179</sup> The project is still very much in its infancy and there is not much detail with regards to metrics or target audience.

### 3.4.1. Analysis

The transition of the CSCC to the GEC has shown an evolution in the understanding of how to counter terrorist narratives. The CSCC rightfully received criticism for attempting to engage directly with terrorist actors online, and without a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of the conflict in which they were entering.<sup>180</sup> However, the GEC understands that the US State Department is not considered a credible messenger among many of the communities in which they are trying to reach and, as such, relies on local actors to deliver counter-narratives.

It could be argued that this is a naïve approach. A cursory examination would show anyone that such communications are funded by the State Department, even if the communications no longer bear the department's logo. Rather, there is a long list of initiatives, which the department is a sponsor or partner towards.<sup>181</sup> If the aspiration of messages being delivered by a credible messenger is serious, the GEC should be less keen to advertise its involvement in such initiatives, as it jeopardises the potential success. This, of course, is not politically viable because governments are, for a number of reasons, keen to show the ways in which they are part of the solution to violent extremism.

The highly political nature of government could also lead to a number of other problems for counter-narrative campaigns. First, the political arena is very reactive to public events, which can change the focus of government resources and the goals, rather than being focused on research-driven outcomes. Second and related, the short-term nature of politics means that governments may not be interested in long-term initiatives, which makes effective monitoring and evaluation difficult as governments may pull funding if a topic becomes politically unpopular or insignificant.

A further problem relates to volume of messages. Despite a significantly increased amount of counter-messaging campaigns, the volume of these messages is vastly outweighed by the "swarming" strategy employed by IS. ICSR director Peter Neumann described the problem testifying before US Congress: "Even if we found the perfect message, the perfect messenger, and even if we managed to produce the perfect video, it would still be a drop in the

<sup>178</sup> Zahid Hamidi, "A, Malaysia's Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy," *Journal of Public Security and Safety* 6, no. 2 (2016): 14, <http://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdf>.

<sup>179</sup> "KL counter-terrorism centre to be expanded with China's help," *Today Online*, January 13, 2017, <http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kl-counter-terrorism-centre-be-expanded-chinas-help>.

<sup>180</sup> Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, "Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016," *VOX-Pol*, 2017, <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ResearchPerspectivesonOnlineRadicalisation.pdf>; Rita Katz, "The State Department's Twitter war with ISIS is embarrassing"; Kate Knibbs, "The State Department's anti-ISIS account just promoted an anti-Islam Advocate," *Gizmodo*, December 14, 2015, <https://gizmodo.com/the-state-department-s-anti-isis-twitter-account-just-p-1747890969>.

<sup>181</sup> "Programs and Initiatives," *US Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/>.

ocean...You need to be loud, you need volume, and you can't be on your own."<sup>182</sup> Most CVE initiatives suffer from a lack of funding, and as a result are "woefully under-staffed and under-populated. While no one explicitly advocates low-volume messaging as a meritorious approach, most prominent campaigns default to that setting."<sup>183</sup> This is, again, an area in which there has been some improvement as the Sawab Center tweets at a volume more comparable with IS recruiters, however, it "remains a singular voice emanating from one account."<sup>184</sup>

None of these problems is insurmountable for any government, but they require a degree of patience, maturity, and funding to do so. Commitment to ideas, such as credible messengers, research-driven foci, and effective monitoring and evaluation, are all central to successful counter-narratives.<sup>185</sup> Unfortunately, the GEC is suffering from a number of internal problems in 2017 and its future is very much in doubt.<sup>186</sup>

### **3.5. Summary**

The four themes that are discussed above are not exhaustive; there are many different approaches that can be taken in countering terrorist narratives. What is clear from the analysis above is that each of four different thematic approaches addresses terrorist propaganda from a different angle, and none of them are comprehensive in themselves. Instead, each of approaches has merit and, collectively, they create a stronger response to terrorist propaganda. Hence, rather than recommending one approach over another, the policy recommendations in the next section support all four approaches, and focus on a number of cross-cutting factors that are central to strategic communications and are internal to each of the approaches.

---

<sup>182</sup> "The power of the swarm, where next for counter-messaging?" *ICSR*.

<sup>183</sup> J.M. Berger, "Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption," 8.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> Henry Tuck and Tanya Silverman, "The Counter-Narrative Handbook, 2016."

<sup>186</sup> Patrick Tucker, "Analysts are quitting the State Department's anti-propaganda team."



## 4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

### KEY FINDINGS

- Disruption of violent extremist networks should be comprehensive and multi-platform to avoid displacement and partnered by targeted messaging to fill the post-disruption vacuum.
- A strategic communications campaign needs a clear and simple-to-understand, overarching central narrative to cohere a thematically diverse messaging over the short, medium and long term.
- Strategic literacy, technical literacy and target audience assessments offer essential metrics for gauging the efficacy of CT-CVE strategic communications. Assessments should begin by establishing pre-implementation baseline measures that can be used to gauge effectiveness and efficiency over time.
- Synchronising CT-CVE strategic communications with actions and events on the ground is essential for amplifying trust, credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of a target audience for oneself and diminishing those sentiments for adversaries. More important than bureaucratic changes are cultural changes within government departments to appreciate the value of strategic communications as central to operational, strategic and policy decisions.

The purpose of this section is to outline key strategic-policy recommendations drawn from the analysis in Section 3 and the latest findings from the fields of scholarship and best practice. Five interrelated 'lines of effort' are essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of CT-CVE strategic communication: disruption activities, campaign and message design, target audience, metrics & evaluation, and synchronisation with action. While each line of effort is singularly important, the implementation of all five is designed to have a cumulatively compounding strategic impact whereby the 'sum is greater than the parts'.<sup>187</sup>

### 4.1. Disruption Activities

As outlined in Section 3, disruption activities on social media platforms, such as Twitter, have broken apart violent extremist networks, diminished the follower numbers and stunted violent extremist activities. Thus, disruption emerges as an essential tool for confronting VE networks both online (e.g. shutting down social media accounts) and offline (e.g. law enforcement and intelligence operations). However, these initiatives have also driven the evolution of violent extremist use of the internet with IS supporters showing a preference for encrypted social media platforms which are harder to monitor and infiltrate. Disruption activities create vacuums, which represent opportunities for other actors to fill the void.<sup>188</sup> Consequently, disruption activities that are not synchronised with an active messaging effort

<sup>187</sup> For an example of these lines of effort in a single strategic framework, see: Haroro J. Ingram, "The Strategic Logic of the "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: Conceptual and Empirical Foundations," *The International Centre for CounterTerrorism - The Hague* 8, no. 6 (2017), <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ICCT-Ingram-The-Strategic-Logic-of-the-Linkage-Based-Approach.pdf>.

<sup>188</sup> J.M. Berger, "Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption"; Conway et al., "Disrupting Daesh: Measuring takedown of online terrorist material and its impacts."

may, at best, be missing opportunities to engage with vulnerable audiences and, at worst, create vacuums, which other violent extremist entities will seek to fill. These are the inevitable pros (e.g. limiting activities on open access forums) and cons (e.g. preference for encrypted services by violent extremist groups) that have emerged from disruption strategies.<sup>189</sup>

Building on Section 3, three strategic-policy recommendations contribute to maximising the pros and minimising the cons of disruption:

First, disruption needs to be applied comprehensively and across multiple platforms. Given that violent extremists are likely to use multiple social media platforms simultaneously, disruption efforts may adopt a similarly holistic approach to shutting down social media accounts.

Second, the vacuums created by disruption need to be filled with messaging. There is a fleeting opportunity immediately after a social media account is shut down for the followers of that account to receive messaging before moving to other platforms or starting a new social media account. It follows that, just as tech companies play a central role in shutting down the social media accounts of violent extremists, this effort should be partnered by the targeted dissemination of messaging to the followers of that account.

Third, the messaging deployed to fill the vacuums created by disruption must be a mix of rational and identity choice 'negative' messaging. For example, immediately after a social media account is shutdown, tech companies work to ensure that the followers of that account receive a series of messages designed to leverage a range of motivational drivers. The logic of deploying a range of messaging is to cater to a potentially diverse motivational spectrum in the target audience. This has a dual purpose: (i.) it disseminates a variety of hooks given that any given message is more likely to resonate with some than others, and (ii.) a range of messages can create a cumulatively reinforcing effect on a target audience.<sup>190</sup>

## **4.2. Campaign & Message Design**

Two significant trends to emerge from Section 3 are the dominance of counter-narrative and theme-centric approaches to CT-CVE strategic communications. Two potential problems arise from strategic communication efforts that adopt these principles. First, counter-narrative-centric strategies are inherently defensive and reactive;<sup>191</sup> they depend on the adversary's messaging in order to craft its own messaging. Consequently, the adversary tends to not only initiate but shape the pace and nature of the information contest. Historical analyses have shown that success in the information theatre tends to follow the actor who proportionally disseminates more offensive than defensive messages compared to their adversaries.

Second, the dominance of theme-based messaging efforts risks the strategic communications campaign falling into cyclical messaging that is less adaptive to change, especially over the medium to long term. Thematic approaches to messaging risk 'communications schizophrenia' by deploying messages that may be thematically consistent from message to

---

<sup>189</sup> Joe Whittaker, "The Sound of an Echo," *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, June 23, 2017, <https://icct.nl/publication/the-sound-of-an-echo/>.

<sup>190</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of this literature, see: Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai. "Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016."

<sup>191</sup> Alastair Reed, "IS Propaganda: Should we counter the narrative?"

message but lack coherence at a broader campaign narrative level. Violent extremist propaganda efforts tend to deploy thematically diverse messages that are cohered around a simple central narrative; it is at the heart of the strategic logic of their messaging campaign. It is a strategy designed not only to champion the violent extremist group's objectives but their 'brand'. In order to compete against these adversaries in the information theatre and degrade their 'brand', CT-CVE strategic communications need to ensure coherent messaging over the short, medium and long term, campaign and message design principles need to be synchronised.<sup>192</sup> A crucial mechanism to this end is the establishment of a clear and simple-to-understand overarching central narrative. A thematically diverse array of messaging will need to be deployed as part of a modern communications campaign.<sup>193</sup> However, the purpose of an overarching central narrative is to ensure that despite this thematic diversity, all messages are in some way supporting that overarching central narrative. Ultimately, the framework of principles used to shape a strategic communications effort needs to be flexible enough to apply as context and conditions change.

### 4.3. Target Audience

Effective strategic communications require both a clear identification of the target audiences of a messaging campaign and a nuanced behavioural and attitudinal understanding of that audience. The modern communication environment is such that a messaging effort must take into account a spectrum of potential consumers of the message: intended, unintended, supporters, adversaries and neutrals. Of this varied spectrum of potential consumers, priority must inevitably be placed on a primary target audience (e.g. those who may be susceptible to violent extremist propaganda). Inevitably, a strategic communications campaign will want to narrowly focus on a particular target audience while recognising that the individuals who constitute that audience will likely represent a motivationally diverse range of consumers. It is for this reason that a strategic communications campaign must deploy a thematically diverse range of messaging in order to resonate across a variety of consumers - in short, different target audiences require different messages. Thus, developing the most nuanced behavioural and attitudinal picture of that target audience is crucial for effective strategic communications.

Surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews (IDIs) provide a multi-tiered means by which to develop a nuanced understanding of one's key target audiences. Behavioural and attitudinal factors regarding the legitimacy of and engagement in politically motivated violence are more pertinent criteria for understanding a spectrum of potential consumers.<sup>194</sup> Ultimately, conceptual (e.g. survey design principles), methodological (e.g. questionnaire structure) and empirical (e.g. representative sample) rigour needs to underpin these efforts. Given that the purpose of a strategic communications campaign is to persuasively shape attitudes and behaviours in target audiences, it is necessary to establish a pre-implementation baseline understanding of that target audience. This allows for the multi-tiered system of surveys, focus groups and interviews to be strategically repeated post-implementation to measure the impact of strategic communication efforts over time. This approach also facilitates a process of ongoing assessments and feedback loops to continuously calibrate across campaign and message design levels. Adaptability in CT-CVE

---

<sup>192</sup> Haroro J. Ingram, "A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners."

<sup>193</sup> J.M., Berger, "Deconstruction of identity concepts in Islamic State Propaganda."

<sup>194</sup> Haroro J. Ingram, "The Strategic Logic of the "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda."

strategic communications efforts is essential to effectively confronting an adversary that has demonstrated innovation and flexibility in the short, medium and long terms.<sup>195</sup>

#### 4.4. Metrics & Evaluation

As Section 3 highlighted, metrics and evaluations represent a significant gap in the field of practice. This is the product of several factors: a general misunderstanding of the purposes of a strategic communications campaign (see Introduction) and a lack of target audience metrics. Measuring the efficacy of strategic communications, i.e. the impact of a strategic communications effort, requires multi-tiered assessments<sup>196</sup> that focus on measures of:

*Strategic literacy:* These measures relate to the fundamentals of a strategic communications effort such as reach, relevance, resonance, messenger, medium and format, which are all crucial to the 'comprehensiveness' of a messaging effort.

*Technical literacy:* Measures related to maximising the variety, effectiveness and efficiency of mediums of communication used in a messaging effort.

*Target audience:* Identification and understanding of the spectrum of consumers of a messaging effort based on behavioural and attitudinal criteria.

Ideally, these assessments need to be initially performed prior to the commencement of a strategic communications effort in order to establish a baseline measure. Once the baseline metrics are established, these assessments need to be regularly implemented as a means to gauge the impact of the campaign over time. This is also a means to measure the strategic and technical effectiveness and efficiency of the campaign. Additionally, strategic literacy, technical literacy and target audience assessments should also be applied to key adversaries in the information theatre. This facilitates the empirical calibration of a strategic communications effort based on both self-assessment and competitor assessment criteria.

#### 4.5. Synchronisation with Action

A central aim of strategic communications is to amplify the effects of one's actions while diminishing the effects of an adversary's actions. This dual "force multiplying" and "force nullifying" intent requires messaging to synchronise with actions on the ground, whether policies, strategies, operations or events. In addition to the pragmatic benefits of using messaging in this way, reducing the perceived disparity between what one says and does, i.e. narrowing the say-do gap, is essential for boosting trust, credibility and legitimacy. This can be a difficult prospect for governments. Coordinating across complex bureaucracies can make the synchronisation of messaging across government departments difficult to manage let alone synchronising that messaging with a diverse array of actions to avoid contradictions. The bureaucratic solutions required to address these issues will be largely unique to each

---

<sup>195</sup> Audrey Alexander, "Digital Decay? Tracing change over time among English-language Islamic State sympathizers on Twitter," *Program on Extremism*, October 2017, [https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/DigitalDecayFinal\\_0.pdf](https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf).

<sup>196</sup> Haroro J. Ingram, "What happens when ISIS becomes an Online Caliphate?" *The National Interest*, July 31, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-when-isis-becomes-online-caliphate-21732>.

government and department. While these bureaucratic issues are important, the central requirement for improving the synchronisation of messaging and action is largely cultural. Archaic attitudes that “actions speak louder than words” contribute to an organisational culture, often reinforced by doctrine, that affords strategic communications an *ex post facto* role in operations, strategy and policy.

Strategic communications should be a key, if not the central, consideration in operational, strategic and policy planning from the beginning of the process. The necessary cultural shift is best facilitated by a multidimensional approach that formalises these changes doctrinally, across management levels and in staff training. Action is itself a form of communication and strategic communications has a powerful role to play as a “force multiplier” of desired operational, strategic and policy effects and a means to mitigate undesirable effects. For governments within the EU, there is a bottom-up and top-down dynamic that needs to be taken into account. From a top-down perspective, governments can play an important role in supporting private and civil society sector actors in the information theatre. There will be times when the best type of support will be to give such actors space, whereas on other occasions, it is necessary to engage in capacity-building efforts. From a bottom-up perspective, EU governments may need to take into account broader EU and transnational initiatives. These levels of bottom-up and top-down coordination are in fact opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness towards shared goals.

## REFERENCES

- Alexander, Audrey. "Digital Decay? Tracing change over time among English-language Islamic State sympathizers on Twitter." *Program on Extremism*. October, 2017. [https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/DigitalDecayFinal\\_0.pdf](https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf).
- Babuta, Alexander. "Online Radicalisation: The need for an Offline Response." *RUSI*. Last modified September 25, 2015. <https://rusi.org/commentary/online-radicalisation-need-offline-response>.
- Bell, Paul. "ISIS and Violent Extremism: Is The West's Counter-Narrative Making the Problem." *Influence*. June 25, 2015. <http://influence.cipr.co.uk/2015/06/25/isis-violent-extremism-vests-counter-narrative-making-problem-worse/>.
- Berger, J.M., and Heather Perez. "The Islamic State's Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How suspensions are limiting the social networks of English-speaking ISIS supporters." *GW Program on Extremism Occasional Paper*. February, 2016. <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/downloads/JMB%20Diminishing%20Returns.pdf>.
- Berger, J.M. "Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption." *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 5 (2016). <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf>.
- ---. "Deconstruction of identity concepts in Islamic State Propaganda: A linkage-based approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications." *Europol*. June 9, 2017. [https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/bergerjm\\_deconstructionofislamicstatetexts.pdf](https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/bergerjm_deconstructionofislamicstatetexts.pdf).
- Bloom, Mia. "Navigating ISIS's Preferred Platform: Telegram." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (2017):1-13. doi: [10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1339695).
- Borum, Randy. "Rethinking Radicalization." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 1-6. <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/1/>.
- Briggs, Rachel, and Sebastian Feve. "Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism: What works and what are the implications for government?" *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*. 2013. <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/444/review-of-programs-to-counter-narratives-of-violent-extremism-what-works-and-what-are-the-implications-for-government>.
- Breakthrough Media. "About us." <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#what-we-do>.
- ---. "Educate Against Hate." <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#our-work>.
- ---. "My Former Life." <https://breakthroughmedia.org/#our-work>.
- Cellan-Jones, Rory. "Something must be done...but what?" *BBC*. June 7, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40190440>.
- Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). "Counter-Extremism Project." 2013. <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/404/center-for-strategic-counterterrorism-communications-cscc>.
- Conway, Maura, Moign Khawaja, Suraj Lakhani, Jeremy Reffin, Ander Robertson, and David Weir. "Disrupting Daesh: Measuring takedown of online terrorist material and its

- impacts." *VOX-Pol*. 2017. [http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol\\_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf](http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf).
- Counternarratives. "Counter-narrative Toolkit." <http://www.counternarratives.org/>.
  - Dreyfuss, Emily. "Blaming the internet for terrorism misses the point." *Wired*. June 6, 2017. <https://www.wired.com/2017/06/theresa-may-internet-terrorism/>.
  - EdVenture Partners. "Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism." <https://edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-challenging-extremism/>.
  - Edwards, Charlie, and Luke Gribbon. "Pathways to Violent Extremism in the Digital Era." *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 5 (2013): 40-47. doi: [10.1080/03071847.2013.847714](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.847714).
  - European Commission. "The Radicalisation Awareness Network." November 9, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/fight-against-radicalisation/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network\\_09112016\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/fight-against-radicalisation/radicalisation_awareness_network_09112016_en.pdf).
  - ---. "Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism." June 14, 2016. [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education\\_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf).
  - ---. "EU Internet Forum: Progress on removal of terrorist content online." March 10, 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-544\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-544_en.htm).
  - ---. "EU Internet Forum: Progress on removal of terrorist content online." March 10, 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-544\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-544_en.htm).
  - ---. "Countering Online Hate Speech – Commission initiative with social media platforms and civil society shows progress." June 1, 2017. Last modified February 20, 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1471\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1471_en.htm).
  - ---. "Communications from the Commission: Eighth progress report towards an effective and genuine security union." July 18, 2017. [http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2017/07/10930\\_17.pdf](http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2017/07/10930_17.pdf).
  - EU Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, "Abdullah-X Project", Last modified, November 14, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7475\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7475_en).
  - ---. "Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online." <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/sep/eu-com-illegal-content-online-code-of-conduct.pdf>.
  - ---. "Collection of inspiring practices." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices_en).
  - ---. "Communication and Narratives Working Group (RAN C&N)." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n).
  - ---. "EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme_en).
  - ---. "EXIT working group (RAN EXIT)." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-exit\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit_en).

- ---. "No-Nazi.net", Last modified November 15, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7482\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7482_en).
- ---. "Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en).
- ---. "RAN Working Groups." Last modified November 14, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran_en).
- ---. "Terrorism: How about listening to what victims have to say?", Last modified November 14 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7481\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7481_en).
- ---. "Training dates & material." Last modified November 6, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme/training\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme/training_en).
- European Commission, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices." September, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran\\_collection\\_approaches\\_and\\_practices\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection_approaches_and_practices_en.pdf).
- European Union. "European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on illegal online hate speech." May 31, 2016. Last modified February 20, 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-16-1937\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm).
- European Union Council. "Detailed description of recent and planned CT/CVE related activities". December, 2016. <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14260-2016-ADD-1-EXT-1/en/pdf>.
- European Union Parliament, Parliamentary Questions. "Answer given by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf of the Commission." May 12, 2016. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016-000505&language=EN>.
- EUR-Lex. "Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments and of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism." December 15, 2016. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016XG1215\(01\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016XG1215(01)).
- Europol. "EU Internet Referral Unit, one year report, highlights." <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-report-highlights>.
- ---. "Europol's Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist propaganda." July 1, 2015. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda>.
- ---. "Europol joins UK appeal to report extremist and terrorist material online using red "STOP" button." April 21, 2016. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-joins-uk-appeal-to-report-extremist-and-terrorist-material-online-using-red-stop-button>.



- ---. "Members Selected for the ECTC Advisory Group on Terrorist Propaganda." September 9, 2016. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/members-selected-for-ectc-advisory-group-terrorist-propaganda>.
- ---. "Europol joins forces with counter-terrorism experts to undermine online terrorist propaganda." December 6, 2016. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-joins-forces-counter-terrorism-experts-to-undermine-online-terrorist-propaganda>.
- ---. "Europol hosts conference on online terrorist propaganda." April 12, 2017. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-hosts-conference-online-terrorist-propaganda>.
- ---. "Europol coordinates fifth joint operation to flag online terrorist content." July 11, 2017. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-coordinates-fifth-joint-operation-to-flag-online-terrorist-content>.
- Facebook. "Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism to hold first meeting in San Francisco." *Facebook Newsroom*. July 31, 2017. <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/07/global-internet-forum-to-counter-terrorism-to-hold-first-meeting-in-san-francisco/>.
- Feikje van der Berg, Else. "Jigsaw's Redirect Method: Brainwashing the Brainwashed." *Medium*. November 6, 2016. <https://medium.com/@ElsevanderBerg/jigsaws-redirect-method-brainwashing-the-brainwashed-fe281733b9c3>.
- Ferguson, Kate. "Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies: A Review of the Evidence." *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research*. March 1, 2016. <http://www.paccsresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf>.
- Ford, Richard. "Home Secretary Amber Rudd will tell web giants to fight terrorism." *The Times*. August 1, 2017. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/home-secretary-amber-rudd-will-tell-web-giants-to-fight-terrorism-dgbhd0zq0>.
- Gabriel, Mariya. "The Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT) and the role of counter-narratives in preventing radicalisation." *European Union Parliament, Parliamentary Questions*. January 25, 2016. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016-000505+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.
- GCTF. "Countering Violent Extremism Working Group." *Working Groups*. <https://www.thegctf.org/Working-Groups/Countering-Violent-Extremism>.
- ---. "Members and Partners." <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Members-and-partners>.
- Gill, Paul, Emily Corner, Maura Conway, Amy Thornton, Mia Bloom, and John Horgan, "Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers." *Criminology & Public Policy* 16, no. 1. (2017). <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12249/pdf>.
- Glazzard, Andrew. "Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-narrative and Violent Extremism." *International Centre for Counter-terrorism - The Hague* 8, no. 8 (2017). <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf>.
- Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh. "Countering Daesh's Propaganda." February 3, 2017. <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/countering-daeshs-propaganda/>.

- ---. "Sawab Centre Launches Campaign to Refute Daesh's Theological Claims." *Counter Messaging*. February 14, 2016. <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/sawab-centre-launches-campaign-to-refute-daeshs-theological-claims/>.
- ---. "How to report Daesh's Terrorist Propaganda." March 21, 2017. <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/takedaeshdown-2/>.
- Gulf News. "#DeludedFollowers campaign targets Daesh recruits." May 1, 2017. <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/media/deludedfollowers-campaign-targets-daesh-recruits-1.2019890>.
- ---. "Sawab Centre launches social media campaign." August 31, 2017. <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/sawab-centre-launches-social-media-campaign-1.2082973>.
- Greenberg, Andy. "Google's Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits." *Wired*. July 9, 2016. <https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/>
- Emily Greenhouse, Twitter's speech problem: Hashtags and hate, *The New Yorker* (25 January 2013), <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/twitters-speech-problem-hashtags-and-hate>.
- Goldman, Julianna. "Fighting ISIS online a game of digital whack-a-mole." *CBS News*. September 13, 2014. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/combatting-isis-online-campaign-a-game-of-digital-whack-a-mole/>.
- Ginnell, Daniel, Stuart Macdonald and David Mair. "The response of, and on, Twitter to the Release of Dabiq Issue 15." *Europol*. May 1, 2017. [https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds\\_maird\\_grinnelld\\_responseofandontwitterto\\_dabiq\\_15.pdf](https://orca.cf.ac.uk/101437/1/macdonalds_maird_grinnelld_responseofandontwitterto_dabiq_15.pdf).
- Hedayah Center. "Counter-Narrative Library." <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-do/91/departments/98/research-and-analysis/477/counter-narrative-library>.
- ---. "Dialogue and Communications." <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/what-we-do/91/departments/93/dialogue-and-communications>.
- ---. "About us: History." <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/about-us/177/history/>.
- ---. "Launch of the Counter Narrative Library." <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/activites/80/activities/511/2016/665/launch-of-the-counter-narrative-library>
- ---. "Launching the PCVE National Action Plans Task Force." 2016. <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-31102016141924.pdf>.
- Holly, K. Hall. "The new voice of America: Countering foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act." *First Amendment Studies* (2017): 1-14. doi: [10.1080/21689724.2017.1349618](https://doi.org/10.1080/21689724.2017.1349618).
- Hamidi, Zahid. "Malaysia's Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy." *Journal of Public Security and Safety* 6, no. 2 (2016): 1-19. <http://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdf>.
- Heinke, Daniel. "Countering Radicalization and Recruitment of so-called Jihadists – Proscription of Radicalization Hubs." *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 8, (2016): 89-97. [https://works.bepress.com/daniel\\_heinke/74/](https://works.bepress.com/daniel_heinke/74/).
- Hussain, Ghaffar, and Erin M. Saltman. "Jihad trending: A comprehensive analysis of online extremism and how to counter it." *Quilliam Foundation*. 2014.

<https://www.quilliaminternational.com/jihad-trending-a-comprehensive-analysis-of-online-extremism-and-how-to-counter-it-executive-summary/>.

- ICSR. "The power of the swarm, where next for counter-messaging?" July 12, 2016. <http://icsr.info/2016/07/icsr-insight-power-swarm-next-counter-messaging/>.
- Ingram, Haroro J., and Alastair Reed. "Lessons from History for counter terrorism strategic communications." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 4. (2016). <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf>.
- Ingram, Haroro J. "An analysis of *Inspire* & *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's propaganda war." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 51, no. 3 (2016). <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551>.
- ---. "A brief history of propaganda during conflict: Lessons for counter-terrorism strategic communications." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 6. (2016). <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-4.pdf>.
- ---. "A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners." *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 6 (2016). <http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-11/icct-ingram-a-linkage-based-approach-nov2016.pdf>.
- ---. "The Strategic Logic of the "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: Conceptual and Empirical Foundations." *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 8, no. 6 (2017). <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ICCT-Ingram-The-Strategic-Logic-of-the-Linkage-Based-Approach.pdf>.
- ---. "What happens when ISIS becomes an Online Caliphate?" *The National Interest*. July 31, 2017. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-when-isis-becomes-online-caliphate-21732>.
- Institute for Strategic Dialogue. "Counter-Narrative Toolkit." <http://www.counternarratives.org/html/home>.
- ---. "Extreme Dialogue UK Launch." <https://www.isdglobal.org/event/extreme-dialogue-uk-launch/>.
- ---. "Partnerships." <https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/partnerships/>.
- ---. "Publications." <https://www.isdglobal.org/programmes/research-insight/publications/>.
- ---. "Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet: A Working Paper of the PPN." 2011. <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/11/ppn-working-paper-radicalisation-the-role-of-the-internet/>.
- ---. "Upcoming Events." <https://www.isdglobal.org/events/>.
- ---. "Who we are." <https://www.isdglobal.org/isdapproach/>.
- The Redirect Method. "Redirect Method." <https://redirectmethod.org/>.
- ---. "The Redirect Method: A blueprint for bypassing extremism." <https://redirectmethod.org/downloads/RedirectMethod-FullMethod-PDF.pdf>.

- Khan, Taimur. "Abu Dhabi counter-terrorism centre to battle ISIL's online lies." *The National*. July 7, 2015. <https://www.thenational.ae/world/abu-dhabi-counter-terrorism-centre-to-battle-isil-s-online-lies-1.45777>.
- Katz, Rita. "The State Department's Twitter war with IS is embarrassing." *Time Magazine*. September 16, 2014. <http://time.com/3387065/IS-twitter-war-state-department/>.
- Knibbs, Kate. "The State Department's anti-ISIS account just promoted an anti-Islam Advocate." *Gizmodo*. December 14, 2015. <https://gizmodo.com/the-state-department-s-anti-isis-twitter-account-just-p-1747890969>.
- Lakomy, Miron. "Cracks in the Online "Caliphate": How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11, no. 3 (2017): 40-53. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/607>.
- Makuch, Ben. "Banning Islamic State Jihadists From Twitter Is Like Playing Whack-a-Mole." *Motherboard*. August 21, 2014. <http://motherboard.vice.com/read/isis-twitter-whack-a-mole>.
- Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander and Nick Kaderbhai. "Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016." *VOX-Pol*, (2017). <http://icsr.info/2017/05/icsr-vox-pol-paper-research-perspectives-online-radicalisation-literature-review-2006-2016/>.
- Metropolitan Police. "250,000 piece of online extremist/terrorist material to be removed." December 23, 2016. <http://news.met.police.uk/news/250000th-piece-of-online-extremist-slash-terrorist-material-to-be-removed-208698>.
- Microsoft. "Microsoft partners with Institute for Strategic Dialogue and NGOs to discourage online radicalization to violence." April 18, 2017. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/>.
- ---. "Microsoft, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube announce formation of Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism." June 26, 2017. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/>.
- Moonshot CVE. "About us." <http://moonshotcve.com/>.
- NATO. "Collective Defence - Article Five." March 22, 2017. [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_110496.htm).
- NATO, COE-DAT. "2017 Activity Plan." 2017. [http://www.coedat.nato.int/2017\\_Activity\\_Plan.pdf](http://www.coedat.nato.int/2017_Activity_Plan.pdf).
- NATO, StratCom COE. "Online Library." [https://www.stratcomcoe.org/online\\_library/](https://www.stratcomcoe.org/online_library/).
- ---. "Program of Work." <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/program-work/>.
- ---. "About Strategic Communications." <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-communications>.
- Neumann, Peter R. "Options and strategies for countering online radicalization in the United States." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 6 (2013): 431-459. doi: [10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568).
- O'Hara, Kieron. "The Limits of Redirection." *Slate*. September 27, 2016. [http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\\_tense/2016/09/the\\_problem\\_with\\_google\\_jigsaw\\_s\\_anti\\_extremism\\_plan\\_redirect.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/09/the_problem_with_google_jigsaw_s_anti_extremism_plan_redirect.html).

- OSCE. "Who we are." <http://www.osce.org/who-we-are>.
- ---. "Countering terrorism." <http://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism>.
- ---. "Countering terrorism, Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism." <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/107807>.
- ---. "OSCE United in Countering Violent Exremism #UnitedCVE Campaign." <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/204751?download=true>.
- ---. "OSCE #UnitedCVE and Peer-2-Peer final: students challenging extremism." <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/285826>.
- ---. "OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism." December 7, 2012. <http://www.osce.org/pc/98008?download=true>.
- ---. "Developing counter narratives to combat online violent extremism content, in focus of OSCE-supported course in Bosnia and Herzegovina." February 5, 2016. <http://www.osce.org/bih/221261>.
- ---. "Recommendations from the 2017 OSCE-wide Countering-Terrorism Conference on 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terror, 23-24<sup>th</sup> May 2017.'" <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/315886?download=true>.
- Quilliam Foundation. "About." <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/about/>.
- ---. "Consultancy." <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/quilliam-global/consultancy/>.
- ---. "Steer." <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/steer/>.
- Radicalisation Awareness Network. "Counter narratives and alternative narratives." *RAN Issue Paper*. 2015. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/issue\\_paper\\_cn\\_oct2015\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_cn_oct2015_en.pdf).
- ---. "Dos and don'ts of involving formers in PVE/CVE work." *Ex Ante Paper*. June 26-27, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/dos\\_and\\_donts\\_involving\\_formers\\_in\\_pve\\_cve\\_work\\_bordeaux\\_27\\_06\\_2017\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/dos_and_donts_involving_formers_in_pve_cve_work_bordeaux_27_06_2017_en.pdf).
- ---. "Lessons learned from adjacent fields: cults." *Ex Post Paper*. June 27-28, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/lessons\\_from\\_adjacent\\_fields\\_cults\\_bordeaux\\_27-28\\_06\\_2017\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/lessons_from_adjacent_fields_cults_bordeaux_27-28_06_2017_en.pdf).
- ---, "Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Delivering counter- or alternative narratives" (2017), [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/delivering\\_alternative\\_narratives\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/delivering_alternative_narratives_en.pdf).
- Reed, Alastair. "Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications: Back to the Future: Lessons from Past and Present." In *Terrorists' Use of the Internet*, edited by Maura Conway, Lee Jarvis, Orla Lehane, Stuart Macdonald, and Lella Nouri, 269-278. 2017. IOS Press Ebooks. <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/FINAL-Reed-CTSC-Back-to-the-Future.pdf>.
- ---. "IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?" *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*. March, 17 2017. <https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/>.

- Reed, Alastair and Haroro J. Ingram. "Exploring the Role of Instructional Material in AQAP's *Inspire* and ISIS' *Rumiyah*." *Europol*. 2017. [https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/reeda\\_ingramh\\_instructionalmaterial.pdf](https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/reeda_ingramh_instructionalmaterial.pdf).
- Robbins-Early, Nick. "How Telegram became the App of choice of ISIS." *Huffington Post*. May 24, 2017. [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis-telegram-app\\_us\\_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis-telegram-app_us_59259254e4b0ec129d3136d5).
- Rowland, Lee. "Turning Tech Companies Into Spies Won't." *TIME*. December 11, 2017. <http://time.com/4144762/social-media-terrorism/>.
- Sawab Center. "United Against Extremism." <http://80.227.220.174/>.
- Sink, Justin. "Obama wants Silicon Valley's help to fight terror online." *Bloomberg Politics*. December 7, 2015. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-07/obama-wants-silicon-valley-s-help-as-terrorists-embrace-social>.
- Shamieh, Luna and Zoltán Szenes. "The Propaganda of ISIS/Daesh through the Virtual Space." *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 7, no. 1 (2015): 7-31.
- Souidi, Yassine, Julia Ebner, and Saeida Rouass. "FATE: Engaging Family to Counter Violent Extremism in North Africa." *Quilliam Foundation*. 2016.
- Tech Against Terrorism. <https://techagainstterrorism.org/>.
- ---. "Events." <https://techagainstterrorism.org/events/>.
- ---. "Why Join?" <https://techagainstterrorism.org/why-join/>.
- Tibi, Bassam. "Countering Ideological Terrorism." *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 1, no. 1 (2008): 101-136.
- The American Presidency Project, President Obama. *Executive Order 13721 – Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584*. March 14, 2016. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=115119>.
- Today Online. "KL counter-terrorism centre to be expanded with China's help." January 13, 2017. <http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kl-counter-terrorism-centre-be-expanded-chinas-help>.
- UK Government. "UK Action to Combat Daesh." <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about>.
- UK Parliament. *Appendix: Letter from the Foreign Secretary and Government Response*. June 8, 2016. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaaff/209/20904.htm>.
- Tuck, Henry and Tanya Silverman. "The Counter-Narrative Handbook, 2016." *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*. 2016. [http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook\\_1.pdf](http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf).
- Tucker, Patrick. "Analysts are quitting the State Department's Anti-Propaganda Team." *Defense One*. September 12, 2017. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/09/analysts-are-quitting-state-departments-anti-propaganda-team/140936/>.
- Twitter. "Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism." June 26, 2017. [https://blog.twitter.com/official/en\\_us/topics/company/2017/Global-Internet-Forum-to-Counter-Terrorism.html](https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/Global-Internet-Forum-to-Counter-Terrorism.html).

- UK Against Daesh (@UKagainstdaesh). *Twitter*. <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/media>.
- ---. "Under #Daesh arts schools were banned, whilst bomb-making factories flourished." *Twitter*. October 7, 2017. <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916604766435803136>.
- ---. "UPDATE: approx.. 80% of Raqqa is now cleared of #Daesh @CJTFOIR." *Twitter*. October 8, 2017. <https://twitter.com/UKagainstDaesh/status/916965141350141953>.
- United Nations. *S/Res/2178*. 2014. [http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178\\_2014\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf).
- ---. "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism." 2015. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674).
- ---. *S/2017/375*. April 28, 2017. <http://www.fedsfm.ru/content/english/legal%20basis/2354%20engl.pdf>.
- ---. "UN, CTED facilitates Tunis workshop on countering terrorism and violent extremism." *United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee*. July 27, 2017. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/2017/07/27/cted-facilitates-tunis-workshop-on-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism/>.
- ---. "UN, CTED and UN Women partner in countering violent extremism in South and South-East Asia." *United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee*. September 30, 2017. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/2017/09/30/cted-and-un-women-partner-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-south-and-south-east-asia/>.
- ---. "UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Plan of Action." *United Nations Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force*. 2006. <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy#plan>.
- US Department of State. "The Global Coalition to Defeat IS." <https://www.state.gov/s/seci/>.
- ---. "Global Engagement Center." <https://www.state.gov/r/gec/>.
- ---. "Programs and Initiatives." <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/>.
- Von Behr, Ines, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon. "Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism." *RAND*. 2013. [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND\\_RR453.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf).
- Richard Waters, "Yahoo loses Nazi memorabilia case", *Financial Times* (13 January 2006), <https://www.ft.com/content/81127f12-83cb-11da-9017-0000779e2340>.
- Watkin, Amy-Louise and Joe Whittaker. "Evolution of terrorists' use of the Internet." *Counterterror Business*. October 20, 2017. <http://www.counterterrorbusiness.com/features/evolution-terrorists%E2%80%99-use-internet>.
- Watt, Nicholas and Patrick Wintour. "Facebook and Twitter have 'social responsibility' to help fight against terrorism, says David Cameron." *The Guardian*. January 16, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/cameron-interrupt-terrorists-cybersecurity-cyberattack-threat>.
- Whittaker, Joe. "The Sound of an Echo." *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague*. June 23, 2017. <https://icct.nl/publication/the-sound-of-an-echo/>.

- Winter, Charlie. "The Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State's propaganda strategy." *Quilliam Foundation*. 2015. <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/shop/e-publications/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy/>.
- YouTube. "Bringing new Redirect Method features to YouTube." *YouTube Official Blog*. July 20, 2017. <https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/07/bringing-new-redirect-method-features.html>.
- YouTube. "Creators for Change." *YouTube Creators*. <https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators-for-change/>.





This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, provides an overview of current approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The first and second sections outline the different responses developed at the global and European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four different approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption of propaganda distribution, redirect method, campaign and message design, and government communications and synchronisation of message and action. The final section offers a number of policy recommendations, highlighting five interrelated 'lines of effort' essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communication.

#### **DISCLAIMER**

This document is addressed to the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and should not be taken to represent an official position of the European Parliament.